Thus spake Robert Ransom (rransom.8...@gmail.com):
> On Thu, 23 Jun 2011 11:19:45 -0700
> Mike Perry wrote:
>
> > So perhaps Torbutton controlled per-tab proxy username+password is the
> > best option? Oh man am I dreading doing that... (The demons laugh
> > again.)
>
> If you do this, you will
On Thu, 23 Jun 2011 11:19:45 -0700
Mike Perry wrote:
> So perhaps Torbutton controlled per-tab proxy username+password is the
> best option? Oh man am I dreading doing that... (The demons laugh
> again.)
If you do this, you will need to give the user some indication of each
tab's ‘compartment’,
Thus spake Robert Ransom (rransom.8...@gmail.com):
> On Thu, 23 Jun 2011 10:10:35 -0700
> Mike Perry wrote:
>
> > Thus spake Georg Koppen (g.kop...@jondos.de):
> >
> > > > If you maintain two long sessions within the same Tor Browser Bundle
> > > > instance, you're screwed -- not because the ex
Thus spake Mike Perry (mikepe...@fscked.org):
> Thus spake Robert Ransom (rransom.8...@gmail.com):
>
> > On Thu, 23 Jun 2011 10:10:35 -0700
> > Mike Perry wrote:
> >
> > > Thus spake Georg Koppen (g.kop...@jondos.de):
> > >
> > > > > If you maintain two long sessions within the same Tor Browse
On Thu, 23 Jun 2011 10:10:35 -0700
Mike Perry wrote:
> Thus spake Georg Koppen (g.kop...@jondos.de):
>
> > > If you maintain two long sessions within the same Tor Browser Bundle
> > > instance, you're screwed -- not because the exit nodes might be
> > > watching you, but because the web sites' l
Thus spake Georg Koppen (g.kop...@jondos.de):
> > If you maintain two long sessions within the same Tor Browser Bundle
> > instance, you're screwed -- not because the exit nodes might be
> > watching you, but because the web sites' logs can be correlated, and
> > the *sequence* of exit nodes that
Thus spake Georg Koppen (g.kop...@jondos.de):
> >> And why having again add-ons that can probably be toggled on/off and
> >> are thus more error-prone than just having an, say, Tor anon mode?
> >> Or is this already included in the Tor anon mode but only separated
> >> in the blog post for explana
> Additionally, we expect that fingerprinting resistance will be an
> ongoing battle: as new browser features are added, new fingerprinting
> defenses will be needed. Furthermore, we'll likely be inclined to
> deploy unproven but better-than-nothing fingerprinting defenses (so
> long as they don't
> If you maintain two long sessions within the same Tor Browser Bundle
> instance, you're screwed -- not because the exit nodes might be
> watching you, but because the web sites' logs can be correlated, and
> the *sequence* of exit nodes that your Tor client chose is very likely
> to be unique.
A
