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> And what would you like to do over the summer so that: a) Something
> useful and concrete comes out of only 3 months of work. b) Your
> work will also be useful after the summer ends.
>
> I would be interested to see some areas that you would like t
Greetings humans,
this is an email to remind you that the regular biweekly pluggable
transports meeting is going to happen tomorrow. Place is the #tor-dev
IRC channel in OFTC. Time is 17:00 UTC.
Cheers!
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Hi,
I am currently working on a personal project implementing an onion-router,
vaguely similar to Tor (let's just call it Oor, other onion router, for the
moment), and I have a few questions about attacks, which I think are not
really protected by Tor, and whether my solution could possibly work.
tl;dr: analysis seems to indicate that switching to one guard node
might not be catastrophic to the performance of Tor. To improve
performance some increased guard bandwidth thresholds are proposed
that seem to help without completely destroying the anonymity of the
network. Enjoy the therapeutic q
I sent this to the Twisted mailing list at twisted-pyt...@twistedmatrix.com
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
GPG: 4096R/A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2014 18:36:36 +
From: isis
Hi Yuhao!
Some of the things Tor does (e.g. public list of nodes) is because
it's relatively easy to attack if you try and not do it that way. For
example:
On 13 March 2014 15:08, Yuhao Dong wrote:
> - No public list of all node addresses; this makes determining
> whether certain tr
