06.01.2015, 18:51 Andrea Shepard:
All relying parties SHOULD by default retain all valid consensuses they
download plus two; [...]
Unfortunately I did not consider this in my previous mail, but this does
not account for the possibility that the valid-until ever increases.
Depending on
Date: Tue, 6 Jan 2015 20:13:51 +0100
From: Mohiuddin Ebna Kawsar mohiuddin.kaw...@gmail.com
To: tor-dev@lists.torproject.org, matthias.wuebbel...@cs.uni-bonn.de
Subject: [tor-dev] how to simulate TOR network through chutney?
HI,
I need to simulate TOR network in minimal case [1 ENTRY,1
Hi George,
Thanks for the really thoughtful comments.
Two HS statistics that we (i.e. people working on Sponsor R) are interested
in collecting are:
1. The number of descriptor fetches received by a hidden-service directory
(HSDir)
2. The number of client introduction requests at an
A. Johnson aaron.m.john...@nrl.navy.mil writes:
Hello tor-dev,
Hello,
and thanks for posting this to the list.
While helping design ways to publish statistics about hidden services in a
privacy-preserving
manner, it has become clear to me that certain statistics cannot be safely
On Thu, 8 Jan 2015 03:25:52 -0800
Mike Perry mikepe...@torproject.org wrote:
I am unfortunately not optimistic about simple low-overhead padding
being successful here. At the very least, this problem will require
something more like a congestion-sensitive always pad if there is
spare capacity
