(You might have already read this email on a closed list.
I'm re-posting it here, with an extra "step 0".)
Hi all,
Fallback directory mirrors help clients reach the Tor network.
We need to rebuild the list every so often when their details change.
(We have an automated check for 25% failure, and
> On 11 Dec 2017, at 10:56, s7r wrote:
>
> I do understand that some operators are particularly concerned about how
> much % they operate, but this can be lowered if too high for example by
> setting RelayBandwidthRate, option which is ready and working and
> doesn't add extra complications and
Hi,
teor wrote:
>
> On 11 Dec 2017, at 09:25, nusenu wrote:
>
>>> And I think we should focus our efforts on expanding the pool of exits,
>>> and improving bandwidth measurement, rather than limiting operators
>>> who are helping the network. (New automatic limits will likely be seen
>>> as a r
On 11 Dec 2017, at 09:25, nusenu wrote:
>> And I think we should focus our efforts on expanding the pool of exits,
>> and improving bandwidth measurement, rather than limiting operators
>> who are helping the network. (New automatic limits will likely be seen
>> as a rejection of someone's contr
>> since a single operator now controls more than 10% of the tor network's
>> exit capacity
>
> Or rather, do they control more than 10% of the Tor Network's consensus
> weight?
I'm referring to exit probability.
> How do you define an "operator"?
Lets use "family" that is be more clear.
> How
> On 11 Dec 2017, at 06:33, nusenu wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> since a single operator now controls more than 10% of the tor network's
> exit capacity
Or rather, do they control more than 10% of the Tor Network's consensus
weight?
Consensus weight is measured from 5 bandwidth scanners in North
America
Hi,
since a single operator now controls more than 10% of the tor network's
exit capacity I wanted to bring this up here (again [1]).
What do you think about capping single operators (family) to 10% exit
capacity and 5% for guard operators?
regards,
nusenu
[1] https://lists.torproject.org/piper