do
generalised EdDSA with Ristretto, [1] since the cofactor is elliminated.
I've been working with Trevor on this, it's called D.A.V.R.O.S. and it'll
be done… (as) soon (as I have more free time to finish it).
[0]: https://signal.org/docs/specifications/xedds
25479
[1]:
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms683472(v=vs.85).aspx)
Best regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys
teor transcribed 0.7K bytes:
> I'm sorry, I didn't get Isis' original email, I think my spam folder ate it.
>
> Can you please re-send?
Of course! I actually didn't get a copy either; not sure what happened there.
- Forwarded message from isis agora lovecruft <i...@patternsi
debian.net/tor-meeting/2018/tor-meeting.2018-02-20-23.11.html
Best regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://fyb.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
signature.asc
D
F)
2. Directory document keywords MUST be printable ASCII.
3. This change may break some descriptor/consensus/document parsers.
If you are the maintainer of a parser, you may want to start
thinking about this now.
[0]:
http://meetbot.debian.net/tor-meeting/2018/tor-meeting.2018-02-12-21.0
82-remove-named-from-consensus.txt
¹ Please note that even if your name is not {isis,teor,nickm} that you are
warmly welcome to attend and participate.
Best regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2
ls/267-tor-consensus-transparency.txt
Best regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://fyb.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
signature.asc
Description: Digital
/torspec.git/tree/proposals/239-consensus-hash-chaining.txt
Best regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://fyb.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
signature.asc
Description
This one is in #tor-meeting, next Monday, 12 February from 21:00-22:00 UTC.
In local times:
* Monday, 12 February 13:00-14:00 PST
* Monday, 12 February 16:00-17:00 EST
* Monday, 12 February 22:00-23:00 CET
* Tuesday, 13 February 08:00-09:00 AEST
isis agora lovecruft transcribed 2.3K bytes
Reminder to please vote for a time for this if you'd still like to attend!
isis agora lovecruft transcribed 2.2K bytes:
> Hello,
>
> Let's schedule a proposal discussion for prop#285 "Directory documents
> should be standardized as UTF-8" [0] sometime between 12 - 13 Feb.
This is happening in #tor-meeting on Thursday, 8 February, 21:00-22:00 UTC.
In various local times:
* Thursday, 8 February, 13:00-14:00 PST
* Thursday, 8 February, 16:00-17:00 EST
* Thursday, 8 February, 22:00-23:00 CET
* Friday, 9 February, 08:00-09:00 AEST
isis agora lovecruft transcribed
s, or if I
forgot to take your timezone into account, please let me know.
https://doodle.com/poll/cnc6scybbfpky5f8
[0]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/285-utf-8.txt
Best regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
Open
take your timezone
into account, please let me know.
https://doodle.com/poll/iahmzu95hpvxciex
[0]:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/239-consensus-hash-chaining.txt
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
Open
isis agora lovecruft transcribed 2.9K bytes:
> Hello all,
>
> Is there an existing Tor proposal you'd like to discuss? Please use
> the following pad to nominate and vote for proposals for discussion.
>
> https://pad.riseup.net/p/Pxo2fQiiaSWo
>
> We'll be reviving
Hello,
It's not done yet; it probably has errors; it definitely has omissions; it's
still riddled with "XXX"s everywhere… but here's a work-in-progress draft
proposal for migrating our link protocol(s) to use TLS 1.3:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/torspec.git/log/?h=t
-22.03.html
[3]: https://pad.riseup.net/p/r.1c4c37baa9251fdfca5a1e1bd5c01f45
[4]:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/249-large-create-cells.txt?id=5fe54569
Best regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R
isis agora lovecruft transcribed 5.3K bytes:
> Hello all,
>
> What: A proposal discussion meeting for prop#249 "Allow CREATE cells with
> >505 bytes of handshake data". [0]
Hey,
Meetbot notes are available. [0] Nick and Tim took summary notes of
discussion items
- Wednesday, 13 December 00:00-01:00 CET
- Thursday, 14 December 09:00-10:00 AUST
teor transcribed 6.8K bytes:
>
> > On 9 Dec 2017, at 11:29, isis agora lovecruft <i...@torproject.org> wrote:
> >
> > Hello all,
> >
> > What: A proposal discussion m
e made about the text encoding or formatting
> of the document.
A specification for the documents that BWAuths produce would be an extremely
welcome contribution! but probably shouldn't be prerequisite to accepting
and implementing this proposal.
Thanks again for the prop
preparation.
Thanks!
Best regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://fyb.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
7*492)=3906 bytes.
Best regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://fyb.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
__
that removing `u` on platforms which don't have `D`
enabled by default could break our reproducible builds.)
Please feel free to open a ticket if you're so inclined.
Best regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B
did Freud invent psychoanalysis? What are you doing during the idle
> cycles of your brain? One does not need a fancy degree to be an amateur at
> anything, or do you folks not call yourselves hackers?
I'd say "Best" but you could only be better,
since he's writing a Rust
parser for bridge descriptors as part of the Bridge Bandwidth Scanner
project) if I got anything wrong. :)
- Forwarded message from isis agora lovecruft <i...@torproject.org> -
> From: isis agora lovecruft <i...@torproject.org>
> Subject: Re
j...@riseup.net transcribed 2.0K bytes:
> Hey Isis,
>
> I have a few crypto questions for you. The bonus question is purely out
> of interest (I searched for the answer, but didn't get a
> good/understandable answer, if you are busy don't worry about it).
Hey Jake!
I'm CCing t
Damian Johnson transcribed 2.0K bytes:
> On Thu, Jun 15, 2017 at 2:07 PM, teor <teor2...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >> On 16 Jun 2017, at 03:49, isis agora lovecruft <i...@torproject.org> wrote:
> >>
> >> Hello all!
> >>
> >> I ha
hod is not subject to
the same patent claims as NewHope theoretically is.
¹ I am not a lawyer. (Fortunately.)
Best,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://fyb.patternsinth
things to change in minor ways during further refinement and
implementation. That said, we welcome all feedback and appreciate review.
[0]: https://patternsinthevoid.net/hyphae/hyphae.pdf
Best regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP
Nick Mathewson transcribed 2.9K bytes:
> On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 10:20 PM, isis agora lovecruft
> <i...@torproject.org> wrote:
> > Hey hey,
> >
> > In summary of the breakaway group we had last Saturday on post-quantum
> > cryptography in Tor, there were a few
oup, and I apologise, but I
don't actually remember all the attendants off the top of my head. If either
of these were your idea, please message me off-list and I'll ensure you're
credited in the eventual proposal(s)/documentation.
Best regards,
--
♥Ⓐ
about this because I don't want to feed
the patent trolls or provide a weapon to anyone who wants to fight against
good crypto, but the patent exists, and it affects nearly all lattice-based
handshakes. NewHope simple is not affected.
My (ongoing, but Nick asked me to stop last summer until there was
ns for other
> distributions.
>
> Feedback requested if this will negatively affect you!
For whatever it's worth, all of Tor's infrastructure runs on Debian stable,
and I'm not sure if weasel would make exceptions to enable backports.
Best,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
chucks out the bridges without the Running flag (i.e. they don't get added to
the hashring). [0]
[0]:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/bridgedb.git/tree/bridgedb/Bridges.py?id=78e352ec18bc55bbb519747a1b1d9e909e3640d7#n453
Best regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
/blog.atagar.com/stem-release-1-5/>!
Awesome! Now I don't need to tell pip to build from git. :)
Thanks, Damian!
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://fyb.patternsin
"ServerTransportPlugin snowflake" on Whonix Gateways
by default? And then "ClientTransportPluging snowflake" on workstations
behind the gateway?
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946AB
est regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://fyb.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
uploaded, etc.
Again, improving the control port notification interface is much welcome, and
patches are straightforward to review for timely inclusion.
Best regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0
isis agora lovecruft transcribed 8.6K bytes:
> For the repeated suggestion of SIDH, [3] I expect we'll soon see concrete
> details and improvements to the attacks mentioned in (and which they establish
> "direct validation" measures to defend against in §9 of) &q
f which are not bugs).
Thanks for pointing this out!
[0]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tordnsel.git/
[1]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/check.git/
[2]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/19843
Best regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
___
e) should be specified in #269.
Thanks for pointing this out! The SHAKE-256() call should actually be added
to #269, since it's acting as a replacement for the HKDF at the end of the
original ntor handshake, and it should be performed regardless of choice of PQ
KEM.
a strong track record of cryptanalysis of
> lattice crypto.
[0]:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/proposal-status.txt
[1]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/287
[2]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-May/010964.html
[3]: https://twitter.com/isislovecruft/st
ensus document in the end would have somewhere between
5 and 9 CoSi signatures.
4. There's a typo in §5.2: s/witnesse's/witnesses'/
Thanks, everyone, for the great discussion!
Best regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
___
468/prop259-redux-v3.txt#L414
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://fyb.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
_
could attend, but not before,
since I will be on a flight. If it works out better for everyone else to have
it at 14:00 instead, then that's also fine with me and please just let me know
afterwards what I can do to help.
Best regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis ago
t-Quantum Cryptography (pp. 134-136). Berlin: Springer Verlag.
https://www.springer.com/us/book/9783540887010
[4]: http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2FBFb0052237.pdf
Best Regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R
eik...@sigaint.org transcribed 0.6K bytes:
> isis wrote:
> > eik...@sigaint.org transcribed 1.1K bytes:
> >> Typos:
> >
> > Thanks! Fixed:
> >
> > https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/torspec.git/commit/?h=draft/newhope=5c115905
>
> You skipped
Tim Wilson-Brown - teor transcribed 3.7K bytes:
>
> > On 7 May 2016, at 05:17, isis <i...@torproject.org> wrote:
> >
> > ...
> >
> > Let `ID` be a router's identity key taken from the router microdescriptor.
> > In the case for relays possessing Ed25
eik...@sigaint.org transcribed 1.1K bytes:
> Typos:
Thanks! Fixed:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/torspec.git/commit/?h=draft/newhope=5c115905
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8
Yawning Angel transcribed 4.3K bytes:
> On Sat, 7 May 2016 19:41:59 + (UTC) lukep <lu...@tutanota.com> wrote:
> > Thanks isis for this, it looks really good, I look forward to seeing a
> > similar protocol for SIDH! (and X25519+NEWHOPE+SIDH !)
>
> When there
er than "the seed was bad".
> > Or let a be a system-wide parameter changing say on a daily basis?
>
> I mentioned using the Tor collaborative random number generator for a in
> my other message, but only as feint to get to the meat of my argument
> that Isis and Peter's prop
olidly aboard the Slow Crypto Train…)
Best,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://fyb.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
signature.asc
Description: Digital sig
Jeff Burdges transcribed 3.1K bytes:
> On Fri, 2016-05-06 at 19:17 +0000, isis wrote:
>
> > --- Description of the Newhope internal functions ---
> >
> > gen_a(SEED seed) receives as input a 32-byte (public) seed. It expands
> > this seed through SHAKE
with a quantum computer in
the future.
I have not given the proposal a number. It is available in my
`drafts/newhope` branch of my torspec repository:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/torspec.git/tree/proposals/XXX-newhope-hybrid-handshake.txt?h=draft/newhope
For purposes of facilitating
d I'm trying to convince Peter Schwabe to participate, if
he's available.
> The wiki page is at:
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/NetworkTeam/MeetingSchedule
I've update the page with the meetings I can attend.
--
♥Ⓐ is
George Kadianakis transcribed 2.1K bytes:
> Hello Nick, isis and Mike!
>
> It seems like some Thoughtworks folks (from here on referred to as FRITO [0])
> are interested in helping us with Tor hidden services development for 4 weeks
> or so. They start early next week! :)
Hell
apacity default
> obfs4 bridges.
> https://bugs.torproject.org/18071 (1 bridge)
> https://bugs.torproject.org/18091 (2 bridges)
There's also https://bugs.torproject.org/18104 (1 bridge, identical to
#18071). I'll have the patch up for that in five minutes.
--
never understood the difference between [OPEN] and [ACCEPTED].
xIs [OPEN] like "waiting for adoption"?
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://blog.patternsinthev
idn't understand who proper was or why that person wanted all kinds of new
features, some of the ticket were kind of ignored. Sorry for not putting two
and two together!
Best Regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6
> Thanks for your time, and happy holidays!
Many thanks for the proposal, research, and code! Have a great new year!
[0]: http://blog.cr.yp.to/20140213-ideal.html
[1]: http://cr.yp.to/talks/2015.04.22/slides-djb-20150422-a4.pdf
[2]: https://github.com/NTRU
tions.
Thanks to Bullgeschichte and Fomas.
* UPDATE Ukranian (uk) translations.
Thanks to Yasha.
* UPDATE Chinese Mandarin (zh_CN) translations.
Thanks to khi.
* UPDATE Taiwanese Mandarin (zh_TW
, missing pages, and internal
server errors. For example: https://bridges.torproject.org/404
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
rently in use by the ntor handshake, right? Are we prepared to wait three
releases for the new changes to be available ubiquitously, or do we have some
sooner timeline in mind for a PQ handshake?
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 40
What could go wrong?
For the record, I do not see any way for the above concerns to be satisfiably
addressed — short of limiting the expansion of extrainfo descriptor to some
limited number of well-specified fields to serve some express purpose. That
should, essentially, constitute
Tim Wilson-Brown - teor transcribed 19K bytes:
>> On 12 Sep 2015, at 17:26, isis <i...@torproject.org> wrote:
>>> Tim Wilson-Brown - teor transcribed 23K bytes:
>>>> On 10 Sep 2015, at 17:01, isis <i...@torproject.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>
Assistance with the completion of #17262 (due 31 Oct) would be greatly
appreciated, since my plan for tomorrow is to work with some of the
cryptographers here to review my changes to the crypto in rBridge for #7520.
[0]:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/torspec.git/commit/?h=bug17261-best-guess
://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17261
[1]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/torspec.git/log/?h=bug17261
Best,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net
ed
forgery resistance that Nick mentioned).
Ex. 1: Alice is building her circuit through Bob the Bridge, and Bob uses
Bridge Guards. Alice would like to extend to Charlie, and so she sends an
EXTEND2 inside a RELAY_EARLY to Bob which says so. Bob recieves this, does
AEZ_Decrypt([…]) on the RELAY_EARLY cell
ct.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
signature.asc
Description: Digital sig
thomas lörtsch transcribed 2.8K bytes:
> On 09 Oct 2015, at 13:17, isis <i...@torproject.org> wrote:
>
> > thomas lörtsch transcribed 8.6K bytes:
> >> analytics server proposal
> >> =
> >
> > Hi Thomas,
> >
> &
Karsten Loesing transcribed 4.6K bytes:
> Hi Thomas and Isis,
>
> first of all, this is a great proposal. Thomas and I talked a bit
> about this idea in Berlin and the days after, and then Thomas turned
> this into a great analysis what's needed to set up such a server to
> a
Li Xiaodong transcribed 0.9K bytes:
> *Hello, are there any better ways to connect to the Tor network than
> bridges?*
Try using obfs4 bridges.
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
C
many of these issues will be helped by Isa's Trac improvements,
and AFAIK there are plans to discuss at the dev meeting better ways for
prioritise devs doing stuff without worrying as much about funder stuffs.
Just saying that knowing which funder is paying me for a thing is still
, rather than actually trying to get multiple copies
of the same IP:port pair listed in the consensus.
[0]:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/or/dirserv.c?id=c84f3c91#n2085
Best Regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0
atform/caller specific.
> * Allow operating both as a client and a server simultaneously. I
> don't see a problem with running 2 copies of something for this
> use case.
As always, I'm glad to provide help with this stuff, whether spec or code
changes,
Tim Wilson-Brown - teor transcribed 23K bytes:
>
> > On 10 Sep 2015, at 17:01, isis <i...@torproject.org> wrote:
> >
> >> 4.4.1. Bridge Reachability Self-Testing
> >>
> >> Before a Bridge uploads its descriptors to the BridgeAuthority, it
> &
al bridges with PTs: 1867
total obfs4: 1413
(obfs2 or obfs3): 1739
(obfs2 or obfs3) and (not obfs4): 438
(obfs2 or obfs3) and (obfs4): 1301
obfs4 only (no other transports): 112
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18
ch Bridges were reachable, letting BridgeDB do the PT
reachability testing.)
Please help me brainstorm a way out of this mess!
[0]:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/188-bridge-guards.txt
[1]: https://bugs.torproject.org/7144
[2]: https://bugs.torproject.org/7349
Best Reg
hewson
+Author: Nick Mathewson, Isis Lovecruft
Created: 14 Oct 2011
+Modified: 10 Sep 2015
Status: Open
1. Overview
@@ -76,111 +77,317 @@ Status: Open
remove, and remove a layer of encryption on incoming cells on that
circuit corresponding to the encryption that the guard will add.
-
Yawning Angel transcribed 2.7K bytes:
> On Thu, 10 Sep 2015 07:01:58 +
> isis <i...@torproject.org> wrote:
> > 3. Should we change how the BridgeAuthority tests Bridge ORPort
> > reachability? If so, how?
> >
> > 4. If I'm going to refactor all of this, a
ved to Golang, but I think it is still
in general a nice thing to do for the rest of the world to maintain a usable
Python PT library.
If help is wanted decoupling the networking bits and putting them into pyptlib,
I'd gladly assist.
Although perhaps this should wait until the PT spec is refactore
t for other researchers to study tor (hopefully, ethically).
[0]:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-cloud-service-ending-many-ways-remain-help-users-access-uncensored-internet
[1]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11502
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
). Were there any others?
[0]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
signature
bridges instead (also, code duplication).
[0]: https://bugs.torproject.org/16650
[1]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/tor.git/log/?h=bug7144
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
_
OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current
makes recalculation of the hashring
when a new consensus arrives much more time efficient.
If you want to play with it, I've implemented it in Python for BridgeDB:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/bridgedb.git/tree/bridgedb/hashring.py?id=949d33e8#n481
One tiny caveat being
Roger Dingledine transcribed 1.0K bytes:
Isis: I'd like to highlight this change for you, since it means
that the bridge authority's networkstatus files are now going to
have HSDir flags on the bridge status lines.
I don't know if this is going to be a problem for any of your parsing
code
in
the package from stretch (testing):
https://packages.debian.org/stretch/obfs4proxy
Best Regards,
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
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WARNING: much text. so email. very long.
Mike Perry transcribed 13K bytes:
isis:
Additionally, SOW.9. is actually the chronological precursor to SOW.10., the
latter of which is implementing rBridge (or at least getting started on it).
(Work on this is still waiting on OTF to officially
it still give out a maximum of
three Bridges per request? More? Less?
Would you and/or Isis be able to work on this on the backend? If not,
can either of you recommend someone that might be able to help with the
domain fronting bits and other bits involved?
I'm in. Yawning mentioned wanting
.
As per usual, the full CHANGELOG is available here:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/tree/CHANGELOG
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♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
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of us know if this would help with scheduling
in any way.
isis transcribed 2.6K bytes:
Hello!
Did you have an interest in attending the Pluggable Transports Meeting v1.0?
Well then, you will certainly be excited to here about the *BRAND NEW*
Pluggable Transports Meeting v2.0
*NOW
Griffin Boyce transcribed 3.1K bytes:
So, just to clarify, this would be 10pm EST on Tuesday or Wednesday night,
correct?
~Griffin
Yes.
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♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
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Current
, rather than both?
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♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
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and in someone's fork of Globe on Github.
Unfortunately, I no longer have enough extra time to do this minor
maintenance, nor anything more extensive. I would be absolutely delighted if
someone else stepped up to be a real maintainer for Globe!
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♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
that is completed, we'll do a
round of screenshots, guide updates, etc. This will most likely happen
in early April.
Wow, this is awesome! Great work, to all of you!
Let me know if there's anything more I can do to help.
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♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
David Fifield transcribed 1.7K bytes:
Let's just drop this part of the spec, and delete some underspecified
and unused code?
+1
If we ever want a PT to lauch all types that it support, we could always add
an explicit reserved PT type for the action, e.g. 'all'.
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♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
Nathan Freitas transcribed 1.6K bytes:
On Fri, Mar 20, 2015, at 04:05 AM, isis wrote:
Let me know if there's anything more I can do to help.
In thinking about how users on phones/tablets will actually get
obfs3/4/scramblesuit bridges, I realized that going to
https://bridges.torproject.org
Matthew Finkel transcribed 1.6K bytes:
On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 01:01:52PM +0200, Karsten Loesing wrote:
On 24/10/14 01:53, isis wrote:
isis transcribed 6.6K bytes:
* The hashed fingerprint (as is the case for bridges in onionoo)
* The hashed ip:port
Actually, my apologies
isis transcribed 6.6K bytes:
* The hashed fingerprint (as is the case for bridges in onionoo)
* The hashed ip:port
Actually, my apologies, I was quite tired when I wrote this and totally
completely wrong.
A hashed ip:port would be a terrible idea because IPv4 space is only 2^32 and
ports
)? Is there another use case?
Also, with that setting, we could consider doing something like #4026, [0]
except have the info specified in the descriptor. Something like:
BridgeDistribution [email]|[https]|[none]|[any]
[0]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4026
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♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
Karsten Loesing transcribed 1.9K bytes:
On 16/10/14 09:06, isis wrote:
Roger Dingledine transcribed 1.0K bytes:
Your best bet at a short-term hack might be to add a line to the
descriptor which politely asks bridgedb not to give its address out.
Interesting idea...
Would
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