A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.
Title : Compact TLS 1.3
Authors : Eric Rescorla
Richard Barnes
Given that RFC 5246 is obsolete, all of this is largely moot.
I think that we can reject this erratum.
On Thu, May 6, 2021, at 09:06, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> I agree that this isn't an appropriate change for an erratum.
>
> Even with a new RFC updating RFC 5246, we'd still need to have some
> di
I agree that this isn't an appropriate change for an erratum.
Even with a new RFC updating RFC 5246, we'd still need to have some
discussion about a transition plan, at which point just relying
on the guidance in BCP 195 becomes more and more attractive.
-Ben
On Wed, May 05, 2021 at 04:00:00PM -
I'm not sure precisely what attacks you are referring to here. In
particular, I'm not aware of any known security issues with HMAC-SHA1. With
that said, I agree that we wouldn't choose AES_128_CBC_SHA as a default
now, but this isn't usually the kind of thing we would usually use an
erratum for. Ra
Hi Martin,
I've not read the draft (yet!), but can you comment on the delta between your
proposal and the one from Christian and Kazuho? Here's a link to their work
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kazuho-quic-authenticated-handshake/
Thanks,
Chris
On Wed, May 5, 2021, at 8:42 AM, M
On 03/05/2021, 16:46, "Sean Turner" wrote:
> Hi!
>
> We would like to re-run the WG adoption call for "Return Routability
> Check for DTLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.3”. Please state whether you support
> adoption of this draft as a WG item by posting a message to the TLS
> list by 2359 UTC 24 May 2021. Plea
Hello TLS,
I just published an individual draft in QUIC that tries to take the ECHO
mechanism and use it to protect the entire Initial packet exchange in QUIC,
instead of just selected fields in the client hello. It is reliant on QUIC
version negotiation to recover from config mismatches:
https:/
ACME had SNI-based challenges, which evolved into ALPN and became RFC 8737
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC5246,
"The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2".
--
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6572
--
Type: Technical
Re
Hi Martin,
Nothing here depends on using a CID, except perhaps to the extent that the endpoint that
observes the "migration" needs to be able to match incoming records with
connection state. If they need a CID for that, then this needs a CID.
If the threat is only weakly related to the use
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