Re: [tor-dev] GSoC 2017 - Project "Crash Reporter for Tor Browser"

It would be cool to build the browser with https://github.com/google/sanitizers this way you could get bug reports for bugs that don't panic the browser Il lun 3 apr 2017, 07:10 Tom Ritter ha scritto: > On 1 April 2017 at 09:22, Nur-Magomed wrote: > > Hi Tom,

Re: [tor-dev] GSoC 2017 - Project "Crash Reporter for Tor Browser"

On 1 April 2017 at 09:22, Nur-Magomed wrote: > Hi Tom, > I've updated Proposal[1] according to your recommendations. > > 1) https://storm.torproject.org/grain/ECCJ3Taeq93qCvPJoWJkkY/ Looks good to me! > 2017-03-31 19:46 GMT+03:00 Tom Ritter : >> >> On 31 March

Re: [tor-dev] GSoC: Support all kinds of DNS queries

On 2017-04-02 05:22, Jeremy Rand wrote: > (Thinking out loud.) It would be interesting to have some kind of > algorithm agility here. For example, a Tor client could send a > request for a Namecoin domain name, and the exit relay would return a > Namecoin merkle proof in the same way that it

[tor-dev] Mailing List Etiquette Reminder

New members are very welcome and valued whether through gradual accretion or project influx such as GSOC's. In order to ensure messaging efficiency and clarity... - Reply *below* what others have written. Do not "top post". - Trim out and *delete* irrelavant portions of what others have written,

Re: [tor-dev] GSoC 2017 - unMessage: a privacy enhanced instant messenger

On Sun, Apr 02, 2017 at 04:51:40PM +, dawuud wrote: > > Hi. I registered with Google to be a GSoC mentor for Tor Project. > Hopefully Meejah will agree to be the backup mentor for this > and register today or tomorrow before the deadline on Monday. > > Let me know if there's anything else

Re: [tor-dev] GSoC 2017 - unMessage: a privacy enhanced instant messenger

Hi. I registered with Google to be a GSoC mentor for Tor Project. Hopefully Meejah will agree to be the backup mentor for this and register today or tomorrow before the deadline on Monday. Let me know if there's anything else timely that I must do for this. Cheers, David On Wed, Mar 29, 2017

Re: [tor-dev] Tor in a safer language: Network team update from Amsterdam

Howdy, Thanks for making these points. They made me realize that this initiative: http://bootstrappable.org/ Might not be on folks' radars. It was an outcome of the last Reproducible Builds Summit in December [1]. It just does a good job of articulating problems and proposed some possible

Re: [tor-dev] Anonymous Local Count Statistics Using PCSA - GSoC

Oops, clicked the SEND button accidentally. Sorry! You can ignore it. > Ah! That reminds me that OP(of this thread) should also aim to fix #8786 > along with that could enable such a counting technique for Pluggable > transports. > > Now coming to the main point, > >> In addition, each user

Re: [tor-dev] Anonymous Local Count Statistics Using PCSA - GSoC

On 02.04.17 15:22, Aaron Johnson wrote: > Also, I think that counting users by IP is still a fine way to do it (absent > the privacy issue that PCSA tries to address). I was just stating that my > understanding based on talking to the Tor Metrics people is that the plan is > to handle the

Re: [tor-dev] GSoC 2017 - Feedback Extension for Tor Browser

Dear Mentor, Please find my draft application here: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1AItxT3k-K1tSHa0OJDl3AC4BL_xYoCUWv6IHDnb4if8/edit?usp=sharing. I have also uploaded it through the GSoC 2017 Official Website. Thank you for your time and effort, Sincerely, Jayati Dev

Re: [tor-dev] GSoC 2017 - Feedback Extension for Tor Browser

Plz send the link of your draft Jayanti so I can submit my draft by reviving your format.. Best, Veer On 02-Apr-2017 8:02 PM, "Jayati Dev" wrote: > Dear Mentors, > > > I am a final year student in Electronics and Communication Engineering, > and I wanted to work on the

[tor-dev] GSoC: Questions on allowing for more DNS request types

Hello, I was interested in the project for allowing any kind of DNS support in Tor for GSoC, or, since it is late for that deadline, then also otherwise. After reading proposal 219, I have some questions. 1. A comment by NM suggests that we should specify exact behavior when generating DNS

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal xyz : Count Unique IP addresses in an anonymous way

> We should also consider how this proposal would interact with other > proposed secure aggregation solutions, like Privcount [1] and/or some > other kind of PrivEx [2]. I'd like to hear what the designers of > those ideas think of this one. As you know, PrivCount is a secure aggregation system.

Re: [tor-dev] Anonymous Local Count Statistics Using PCSA - GSoC

Also, I think that counting users by IP is still a fine way to do it (absent the privacy issue that PCSA tries to address). I was just stating that my understanding based on talking to the Tor Metrics people is that the plan is to handle the privacy issue by moving to per-connection country

Re: [tor-dev] Anonymous Local Count Statistics Using PCSA - GSoC

Sorry, I should have been more clear there. Tor Metrics estimates the total number of users by counting the number of directory downloads and dividing by an estimated expected number of directory downloads per user per day (10, I believe). This statistic is in the graph under the “Relay Users”

Re: [tor-dev] Anonymous Local Count Statistics Using PCSA - GSoC

about which stats are you talking Aaron? On Sun, Apr 2, 2017 at 5:45 PM, Aaron Johnson wrote: > > These statistics not just tell about the user's country but also keep a > > track of unique IP addresses connecting from each country. This is > > needed so as to

Re: [tor-dev] Anonymous Local Count Statistics Using PCSA - GSoC

> These statistics not just tell about the user's country but also keep a > track of unique IP addresses connecting from each country. This is > needed so as to present more realistic stats. If we increment counter on > any IP address instead of unique IP address then the statistics would > also

Re: [tor-dev] Rethinking Bad Exit Defences: Highlighting insecure and sensitive content in Tor Browser

On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 11:31 AM, Donncha O'Cearbhaill wrote: > The Tor bad-relay team regularly detects malicious exit relays which are > actively manipulating Tor traffic. These attackers appear financial > motivated and have primarily been observed modifying Bitcoin and