Inlining the proposal written for #8243.
Feedback is welcome. Thanks!
--
Filename: 243-hsdir-flag-need-stable.txt
Title: Give out HSDir flag only to relays with Stable flag
Author: George Kadianakis
Created: 2015-03-23
Status: Open
1. Introduction
The descriptors of hidden services
Karsten Loesing kars...@torproject.org writes:
[Cc'ing tor-dev@, because why not.]
On 11/03/15 19:13, Karsten Loesing wrote:
Please let me know if I can help *reduce* confusion somehow. :)
Looking forward, hidden-service statistics are now available on Metrics:
Gautham Nekkanti gauthamn...@gmail.com writes:
Hi,
I have already shared my project idea on a Simple analytics tool
for Hidden service providers. I am looking for suggestions and input from
users who have had experience in hosting hidden services. Obviously, there
would all useful
A. Johnson aaron.m.john...@nrl.navy.mil writes:
Hello tor-dev,
snip
Two HS statistics that we (i.e. people working on Sponsor R) are interested
in collecting are:
1. The number of descriptor fetches received by a hidden-service directory
(HSDir)
2. The number of client
Florian Rüchel florian.ruechel@inexplicity.de writes:
Hi everyone,
I have taken some time and considered my topic for the Master's Thesis.
I have finally decided to write it on integrating high-latency traffic
with the Tor low-latency network (see also my initial mail and George's
[Declassifying this discussion and posting on [tor-dev]]
David Goulet dgou...@ev0ke.net writes:
Hello HS elves!
I wrote a document to organize my thought and also list what we have in
the bug tracker right now about HS behaviours that we want to
understand/measure/assess/track.
It's a
George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net writes:
Hello people,
for the past few months we've been working on getting better
statistics for hidden services [0].
The questions we are trying to answer are Approximately how many
hidden services are there? and Approximately how much traffic
A. Johnson aaron.m.john...@nrl.navy.mil writes:
Hi George,
Thanks for the really thoughtful comments.
Two HS statistics that we (i.e. people working on Sponsor R) are interested
in collecting are:
1. The number of descriptor fetches received by a hidden-service directory
(HSDir)
2.
A. Johnson aaron.m.john...@nrl.navy.mil writes:
Hello tor-dev,
Hello,
and thanks for posting this to the list.
While helping design ways to publish statistics about hidden services in a
privacy-preserving
manner, it has become clear to me that certain statistics cannot be safely
review our design and code and provide us with feedback :)
Thanks!
George Kadianakis
Karsten Loesing
Aaron Johnson
David Goulet
[0]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/sponsors/SponsorR
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-October/007642.html
[1]: see threads
Liste lists...@tramacci.org writes:
Hidden service is unavailable, but tor is running.
Hello,
thanks for this info. We need more feedback from HS operators who are
encountering bugs or having problems.
Here is a short email with some comments. Not very revealing
unfortunately, but that's all
A. Johnson aaron.m.john...@nrl.navy.mil writes:
Hi George,
Hello!
I recommend a change to the way that these statistics are
obfuscated. The problem is that new noise is used every day, and from
the distribution of the reported bins, the exact location within the
bin (assuming the stat
George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net writes:
Hello there,
I inline a copy of a proposal we've been working on lately. Discussion
can be found in the Feedback on obfuscating hidden-service statistics
thread.
The proposal suggests that Tor relays add some stats about hidden
service usage
A. Johnson aaron.m.john...@nrl.navy.mil writes:
Hi George,
I posted an initial draft of the proposal here:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-November/007863.html
Any feedback would be awesome.
OK, I’ll have a chance to look at this in the next few days.
Specifically, I
A. Johnson aaron.m.john...@nrl.navy.mil writes:
Roger's branch was a PoC that wrote stats on the log file. I don't
think we have newer data than what is in #13192. It's unclear whether
the relays stopped collecting statistics, or they just haven't updated
the trac ticket.
If we could check
George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net writes:
Hello,
this is an attempt to collect tasks that should be done for
SponsorR. You can find the SponsorR page here:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/sponsors/SponsorR
FWIW, I skimmed the thread and collected all the tasks
Michael Rogers mich...@briarproject.org writes:
On 09/11/14 18:33, Mansour Moufid wrote:
Has there been research on integrating high-latency message
delivery protocols with the hidden service model of location
hiding? The SecureDrop or Pynchon Gate protocols sound like good
starting points.
be useful to Tor developers and to people who want to understand
hidden services and the onionspace better.
Any feedback is appreciated :)
==
Filename: 238-hs-relay-stats.txt
Title: Better hidden service stats from Tor relays
Author: George Kadianakis, David Goulet, Karsten Loesing, Aaron
A. Johnson aaron.m.john...@nrl.navy.mil writes:
Hello all,
snip
We put in some simple obfuscations in order to not reveal too
sensitive data: we multiplied actual values with a random number in
[0.9, 1.1] before including those obfuscated values in extra-info
descriptors. Maybe there's
Fabio Pietrosanti - lists li...@infosecurity.ch writes:
On 10/20/14 3:37 PM, George Kadianakis wrote:
Hello,
this is an attempt to collect tasks that should be done for
SponsorR. You can find the SponsorR page here:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/sponsors/SponsorR
[snip
Richard Dennis mad_rap...@hotmail.com writes:
Hi guys,
i have been doing a bit of reading recently about hidden services, and
i am just wondering how exactly a hidden service selects its
introduction points, i understand there are two methods, one where the
H.S picks its own set of I.P's
Nick Mathewson ni...@freehaven.net writes:
On Sat, Nov 8, 2014 at 12:07 PM, George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net
wrote:
I don't expect this to be merged in mainline Tor, but if any HS
operators feel like they need it, here it is.
Make a ticket for it please, just in case?
Done. Please
A. Johnson aaron.m.john...@nrl.navy.mil writes:
A response to George’s comment: The timeline here is that we are hoping the
proposal _and_ the
implementation to be ready by mid-December… I'm currently OK with the two
statistics in:
A. Johnson aaron.m.john...@nrl.navy.mil writes:
George and I have been working on a small proposal to add two
hidden-service related statistics: number of hidden services and
total hidden-service traffic.
Great, I’m starting to focus more on this project now. Well,
actually I’m going on
Tom Ritter t...@ritter.vg writes:
There's been a spirited debate on irc, so I thought I would try and
capture my thoughts in long form. I think it's important to look at
the long-term goals rather than how to get there, so that's where I'm
going to start, and then at each item maybe talk a
Mike Perry mikepe...@torproject.org writes:
A. Johnson:
The idea would be that Guard_3 would rotate on the order of hours,
Guard_2 would come from a set that is rotated on the order of days
(based on the expected duration for the adversary to become
Guard_3), and Guard_1 would rotate on
George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net writes:
Mike Perry mikepe...@torproject.org writes:
A. Johnson:
The idea would be that Guard_3 would rotate on the order of hours,
Guard_2 would come from a set that is rotated on the order of days
(based on the expected duration for the adversary
Gareth Owen gareth.o...@port.ac.uk writes:
Grarpamp
I'm only not publishing it because of privacy concerns - ultimately some HS
operators might not wish to have their existence publically known.. I
would be open to supplying it to bona fide and verifiable tor project
members if it is for a
Hidden Service authorization is a pretty obscure feature of HSes, that
can be quite useful for small-to-medium HSes.
Basically, it allows client access control during the introduction
step. If the client doesn't prove itself, the Hidden Service will not
poroceed to the rendezvous step.
This
A. Johnson aaron.m.john...@nrl.navy.mil writes:
As I've suggested before, I really really think you should also analyze
an I2P-like scheme where HSs try really hard to maintain path
persistence to their RPs for some fixed time period on the order of an
hour (but which can be parameterized and
Hello,
inspired by the recent discussions on guard discovery, I went ahead
and implemented a small patch for Tor that tries to help defend
against Hidden Service guard discovery attacks.
It basically allows the operator to specify a set of nodes that will
be pinned as middle nodes in Hidden
Griffin Boyce grif...@cryptolab.net writes:
Roger Dingledine wrote:
snip
- #8902 Rumors that hidden services have trouble scaling to 100
concurrent connections
I've been curious about this ticket for a while, and happy to
structurerun a follow-up test on a controlled server.
Hello!
just wanted to remind you that the regular biweekly pluggable
transports meeting is going to occur tomorrow at 16:00 UTC. Place is
the #tor-dev IRC channel in the OFTC network.
Thanks for your attention!
___
tor-dev mailing list
Christopher Baines cbain...@gmail.com writes:
On 20/10/14 14:37, George Kadianakis wrote:
f) On a more researchy tone, this might also be a good point to start
poking at the HS scalability project since it will really affect HS
performance.
We should look at Christopher Baines
Virgil Griffith i...@virgil.gr writes:
- Opt-in HS indexing service
I offer to captain and lead development of this one.
Thanks for offering to help!
My main goal with this project would be to increase visibility of
Hidden Services: make it easy for people to find Hidden Services that
want
Hello!
just wanted to remind you that the regular biweekly pluggable
transports meeting is going to occur tomorrow at 16:00 UTC. Place is
the #tor-dev IRC channel in the OFTC network.
Thanks for your attention!
___
tor-dev mailing list
Hello,
this is an attempt to collect tasks that should be done for
SponsorR. You can find the SponsorR page here:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/sponsors/SponsorR
I'm going to focus only on the subset of those categories that
Roger/David told me are the most important for the
George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net writes:
George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net writes:
==Guardiness: Yet another external dirauth script==
sniped
FWIW, a weasel suggested to me a potentially better solution than the
iffy summary files.
He suggested parsing consensuses
Hello!
just wanted to remind you that the regular biweekly pluggable
transports meeting is going to occur today at 16:00 UTC. Place is the
#tor-dev IRC channel in the OFTC network.
Thanks for your attention!
___
tor-dev mailing list
I attach a patch that adds a link to Nick Hopper's proof of the
keyblinding scheme in rend-spec-ng.txt.
Thanks!
From 2bc39a9721ed9639220b9c94c62d52cc5affd12b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net
Date: Mon, 6 Oct 2014 21:29:14 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] rend-spec-ng
== What is bridge reachability data? ==
By bridge reachability data I'm referring to information about which
Tor bridges are censored in different parts of the world.
The OONI project has been developing a test that allows probes in
censored countries to test which bridges are blocked and which
Hello!
just wanted to remind you that the regular biweekly pluggable
transports meeting is going to occur today at 16:00 UTC. Place is the
#tor-dev IRC channel in the OFTC network.
As you see, the meeting day was recently changed from Fridays to
Wednesdays:
George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net writes:
==Guardiness: Yet another external dirauth script==
Introduction
One well-known problem with Tor relays, is that Guards will suffer a
big loss of traffic as soon as they get the Guard flag. This happens
because clients pick guards
Damian Johnson ata...@torproject.org writes:
- Q: Why do you slow stem instead of parsing consensuses with Python on your
own?
This is another part where I might have taken the wrong design
decision, but I decided to not get into the consensus parsing business
and just rely on stem.
This
Sebastian Hahn sebast...@torproject.org writes:
On 16 Sep 2014, at 16:15, George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net wrote:
How guardiness works
The idea was that the guardiness script will be an external script
that is run by Tor in a similar fashion to the bandwidth auth
scripts. We
Paul Syverson paul.syver...@nrl.navy.mil writes:
On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 08:31:05AM -0400, Ian Goldberg wrote:
On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 01:44:36PM +0300, George Kadianakis wrote:
Hey Nick,
this mail is about the schemes we were discussing during the dev
meeting on how to protect HSes
Tim t_e...@icloud.com writes:
On 13 Aug 2014, at 22:33 , George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net wrote:
My plan was to make a Peach fuzzer to achieve this [0], but as I
mentioned in a previous email I never got past the V3 link handshake
since I actually had to implement Tor's crypto to get
George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net writes:
I inline a patch that specifies how voting should happen in proposal 236.
The changes reflect a discussion I had yesterday with nickm during the
Tor IRC meeting.
BTW, while I like the simplicity of the new vote (just an integer),
I'm afraid
and the number of months considered
should also be mentioned somewhere in the votes?
From de60f2daaab573912fcd78057a93bc7e12eda96c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net
Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2014 13:24:11 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Specify how Guard Appearance Fraction voting
Matthew Finkel matthew.fin...@gmail.com writes:
On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 02:05:49PM +0300, George Kadianakis wrote:
One missing piece of rend-spec-ng.txt [0] is a section on how HSes
should pick their Introduction Points (IPs). There are three main
questions here:
- How many IPs should an HS
Tim t_e...@icloud.com writes:
On 13 Aug 2014, at 22:33 , George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net wrote:
My plan was to make a Peach fuzzer to achieve this [0], but as I
mentioned in a previous email I never got past the V3 link handshake
since I actually had to implement Tor's crypto to get
Tim t_e...@icloud.com writes:
On 13 Aug 2014, at 0:10, George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net wrote:
Gareth Owen gareth.o...@port.ac.uk writes:
...
The framework implements the tor protocol so should be easy to modify to do
fuzzing of the actual protocol but I'm skeptical how successful
Hello friends :)
This is a post to discuss how Tor should treat its entry guards when
its network goes down. This is part of ticket #12595 [0] which aims to
design better interfaces and data structures for entry guards.
This thread investigates what should happen when the network goes down
and
One missing piece of rend-spec-ng.txt [0] is a section on how HSes
should pick their Introduction Points (IPs). There are three main
questions here:
- How many IPs should an HS have?
- Which relays can be IPs?
- What's the lifetime of an IP?
==Introduction Points attacks==
Before exploring
Hola brothers and sisters,
just wanted to remind you that the regular biweekly pluggable
transports meeting is going to occur tomorrow at 16:00 UTC. Place is
the #tor-dev IRC channel in the OFTC network.
As you see, the meeting day was recently changed from Fridays to
Wednesdays:
Gareth Owen gareth.o...@port.ac.uk writes:
Hi George
Thanks for your reply and information+links. Tim (cc-ed) is leading the
work on the fuzzer and is looking at a couple of different frameworks.
I've set up a example that can do port-forwarding to a BEGIN_DIR service
- so you can just
tibi...@riseup.net writes:
Hi everyone,
Is there any project in little-t tor that needs another hacker? I have
(under another name) been writing tor unit tests, which I've finished.
What should I work on next? Happy to work on either new code or more unit
tests.
FWIW, if you want to keep
Gareth Owen gareth.o...@port.ac.uk writes:
Hi all
I thought I'd give you an update on where the Tor Research Framework is now
at as there's been lots of development over the last few weeks. At present,
the framework is a largely fully functional tor client with code that is
easy to read,
tl;dr: From now on, Tor PT meetings happen on Wednesdays. Same time.
Next PT meeting: Wednesday 13th of August, at 16:00 UTC.
Hello friends,
I want to inform you of a schedule change that affects Pluggable
Transport meetings.
Because of the diverse set of timezones participating in the
Hello list,
in my monthly status report [0] I mentioned that some PT-related parts
of the website are in need of improvement. As a response, a few people
sent me a private email asking me what kind of improvements I was
thinking about. Instead of replying individually, I decided to send a
mail to
Nicholas Hopper hop...@cs.umn.edu writes:
On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 11:24 AM, George Kadianakis
desnac...@riseup.net wrote:
- You can see that old guards (like RichardFeynman) see a shrinkage
both on their guard and on their middle probabilities. This happens
because both the total guard
Hello brothers and sisters,
just wanted to remind you that the regular biweekly pluggable
transports meeting is going to occur tomorrow at 16:00 UTC.
Place is the #tor-dev IRC channel in the OFTC network.
Thanks!
___
tor-dev mailing list
One of the aims of proposal 236 is to reduce the period of
inactiveness when a relay becomes a guard (see 'Phase three' of
[0]). This phenomenon will become worse when the lifetime of the guard
gets increased to 9 months, so we need to find a good fix.
Proposal 236 tries to make young guards more
Hey Nick,
this mail is about the schemes we were discussing during the dev
meeting on how to protect HSes against guard discovery attacks (#9001).
I think we have some ideas on how to offer better protection against
such attacks, mainly by keeping our middle nodes more static than we
do
Sebastian G. bastik.tor bastik@googlemail.com writes:
11.07.2014 14:31, Ian Goldberg:
On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 01:44:36PM +0300, George Kadianakis wrote:
Hey Nick,
this mail is about the schemes we were discussing during the dev
meeting on how to protect HSes against guard discovery
Hello friends,
the PT meeting last week was a bit quiet because it was conflicting
with the Tor dev meeting.
To compensate for that, we are thinking of throwing an extra PT
meeting this Friday. The agenda can be modified according to the
participants, but we are planning to spend some time
During our meeting in Iceland, we talked a lot about guard nodes. Some
of that discussion eventually turned into proposal 236 [0].
During our discussions, we looked into the state file of Roger, and we
noticed that there are 50 or so guard nodes in there. And that made us
wonder: Why does Roger
Hello friends,
just wanted to remind you that the regular biweekly pluggable
transports meeting is going to occur today at 16:00 UTC.
Place is the #tor-dev IRC channel in the OFTC network.
Thanks!
___
tor-dev mailing list
tor-dev@lists.torproject.org
Hello friends,
just wanted to remind you that the regular biweekly pluggable
transports meeting is going to occur today at 16:00 UTC.
Place is the #tor-dev IRC channel in the OFTC network.
Please note that we recently *changed* the time from 17:00 to 16:00 UTC.
Thanks!
Nicholas Hopper hop...@cs.umn.edu writes:
On Mon, May 5, 2014 at 12:07 PM, Nick Mathewson ni...@torproject.org wrote:
I noticed that proposal 236 doesn't mention directory guards. (See
proposal 207, implemented in Tor 0.2.4.) I think that we should
consider retaining multiple directory
Nick Mathewson ni...@torproject.org writes:
Hi, all!
I noticed that proposal 236 doesn't mention directory guards. (See
proposal 207, implemented in Tor 0.2.4.) I think that we should
consider retaining multiple directory guards while going to a single
guard for multi-hop circuits.
My
Ian Goldberg i...@cs.uwaterloo.ca writes:
On Sat, May 31, 2014 at 05:51:16PM +0100, George Kadianakis wrote:
Hello Ian,
hope you are well :)
I have a question wrt a new PT and ntor.
Yawning Angel has been developing a new PT called obfs4 (temp name),
which is basically scramblesuit
Hello Ian,
hope you are well :)
I have a question wrt a new PT and ntor.
Yawning Angel has been developing a new PT called obfs4 (temp name),
which is basically scramblesuit using ntor and elligator2. This
results in better performance than UniformDH.
You can find the spec of obfs4 here:
Marc Juarez marc.juarezm...@esat.kuleuven.be writes:
Hi all,
I am a GSoC student working in a new PT for the development of future
Website Fingerprinting countermeasures in Tor.
The PT is not targeting any specific defense, but to link padding
defenses in general. The idea is to implement
Hello friends,
just wanted to remind you that the regular biweekly pluggable
transports meeting is going to occur today at 16:00 UTC.
Place is the #tor-dev IRC channel in the OFTC network.
Please note that we recently *changed* the time from 17:00 to 16:00 UTC.
Thanks!
Michael Rogers mich...@briarproject.org writes:
On 10/05/14 21:09, George Kadianakis wrote:
It's interesting that you say this, because we pretty much took
the opposite approach with guard nodes. That is, the plan is to
extend their rotation period to 9 months (from the current 2-3
months
waldo waldoalvare...@yahoo.com writes:
El 02/05/14 02:34, Christopher Baines escribió:
On 02/05/14 00:45, waldo wrote:
El 30/04/14 17:06, Christopher Baines escribió:
On 08/10/13 06:52, Christopher Baines wrote:
I have been looking at doing some work on Tor as part of my degree, and
more
Hello friends,
just wanted to remind you that the regular biweekly pluggable
transports meeting is going to occur tomorrow at 16:00 UTC.
Place is the #tor-dev IRC channel in the OFTC network.
Please note that we recently *changed* the time from 17:00 to 16:00 UTC.
Thanks!
Christopher Baines cbain...@gmail.com writes:
On 08/10/13 06:52, Christopher Baines wrote:
I have been looking at doing some work on Tor as part of my degree, and
more specifically, looking at Hidden Services. One of the issues where I
believe I might be able to make some progress, is the
Kevin P Dyer kpd...@gmail.com writes:
Hi Mike,
It looks like [1] broke FTE [2].
Can you hold off on pushing any releases public, until we resolve #11629?
George - Can we revert obfsproxy back to 0.2.4, to give me time to sort
this out?
Sure, that seems reasonable for now. Could you
Juha Nurmi juha.nu...@ahmia.fi writes:
On 22.04.2014 17:35, George Kadianakis wrote:
Enjoy GSoC :)
I will :)
BTW, looking again at your proposal, I see that you are going to
do both popularity tracking and backlinks.
Yes, another crawler gathers backlinks from the public WWW and I
Hello friends,
just wanted to remind you that the regular biewekly pluggable
transports meeting is going to occur tomorrow at 16:00 UTC.
Place is the #tor-dev IRC channel in OFTC.
Please note that we *changed* the time from 17:00 to 16:00 UTC.
Thanks!
Juha Nurmi juha.nu...@ahmia.fi writes:
Hi,
I'm a student who is starting to work with ahmia.fi search engine as a
part of Google Summer of Code. :)
The proposal is online here https://ahmia.fi/gsoc/
In practise, I have now time and funding to develop my search engine.
George is my
Nicholas Hopper hop...@cs.umn.edu writes:
On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 7:45 AM, George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net
wrote:
I see. That makes sense, I think.
Good.
I will ponder on this a bit more, and then edit the proposal.
When/if you become convinced, let me know if you want me
Greetings humans,
this is an email to remind you that the regular biweekly pluggable
transports meeting is going to happen today. Place is the #tor-dev
IRC channel in OFTC. Time is 17:00 UTC.
Cheers!
___
tor-dev mailing list
On Mon, Apr 7, 2014 at 11:34 AM, George Kadianakis So, based on your
response, IIUC, the idea is that because young
guards are underutilized, we want to increase the probability of them
being chosen in non-guard positions, so that they become more utilized
till more people pick them
Yawning Angel yawn...@schwanenlied.me writes:
Hello,
The topic of routing pluggable transports through other proxys (SOCKS
and HTTP CONNECT) has come up a few times recent, both as bug reports
from users and as something that probably should be done to round out
the pluggable transport
Hello people of the Trac,
could you make us some Trac components for some PT projects?
Specifically, it would be great if you could make us the following components:
a) meek
b) FTE
c) obfsclient
Thank you!
___
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Greetings humans,
this is an email to remind you that the regular biweekly pluggable
transports meeting is going to happen tomorrow. Place is the #tor-dev
IRC channel in OFTC. Time is 17:00 UTC.
Cheers!
___
tor-dev mailing list
Roger Dingledine a...@mit.edu writes:
On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 10:21:38PM +, George Kadianakis wrote:
From {2}, we see that the Tor network has 6000MiB/s advertised guard
bandwidth (orange line), but supposedly is only using the 3500MiB/s
(yellow line). This means, that supposedly we
Replying to some new additions in the proposal:
Thanks asn! Ask help from organizations that are crawling Today I
emailed to duckduckgo and asked is there an easy way to search new
.onions using their search engine. Checking out the backlinks from
public WWW With known onion address it is
Frank Young pfco...@gmail.com writes:
I have noticed that since the release of version 0.2.4.18-rc - 2013-11-16,
Attempts to fetch v2 rendezvous service descriptor are failing.
The issue seems to get worse as many people are updating their clients.
The calculation of decriptor ids based on
Nurmi, Juha juha.nu...@ahmia.fi writes:
Hi,
Thank you George, Fabio and Giovanni! :)
I gathered these comments to the Google Docs:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1XB42HM4uESYBAnoHHRuaqKMP64VFDI91Qa-CtIuye2E/edit?usp=sharing
I have wrote a comment to the each comment.
Furthermore, I
Juha Nurmi juha.nu...@ahmia.fi writes:
Also, are you sure that 1-3 workdays are sufficient to design
implement a banned domain synchronizer between tor2web and
ahmia?
Well, I cannot know that. Let's put one workweek for that. I am
hoping to spend a workday or two with Tor2web and we get
Giovanni `evilaliv3` Pellerano giovanni.peller...@evilaliv3.org
writes:
I do not see any paricular risk in exposing the hashed list. the
reason behind the hashed list is exactly that we want to allow
publishing without any risk to publish direct link to child porn
contents or other shit.
Nurmi, Juha juha.nu...@ahmia.fi writes:
Hi,
Thank you George, Fabio and Giovanni! :)
I gathered these comments to the Google Docs:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1XB42HM4uESYBAnoHHRuaqKMP64VFDI91Qa-CtIuye2E/edit?usp=sharing
I have wrote a comment to the each comment.
Furthermore, I
Juha Nurmi juha.nu...@ahmia.fi writes:
And what would you like to do over the summer so that: a) Something
useful and concrete comes out of only 3 months of work. b) Your
work will also be useful after the summer ends.
I would be interested to see some areas that you would like to work
on
Greetings humans,
this is an email to remind you that the regular biweekly pluggable
transports meeting is going to happen tomorrow. Place is the #tor-dev
IRC channel in OFTC. Time is 17:00 UTC.
Cheers!
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tl;dr: analysis seems to indicate that switching to one guard node
might not be catastrophic to the performance of Tor. To improve
performance some increased guard bandwidth thresholds are proposed
that seem to help without completely destroying the anonymity of the
network. Enjoy the therapeutic
Roger Dingledine a...@mit.edu writes:
On Mon, Mar 10, 2014 at 06:00:13PM +0100, Marc Juarez wrote:
I'm a PhD student at COSIC (COmputer Security and Industrial
Cryptography) in KU Leuven, Belgium. My research topic is related to
network traffic analysis and I'm now focused in the more
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