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Hello Onionoo users,
the upcoming Onionoo [0] version 3.1 will contain two minor changes
that are worth announcing in advance:
- Details documents will not contain a "family" field anymore but
instead two fields "alleged_family" and "effective_famil
Hi list,
Thanks for all your valuable comments.
We have updated the feature request following your comments.
Please see the attachment for the updated feature request, and see
https://github.com/zhenfeizhang/ntru-tor/commit/0354fe1d61b2b79615301ff387e8c03230235f12
for the modification over last ve
Hi,
transparent proxying to TOR Hidden Services is a great feature of the
TOR daemon when it comes to other applications/protocols than HTTP and
surfing. It would also be great with privacy appliances (e.g. Mailpile
using TOR as secure SMTP transport channel).
John Does have problems with su
On Mon, 11 Jan 2016 16:43:10 +
Rene Bartsch wrote:
> Hi,
>
> transparent proxying to TOR Hidden Services is a great feature of the
> TOR daemon when it comes to other applications/protocols than HTTP
> and surfing. It would also be great with privacy appliances (e.g.
> Mailpile using TOR as
On 01/11/2016 12:47 PM, David Fifield wrote:
> December 2015 $561.29 + $603.27 + $172.60 = $1337.16
> ...
> The number of users increased by about 1,000 in December 2015.
Thanks for the report, David.
There are now ~1800 users on meek-google sharing 8 Mbits. Of course,
it's also possible that
On 01/11/2016 12:47 PM, David Fifield wrote:
> December 2015 $561.29 + $603.27 + $172.60 = $1337.16
> ...
> The number of users increased by about 1,000 in December 2015.
Thanks for the report, David.
There are now ~1800 users on meek-google sharing 8 Mbits. Of course,
it's also possible that
On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 01:19:22PM -0900, Jesse V wrote:
> On 01/11/2016 12:47 PM, David Fifield wrote:
> > December 2015 $561.29 + $603.27 + $172.60 = $1337.16
> > ...
> > The number of users increased by about 1,000 in December 2015.
>
> Thanks for the report, David.
>
> There are now ~1800
On 01/11/2016 02:42 PM, David Fifield wrote:
> We still have support from
> Google, so that $561.29 actually costs about $61.29.
Oh, I was not aware of this. When does the support expire, and how much
would it cost (in terms of Tor's budget) to double the bandwidth to 16
Mbits, for instance? I'm j
On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 02:51:12PM -0900, Jesse V wrote:
> On 01/11/2016 02:42 PM, David Fifield wrote:
> > We still have support from
> > Google, so that $561.29 actually costs about $61.29.
>
> Oh, I was not aware of this. When does the support expire, and how much
> would it cost (in terms of T
I wanted to know how many exits exit from an address that is different
from their OR address. The answer is about 10.7%, 109/1018 exits. The
interesting part is that of those 109 mismatches, 87 have an exit
address that differs from the OR address in all four octets; i.e., the
IP addresses used by
Hi Karsten, implemented Stem counterparts of these (see attached). On
one hand the code is delightfully simple, but on the other
measurements I got were quite a bit slower. Curious to see what you
get when running at the same place you took your measurements.
Cheers! -Damian
On Thu, Jan 7, 2016
On 01/11/2016 06:43 PM, David Fifield wrote:
> Also, there are several groups of exits whose OR addresses *are* in a
> related subnet, but which all exit through the same, unrelated, IP
> address. See for example 109.236.82.* (all exiting through
> 185.108.128.7), 178.17.171.* (all exiting through
Hi,
I ran into the technical report from George Danezis about an
anomaly-based censorship-detection system for Tor. I have a few
questions that I hope you can help me with.
Is there an implementation available of the approach described in the paper?
The paper talks about finding anomalies in the
On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 07:21:39AM +, John wrote:
> I ran into the technical report from George Danezis about an
> anomaly-based censorship-detection system for Tor. I have a few
> questions that I hope you can help me with.
>
> Is there an implementation available of the approach described in
On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 12:44 AM, Jesse V wrote:
> This is quite interesting, thanks for the report. I'm not sure why it
> would be advantageous to set up a server or network this way, but I
> guess they have their reasons.
1) They may or may not be aware of their routing, or the routing
applied
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