Re: [tor-dev] The Onion Name System (OnioNS)

2015-06-02 Thread OnioNS Dev
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 > What's to stop a sybil attack where the malicious relays try to occupy likely > site(s) for the next Quorum? > > Is the consensus unpredictable enough to thwart this attack? > Even during quiet times? (Does Tor have quiet times?) As you can see

Re: [tor-dev] The Onion Name System (OnioNS)

2015-06-02 Thread teor
> On 3 Jun 2015, at 02:07 , teor wrote: > > >> Date: Mon, 18 May 2015 15:48:50 -0800 >> From: OnioNS Dev >> >> ... >> >> I introduce several data structures, but the most important one is the >> Pagechain, a distributed structure of linked Pages. Pages contain Records, >> Records contain .

Re: [tor-dev] The Onion Name System (OnioNS)

2015-06-02 Thread teor
> Date: Mon, 18 May 2015 15:48:50 -0800 > From: OnioNS Dev > > ... > > I introduce several data structures, but the most important one is the > Pagechain, a distributed structure of linked Pages. Pages contain Records, > Records contain .tor -> onion associations. Anyone who is familiar with

Re: [tor-dev] The Onion Name System (OnioNS)

2015-05-23 Thread Christian Grothoff
On 05/23/2015 06:26 PM, OnioNS Dev wrote: > My design also assumes > that there is no dynamic compromise of Tor routers (there's no > incentive for an attacker to target Tor routers because of OnioNS) I can live with explicitly stated design assumptions, but the claim that there is "no incentive f

Re: [tor-dev] The Onion Name System (OnioNS)

2015-05-23 Thread OnioNS Dev
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 05/20/2015 12:18 AM, tor-dev-requ...@lists.torproject.org wrote: > Furthermore, there is the question of time. As .tor-names are pinned (if you > have a name, you get to keep it 'forever', right?), an adversary may invest > into the required

Re: [tor-dev] The Onion Name System (OnioNS)

2015-05-20 Thread Christian Grothoff
On 05/19/2015 07:11 PM, OnioNS Dev wrote: > On 05/19/2015 03:20 AM, tor-dev-requ...@lists.torproject.org wrote: > >> I'm not sure how your proposal significantly improves on NameCoin, >> except that it is specialized to Tor (and thus doesn't attempt to >> be as compatible with DNS as Namecoin): fo

Re: [tor-dev] The Onion Name System (OnioNS)

2015-05-19 Thread grarpamp
In the sense that the IPv6 addresses provided by Onioncat are namelike, these may be of reference interest (I do not know if Bernhard has produced paper/slides/video for the new HS crypto model in english yet. I hope to look it over.) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zj4hSx6cW80 https://www.yo

Re: [tor-dev] The Onion Name System (OnioNS)

2015-05-19 Thread OnioNS Dev
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 05/19/2015 03:20 AM, tor-dev-requ...@lists.torproject.org wrote: > Subject: > Re: [tor-dev] The Onion Name System (OnioNS) > From: > Christian Grothoff > Date: > 05/19/2015 03:24 AM > > To: > tor-dev@lists.torprojec

Re: [tor-dev] The Onion Name System (OnioNS)

2015-05-19 Thread Christian Grothoff
Please write an IETF draft asking for ".tor" to be reserved for Tor under RFC 6761 referencing your documentation. Should take no time if you base it on Jake's ".onion" draft. Send it to dnsop, they really love to discuss this topic and alternative DNS protocol ideas right now. ^_^. Also, GNS is