Re: [tor-dev] Sharing Circuits Between Onion Servers and Clients

And some email clients like mine even include the trailing "." in the link! Third time's the charm: https://github.com/devnetsec/rand_num_consensus On Tue Oct 22, 2024, 10:48 AM GMT, Georg Koppen wrote: > stifle_sava

Re: [tor-dev] Timers in Arti?

Michael, what kind of reduction in battery impact would you expect if you were able to make these changes? Also, is anyone aware of any work that has been done within this community or in academia to consider from first principles what Tor would look like if built for mobile first? (e.g. built

Re: [tor-dev] Hacks to reduce Tor's initial download on slow Internet, sacrificing privacy?

This is what I was looking for. Thanks! On Mon, May 8, 2023, 4:56 PM Mike Perry wrote: > > > On 5/3/23 17:24, Holmes Wilson wrote: > > Hi everyone, > > > > Is there a way right now to get Tor hidden service functionality > > (hosting a hidden service, co

[tor-dev] Hacks to reduce Tor's initial download on slow Internet, sacrificing privacy?

Hi everyone, Is there a way right now to get Tor hidden service functionality (hosting a hidden service, connecting to hidden services) on a connection where the Internet is so slow and unreliable that the initial download of network information currently takes ~forever, provided one is willing

Re: [tor-dev] [CRITICAL] DeepCorr Traffic Confirmation Attack

This attack looks especially bad for situations where both ends of the connection are controlled by the attacker, so it seems really bad for onionshare, ricochet refresh, Briar, and Quiet, at least when users are communicating with others in the same country. 96% correlation after 900k of data sent

[tor-dev] A way to connect quickly to a newly-online hidden service?

Hi everyone, In the p2p messaging app we're building, Quiet, users exchange some information out-of-band (an onion address) and use that to connect to each other over Tor, as they would for direct messages in Ricochet Refresh or Cwtch. One UX failure we see now is that newly-online hidden servi

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal 342: Decouple hs_interval and SRV lifetime

Understood and thanks! On Tue, Jan 10, 2023, 11:24 AM Nick Mathewson wrote: > > > On Tue, Jan 10, 2023 at 8:41 AM Holmes Wilson wrote: > >> Apologies if I missed this in the proposal, but what are the benefits of >> this beyond decoupling? Will onion service user

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal 342: Decouple hs_interval and SRV lifetime

Apologies if I missed this in the proposal, but what are the benefits of this beyond decoupling? Will onion service users see benefits? Or is it just about simplifying the code? On Tue, Jan 10, 2023, 8:22 AM Nick Mathewson wrote: > ``` > Filename: 342-decouple-hs-interval.md > Title: Decoupling

Re: [tor-dev] Shortcuts to data-heavy parts of the bootstrapping process

irectory designs that are both practical and theoretical! H On Fri Sep 2, 2022, 01:41 AM GMT, Roger Dingledine <mailto:a...@torproject.org> wrote: > On Fri, Sep 02, 2022 at 12:10:35AM +, Holmes Wilson wrote: >> At some point I got an error message that indicated that it was givin

[tor-dev] Shortcuts to data-heavy parts of the bootstrapping process

I was just at an event with a slow (but reliable) network and Tor was not able to connect; the "Loading relay descriptors" step just took too long. At some point I got an error message that indicated that it was giving up but that I had enough information to connect to onion addresses. I can't r

Re: [tor-dev] Counting HS descriptor uploads

Knowing when an onion service is likely to be reachable would be useful for us too, as would less variation in the time required to connect to an onion address, or a clearer sense of progress when making a connection that we could relay to the user. Holmes On Tue, Aug 9, 2022, 9:01 AM David Goule

[tor-dev] We built a new Tor-based team chat prototype. Wanna try it?

Hi everyone, My collaborators and I have been working for the past couple years on building a Tor-based team chat app which we're calling Quiet*, and I'm curious if anyone here would like to try it out! If you would, please reply! :) I am especially interested in feedback from Tor project partici

Re: [tor-dev] Interoperation with libp2p

One thing I'm excited about for libp2p/tor is Arti. It seems like Arti, when it's ready, will make it much easier to build a fully functional and audited Tor client into a libp2p transport. On Sun, Mar 20, 2022, 4:23 PM Jorropo wrote: > Hey, I work for protocol labs (however not in the libp2p t

Re: [tor-dev] A series of questions about Tor (m1 support, forward secrecy, v3 auth)

>> We just got a report from a user that the tor binary for Mac was using much >> more CPU on Apple Silicon / M1 than it used on Intel. Has anyone scene >> anything like this? Is there an arm64 build of tor binary for Mac, existing >> or in the works? > > Can you provide more detail about whe

[tor-dev] A series of questions about Tor (m1 support, forward secrecy, v3 auth)

Hi everyone, A few disjointed questions that have come up recently in our work with Tor: 1. PERFORMANCE ON M1 / ARM64 We just got a report from a user that the tor binary for Mac was using much more CPU on Apple Silicon / M1 than it used on Intel. Has anyone scene anything like this? Is there

Re: [tor-dev] Scalability or Onionbalance for v3 ephemeral/ADD_ONION services

Hi George, Sorry for the slow reply here! Just getting back to this. >> For our application (a messaging app) it would be super useful to get the >> full list of known online (or recently seen online) onion addresses in >> possession of some frontend key. This would let us use onionbalance for >

Re: [tor-dev] Scalability or Onionbalance for v3 ephemeral/ADD_ONION services

Would this return a list of currently-online onion addresses in possession of the frontend address key? Or would it just route traffic to one of those addresses invisibly? For our application (a messaging app) it would be super useful to get the full list of known online (or recently seen online)

Re: [tor-dev] Uptime stats for "Tor user can access an otherwise-functional hidden service"?

learn more!! —Holmes > On May 5, 2021, at 3:27 PM, Holmes Wilson wrote: > > Hi everyone, > > I’m building a messaging app based on Tor v3 onion services and I’m wondering > what kind of uptime expectations we should set with users and other > stakeholders. > > I

[tor-dev] What's the best way to learn about critical updates to Tor?

Hi all, For the messaging app we’re building on Tor (not Tor browser) what’s the best way for us to be alerted when there are critical updates to Tor, so that we can prepare a new release as quickly as possible? (Apologies for the flurry of questions today!) Holmes

[tor-dev] Uptime stats for "Tor user can access an otherwise-functional hidden service"?

Hi everyone, I’m building a messaging app based on Tor v3 onion services and I’m wondering what kind of uptime expectations we should set with users and other stakeholders. Is there data over time on uptime for onion service functionality? That is, not for a particular onion service, but for

Re: [tor-dev] Question about hidden services shared by multiple hosts

> On Apr 6, 2021, at 6:37 AM, George Kadianakis wrote: > > David Goulet writes: > >> On 26 Mar (08:55:54), Holmes Wilson wrote: >>> Hi everyone, >> >> Greetings, >> >>> >>> We’re working on a peer-to-peer group chat app where

Re: [tor-dev] Question about hidden services shared by multiple hosts

destination for incoming traffic to the onion address? Thanks so much for this feedback! Holmes On Fri, Apr 2, 2021 at 1:41 PM David Goulet wrote: > On 26 Mar (08:55:54), Holmes Wilson wrote: > > Hi everyone, > > Greetings, > > > > > We’re working on a peer-to-p

[tor-dev] Question about hidden services shared by multiple hosts

Hi everyone, We’re working on a peer-to-peer group chat app where peers connect over v3 onion addresses. One issue are groups where there are many users but only a few are online in a given moment. Onion addresses are forever, and existing peers might know every peer in the network, but it w

Re: [tor-dev] Best way to reload config on Windows?

t; > You can reconfigure tor (by the torrc file) with ease. Cheers. > --Keifer > > > On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 9:59 AM Holmes Wilson wrote: > Hi everyone, > > We’re building a Ricochet-inspired chat app, and there are situations where > we want to create a new hidde

Re: [tor-dev] Best way to reload config on Windows?

ote: > > On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 10:59:34AM -0500, Holmes Wilson wrote: >> We???re building a Ricochet-inspired chat app, and there are situations >> where we want to create a new hidden service URL. On macOS and Linux we can >> send a SIGHUP to make Tor reload its config.

[tor-dev] Best way to reload config on Windows?

Hi everyone, We’re building a Ricochet-inspired chat app, and there are situations where we want to create a new hidden service URL. On macOS and Linux we can send a SIGHUP to make Tor reload its config. What’s the best way to do this on Windows? I found an old issue for this (https://gitlab