Reviewer: Dale Worley
Review result: Ready with Nits
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.
For more
On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
wrote:
> On Thu, 2018-03-01 at 10:49 -0500, David A. Cooper wrote:
> >
> > I believe you are misinterpreting the text, but agree that it could
> > be
> > made more clear.
> >
> > Suppose that the ClientHello includes a supported_versions
>
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.
Title : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version
1.3
Author : Eric Rescorla
Filename
With no dis-respect to Russ or Ralph (but with zero
acceptance/respect for the main concept espoused by this
draft)...
I request that the WG chairs not waste yet more time on
agenda items dealing with proposals for breaking TLS - a
working group that spends so many f2f hours (yes, hours,
multipli
A few minutes at the TLS WG session in London have been requested to talk about
this draft.
Russ
> From: internet-dra...@ietf.org
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01.txt
> Date: March 2, 2018 at 3:58:35 PM EST
> To: "Ralph Droms" , "Russ Housley"
>
>
>
Dear all
We have uploaded a personal draft on using identity as raw public key for
TLS/DTLS to TLS group website just now.
A pdf version is also attached in this email.
Your comments are appreciated.
Dr Yanjiang Yang, who is author of the draft, will attend the coming IETF 101
meeting. You
Hi,
> On 2 Mar 2018, at 08:32, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
>
>> On Thu, 2018-03-01 at 21:52 +, Paterson, Kenny wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> I've been analysing the record protocol spec for TLS 1.3 a bit,
>> specifically the new padding mechanism. I think there's a possible
>> timing attack on a n
On Thu, 2018-03-01 at 21:52 +, Paterson, Kenny wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I've been analysing the record protocol spec for TLS 1.3 a bit,
> specifically the new padding mechanism. I think there's a possible
> timing attack on a naïve implementation of de-padding. Maybe this is
> already known to people
On Thu, 2018-03-01 at 10:49 -0500, David A. Cooper wrote:
>
> I believe you are misinterpreting the text, but agree that it could
> be
> made more clear.
>
> Suppose that the ClientHello includes a supported_versions
> extensions
> that contains two values, TLS 1.4 and TLS 1.0, and the server
>