Yeah I guess if the PT doesn't draw attention and the bridge IP is not known
then one's Tor traffic may be somewhat obscured.
What about bananaphone? Do you mean the bananaphone PT?
It is trivially detectable... more so than say... a transport like obfs3
who's output looks like pseudo random noise
On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 7:08 AM, Karsten Loesing wrote:
[...]
> I talked to Roger on IRC, and here's why this proposal may indeed be
> overkill:
>
> As of January 2013, there is only a single version 3 directory authority
> left that serves version 2 statuses: dizum. moria1 and tor26 have been
>
On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 9:15 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 01:08:03PM +0100, Karsten Loesing wrote:
>> I talked to Roger on IRC, and here's why this proposal may indeed be
>> overkill:
>>
>> As of January 2013, there is only a single version 3 directory authority
>> left th
Ximin Luo wrote:
In my understanding, the anonymity set doesn't apply to use of PTs
since this is only at the entry side. The exit side does not know[1]
what PT the originator is using, so is unable to use that information
to de-anonymise.
[1] at least, in theory should not know, perhaps some
On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 1:56 PM, Karsten Loesing wrote:
[...]
> (Let me know if you prefer this review to happen in a ticket rather than
> here.)
>
Thanks, Karsten! I think it should ideally be a ticket?
--
Nick
___
tor-dev mailing list
tor-dev@list
On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 7:16 PM, Jim Rucker wrote:
> [snip]
>
> From my understanding (please correct me if I'm wrong) Tor has a weakness in
> that if someone can monitor data going into the relays and going out of the
> exit nodes then they can defeat the anonymity of tor by correlating the size
> I imagine the anonymity set would be much smaller for these combined
> transports... fewer people using them.
In my understanding, the anonymity set doesn't apply to use of PTs since this
is only at the entry side. The exit side does not know[1] what PT the
originator is using, so is unable to
In that case would it then look like zero in $(organizational unit of
harvard) using tor and
one in $(organizational unit of harvard) using scramble suit?
I like the idea of the tor pluggable transport combiner... wherein we
could wrap a pseudo-random appearing obfuscation protocol (such as
obfs3,
I don't think that a solution which uses DKG is overkill, I think it
would be more secure.
The more all-or-nothing security provided by DKG based schemes seems
preferable to the sliding-scale-of-influence provided by coin flipping
ones.
Then again I don't know that much about coin flipping protocol
Sounds like a challenging problem, good luck.
In the case of the Harvard exam, the administration may have used some meta
data that may not be under your control, listing out all student taking an
exam that day, asking teachers for a shortlist of their class jerks and clowns,
checking for rep
On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 09:16:20PM -0600, Jim Rucker wrote:
> Are there any projects in Tor being worked in to combat data correlation?
> For instance, relays the send/recv constant data rates continuously -
> capping data rates and padding partial or non-packets with random data to
> maintain the
Hi devs,
you probably know that we use MaxMind's GeoIP database in various of our
products (list may not be exhaustive):
- tor: We ship little-t-tor with a geoip and a geoip6 file for clients
to support excluding relays by country code and for relays to generate
by-country statistics.
- BridgeD
Hello Norbert and Karsten,
I have added a couple of attachments to the projects wiki-page. The
first one, is a UML diagram of the data-models being used in the
current weather. It should gives us a good idea about the current
implementation.
The second attachment is the Design Document from the c
On Wed, 15 Jan 2014 21:16:20 +, Jim Rucker wrote:
> There was a story in the news recently of a Harvard student who used Tor to
> send a bomb threat to Harvard in order to cancel classes so he wouldn't
> have to take a test. He was apprehended within a day, which puts into
> question the anonym
14 matches
Mail list logo
