On Mon, Dec 01, 2014 at 09:59:57AM -0500, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:30 AM, Ian Goldberg wrote:
> > On Mon, Dec 01, 2014 at 09:14:03AM -0500, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> >> Then how about specifying something like this for the RSA-signed part
> >> (in place of the SHA1):
> >>
On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:30 AM, Ian Goldberg wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 01, 2014 at 09:14:03AM -0500, Nick Mathewson wrote:
>> Then how about specifying something like this for the RSA-signed part
>> (in place of the SHA1):
>>[fixed string] 8 bytes
>>[SHA512 signature] 32 bytes
>>
>> Where the f
On Mon, Dec 01, 2014 at 09:14:03AM -0500, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> Then how about specifying something like this for the RSA-signed part
> (in place of the SHA1):
>[fixed string] 8 bytes
>[SHA512 signature] 32 bytes
>
> Where the fixed sting could be something like "HSNONTOR", and we can
>
On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 1:19 PM, Ian Goldberg wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 03:22:18PM +, Steven Murdoch wrote:
>> On 24 Nov 2014, at 18:54, Tom Ritter wrote:
>>
>> > Attached is a document written in the specification format for one
>> > aspect of CA-signed .onion addresses - specifically
On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 03:22:18PM +, Steven Murdoch wrote:
> On 24 Nov 2014, at 18:54, Tom Ritter wrote:
>
> > Attached is a document written in the specification format for one
> > aspect of CA-signed .onion addresses - specifically a "What is a safe
> > way to sign (or not sign) a statemen
On 24 Nov 2014, at 18:54, Tom Ritter wrote:
> Attached is a document written in the specification format for one
> aspect of CA-signed .onion addresses - specifically a "What is a safe
> way to sign (or not sign) a statement using the .onion key" It
> presents a couple options - I'd love to get
Some hidden services have been signing various things
with their HS keys. Even benefit may exists from moving
from 1024 to 4k+ and add passphrased startup option while
keeping 80bit for now. There may already be ticket on this area.
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Attached is a document written in the specification format for one
aspect of CA-signed .onion addresses - specifically a "What is a safe
way to sign (or not sign) a statement using the .onion key" It
presents a couple options - I'd love to get feedback from folks on
which they prefer.
I recognize
