Re: [tor-dev] Proposal for PoW DoS defenses during introduction (was Re: Proposal 305: ESTABLISH_INTRO Cell DoS Defense Extension)

2019-06-20 Thread Chelsea Holland Komlo
On 2019-06-20 00:19, Watson Ladd wrote: > On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 6:29 PM Chelsea Holland Komlo > wrote: >> >> There are a couple approaches to consider. >> >> POW via hashing goes for a relatively simple to implement approach. >> However, this incurs a high cost for all clients, and also environm

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal for PoW DoS defenses during introduction (was Re: Proposal 305: ESTABLISH_INTRO Cell DoS Defense Extension)

2019-06-20 Thread Jeff Burdges
On 2019-06-20 00:19, Watson Ladd wrote: > > Privacy Pass has already been integrated into Tor Browser. Perhaps > work could be done to use it here? As I said above, any oblivious PRF scheme like privacy pass violates privacy *if* you can supply different keys to different users. We cannot de

Re: [tor-dev] Shortcomings of the pluggable transports specification?

2019-06-20 Thread David Fifield
On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 04:41:34PM -0700, Philipp Winter wrote: > We are working on improving Tor's pluggable transports specification: > > > The goal is to make the spec useful to more people and fix issues that > have accumulated over the years. For more co

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal for PoW DoS defenses during introduction (was Re: Proposal 305: ESTABLISH_INTRO Cell DoS Defense Extension)

2019-06-20 Thread Jeff Burdges
> On 2019-06-20 00:19, Watson Ladd wrote: >> >> Privacy Pass has already been integrated into Tor Browser. Perhaps >> work could be done to use it here? > > As I said above, any oblivious PRF scheme like privacy pass violates privacy > *if* you can supply different keys to different users. We

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal for PoW DoS defenses during introduction (was Re: Proposal 305: ESTABLISH_INTRO Cell DoS Defense Extension)

2019-06-20 Thread juanjo
Why do we need to send a challenge to a client on every request? No, it is only the first time when connecting an onion and moreover this should be enabled only when the configured rate limit / antiDoS is reached. SO actually a client will be connecting to the onion like always: with no PoW. I

[tor-dev] Release: obfs4proxy-0.0.11

2019-06-20 Thread Yawning Angel
Hello, I just tagged obfs4proxy-0.0.11. The primary changes are an alteration to how the obfs4 transport handles connections after the handshake failed, based on a report and assistance from Sergey Frolov. Tarball/Signature: https://people.torproject.org/~yawning/releases/obfs4proxy/obfs4proxy-0