On 11 Oct 2014, at 01:14, Virgil Griffith i...@virgil.gr wrote:
Will a longer version of this paper be coming out, particularly one for
developers?
I don’t have any immediate plans to do so, as my current thinking is it would
end up being a queuing theory tutorial with the current paper
Hi Nick,
This sounds related to an old idea I presented at PETS 2006:
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/07/13/protecting-software-distribution-with-a-cryptographic-build-process/
However there's an important difference. The proposal below is how the
directory authorities advertise good
Hi Chang,
Thanks for the update. BOSH certainly looks like a promising basis, though of
course it makes no attempt at obfuscation or scanning resistance.
I've added this to the design document:
https://github.com/sjmurdoch/http-transport/blob/master/design.md
I was thinking about this being a
Hi Chang,
On 29 May 2013, at 06:22, Chang Lan changl...@gmail.com wrote:
Given that ScrambleSuite is being deployed, improving protocol obfuscation
will be my main focus. HTTP impersonation is really useful, since there are
numerous HTTP proxy outside the censored region, while the number of
On 11 Jun 2013, at 12:49, Steven Murdoch steven.murd...@cl.cam.ac.uk wrote:
There certainly are quite a few open questions, so it would be good to start
planning early. Implementing HTTP is a deceptively difficult project.
I've started a design document
https://github.com/sjmurdoch/http
Hi,
Thanks for considering this project and posting your proposal to the list.
On 1 Apr 2012, at 11:24, drake01 wrote:
After initial shortlisting of transport protocols to be integrated with tor, I
am left with sctp and udp.
Do you mean utp (or µtp with appropriate mail client :-))
So if
On 12 Feb 2012, at 03:28, Nick Mathewson wrote:
2. In comparison assertions, the general convention seems to be to place the
expected value first (test_eq(0, functioncall(...)) rather than
test_eq(functioncall(...), 0)). I have modified the assertions not
following that convention, so they all
On 15 Jan 2012, at 20:47, Nick Mathewson wrote:
Another thing to try: recent gccs and their toolchains have a trick where
they can stick every function in its own segment, then tell the linker to
dump the unused ones. I believe it's called gc-segments or something. I
have no idea if it
From a first look at 176 it looks good. Some comments and suggestions inline:
Terminological note: I use client below to mean the Tor
instance (a client or a bridge or a relay) that initiates a TLS
connection, and server to mean the Tor instance (a bridge or a
relay) that accepts
