A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.
Title : Delegated Credentials for TLS
Authors : Richard Barnes
Subodh Iyengar
Hello TLSWG,
We made a -08 version of this draft before the WGLC that incorporated some
of the comments on-list for -07, but didn't notice until now that the
submission didn't go through and therefore wasn't available for this RGLC.
I apologize for this oversight. This submission just went through
Nick:
There is something wrong with the formatting of the numbered list in Section
4.1.3.
Russ
> On Jun 3, 2020, at 4:20 PM, Nick Sullivan
> wrote:
>
> Hello TLSWG,
>
> We made a -08 version of this draft before the WGLC that incorporated some of
> the comments on-list for -07, but didn't
Thanks Russ, I filed an issue to address it.
On Wed, Jun 3, 2020 at 1:27 PM Russ Housley wrote:
> Nick:
>
> There is something wrong with the formatting of the numbered list in
> Section 4.1.3.
>
> Russ
>
> On Jun 3, 2020, at 4:20 PM, Nick Sullivan <
> nick=40cloudflare@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote
The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8446,
"The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3".
--
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6204
--
Type: Editorial
Re
I think that this is a useful erratum and it should be approved/HFDU. The
extension to which this text alludes is RFC 8773, not post_handshake_auth.
There is one other piece to this that is very confusing, and less clear.
"Servers which are authenticating with a PSK MUST NOT send the
Certific
On Wed, Jun 3, 2020 at 6:07 PM Martin Thomson wrote:
> I think that this is a useful erratum and it should be approved/HFDU. The
> extension to which this text alludes is RFC 8773, not post_handshake_auth.
>
Yes, although 8773 actually is not super-clear about post-handshake, so
that's actually
On Thu, Jun 4, 2020, at 11:44, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> I think it would help to be more explicit here:
> Servers which are authenticating with a resumption PSK MUST NOT send
> the CertificateRequest message in the main handshake, [...],
> Servers which are authenticating with an external PSK MUST N
On Wed, Jun 3, 2020, at 6:47 PM, Martin Thomson wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 4, 2020, at 11:44, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > I think it would help to be more explicit here:
> > Servers which are authenticating with a resumption PSK MUST NOT send
> > the CertificateRequest message in the main handshake, [..
The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8446,
"The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3".
--
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6205
--
Type: Editorial
Re
All,
Changes introduced in -38 were well discussed on the list. The AEAD limits are
the notable exception however those changes are to address findings discovered
by security researchers. The chairs believe that -38 is ready for AD review.
spt
(for the chairs)
> On Mar 20, 2020, at 10:17, Sean
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