Hello,
I just pushed a fairly large update to or-ctl-filter, that lets you do
lots of interesting things, most of them probably unsafe. In
particular or-ctl-filter now ships with a SOCKS5 client/server
implementation and a stub control port implementation.
A picture is worth a thousand words:
This is my favorite paper on quantifying anonymity:
http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Anonymous/bagai.pdf
-V
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Hi there,
I am currently writing my Master's thesis about Mix networks Tor (was
on list previously). I am currently at a point, where I'd like to
practially quantify anonymity. That is, given a pcap, I want to anaylze
how successful an adversary can determine whether a specific client
talked to
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On 06/03/2015 04:07 PM, Yawning Angel wrote:
Hello,
I just pushed a fairly large update to or-ctl-filter, that lets you
do lots of interesting things, most of them probably unsafe. In
particular or-ctl-filter now ships with a SOCKS5
Hello Florian,
I just saw your mail on tor-dev. The assumption a number of us have
been using in our work, is that if the adversary observes a circuit at
two different locations, then it can link it. This is a bit like
assigning a unique ID to each circuit, and assuming that seeing the
link /
