Re: [TLS] Security review of TLS1.3 0-RTT

2017-05-20 Thread Ilari Liusvaara
On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 09:59:57AM -0700, Colm MacCárthaigh wrote: > > Some protection is necessary; but it isn't too hard - a single-use session > cache, or a strike register, do protect against the side-channel and DOS > problems. Combined with a "fail closed" strategy and tickets that are > sc

Re: [TLS] Security review of TLS1.3 0-RTT

2017-05-20 Thread Ilari Liusvaara
On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 01:10:29PM -0700, Colm MacCárthaigh wrote: > On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 11:40 AM, Ilari Liusvaara > wrote: > > > > * In order to fully reason about when that message may later get > > received, > > > there needs to be an agreed upon time-cap for 0-RTT receipt. Agreed by > > a

Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13

2017-05-20 Thread Ilari Liusvaara
On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 09:43:19PM -0400, Dave Garrett wrote: > On Friday, May 19, 2017 04:51:21 pm Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > > Which brings us to some more undesirable layer violation in the current > > draft. The language in question is appropriate for updates to RFC5280, > > but does not belong