Hi nusenu,
>Do you consider in-family diversity so important - even though all of
>them are run by a single entity anyway?
> How about having a badge for tor network wide diversity?
> I'd consider the tor network's overall diversity far more important than
> in-family diversity because clients wo
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On 08/09/15 18:16, Damian Johnson wrote:
>>> Hi Karsten. Quick question: with the switchover are relay
>>> fingerprints going away? That is to say, server descriptors no
>>> longer have a...
>>>
>>> fingerprint D203 4DDF 1275 A234 4F66 9935 A3EF B908
> It's true, dropping the fingerprint is quite invasive and might break
> things. But that's why we're making plans now to make this transition
> as smooth as possible.
>
> However, I don't think that we can get away by just replacing the
> existing 20 byte long RSA key digest with a 20 byte long
> On 13 Sep 2015, at 18:18, Sean Saito wrote:
>
> >"No Self-Referencing Relays"
>
> >I'm not sure what exactly you mean by that but I assume it is a MyFamily
>
> >config where a relay includes his own fingerprint. Why does that hurt?
>
> >The unnecessary descriptor space/bw?
>
>
>
> This
> On 13 Sep 2015, at 22:09, teor wrote:
>
>
>> On 13 Sep 2015, at 18:18, Sean Saito wrote:
>>
>> >"No Self-Referencing Relays"
>>
>> >I'm not sure what exactly you mean by that but I assume it is a MyFamily
>>
>> >config where a relay includes his own fingerprint. Why does that hurt?
>>
>>
I spent some time trying to clean up proposal 247 based on everyone's
comments, as well as based on my own thoughts. Please have a look if you
commented on the original proposal, and complain if I've not taken your
thoughts into account.
(Aaron: In particular, I made several tradeoffs in favor of
> On 12 Sep 2015, at 17:26, isis wrote:
>
> ...
>
> However, for "double onion services" — or whatever we're calling the thing
> that
> is (historical) hidden services 2.0 — your point is a good one; I'm starting
> to
> realise more and more that defences for "double onion services"¹ are poss
> On 14 Sep 2015, at 09:07, Mike Perry wrote:
>
> ...
>
>
> 4. Security concerns and mitigations
>
> 4.1. Mitigating fingerprinting of new HS circuits
>
> By pinning the middle nodes of rendezvous circuits, we make it
> easier for all hops of the circuit to detect that they are part of a
>
Tim Wilson-Brown - teor:
> Hi Mike,
>
> Just a few questions about the proposal, inline below:
>
> > On 12 Sep 2015, at 10:34, Mike Perry wrote:
> >
> > Here's a proposal describing some padding negotiation cell primitives that
> > should be useful to defend against website traffic fingerprinti
We'll remove it.
-V
On Mon, 14 Sep 2015 at 05:20 Tom van der Woerdt wrote:
>
> On 13 Sep 2015, at 22:09, teor wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Sep 2015, at 18:18, Sean Saito wrote:
>
> >"No Self-Referencing Relays"
>
> >I'm not sure what exactly you mean by that but I assume it is a MyFamily
>
> >config wh
Tim Wilson-Brown - teor:
>
> > On 14 Sep 2015, at 09:07, Mike Perry
> > wrote:
> >
> > ...
> >
> >
> > 4. Security concerns and mitigations
> >
> > 4.1. Mitigating fingerprinting of new HS circuits
> >
> > By pinning the middle nodes of rendezvous circuits, we make it
> > easier for all ho
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