Re: [tor-relays] Using aes-in in Tor

2012-08-15 Thread Robert Ransom
On 8/15/12, tor-admin tor-ad...@torland.me wrote: Hi, I am struggling setting up aes-in support with Ubuntu 12.04 LTS. I enabled aes in bios. cat /proc/cpuinfo shows the aes flag. #lsmod |grep aes aesni_intel55664 0 cryptd 20530 1 aesni_intel aes_x86_64

Re: [tor-relays] Help the Tor Project by running a fast unpublished bridge

2012-08-15 Thread Philipp Winter
On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 11:55:55AM +0800, Lorenz Kirchner wrote: I'm not a tor expert but I am in China and have been using tor... I brought this up before and I still feel that tor would benefit from having special (entry)relays inside the GFW that have a reliable link to relays outside the

Re: [tor-relays] Using aes-in in Tor

2012-08-15 Thread Moritz Bartl
On 15.08.2012 13:03, tor-admin wrote: Does this mean that the command #openssl engine (rsax) RSAX engine support (dynamic) Dynamic engine loading support does not need to show a line with (aesni) Intel AES-NI engine as described here at Torservers:

Re: [tor-relays] Help the Tor Project by running a fast unpublished bridge

2012-08-15 Thread Lorenz Kirchner
I guess, that would require a modification of the path selection on the clients side. Usually, Tor clients randomly pick relays weighted by bandwidth. Unless the Chinese relays would provide an enormous amount of bandwidth, they would barely get selected by clients which leads to a poor user

Re: [tor-relays] Help the Tor Project by running a fast unpublished bridge

2012-08-15 Thread Philipp Winter
Hi Loz, On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 11:00:11PM +0800, Lorenz Kirchner wrote: I guess, that would require a modification of the path selection on the clients side. Usually, Tor clients randomly pick relays weighted by bandwidth. Unless the Chinese relays would provide an enormous amount of

Re: [tor-relays] Help the Tor Project by running a fast unpublished bridge

2012-08-15 Thread Philipp Winter
On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 11:42:08PM +0800, Lorenz Kirchner wrote: Perhaps it's better to focus on improved bridge distribution strategies [0] and hard-to-block transport protocols [1]. Also, that would be a universal solution which would also help in other countries and not a specific - and

Re: [tor-relays] Exit Port Usage Statistics for Allow all nodes

2012-08-15 Thread Mike Perry
Thus spake Moritz Bartl (mor...@torservers.net): At torservers.net, we run some large exit relays with an allow all except port 25 policy. These are statistics from ARM showing exit port statistics of a fast exit running for seven hours at 30-40 MB/s: 443 HTTPS 17650 (%55) 80

Re: [tor-relays] Exit Port Usage Statistics for Allow all nodes

2012-08-15 Thread Mike Perry
Thus spake Steve Snyder (swsny...@snydernet.net): On Wednesday, August 15, 2012 4:44pm, Mike Perry mikepe...@torproject.org said: Here's the read and write statistics from the ExtraInfo descriptors from a handful of the fastest default-policy and reduced-policy relays: Pardon my

Re: [tor-relays] Exit Port Usage Statistics for Allow all nodes

2012-08-15 Thread Andy Isaacson
On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 10:21:18PM +0200, Moritz Bartl wrote: At torservers.net, we run some large exit relays with an allow all except port 25 policy. These are statistics from ARM showing exit port statistics of a fast exit running for seven hours at 30-40 MB/s: 443 HTTPS 17650

Re: [tor-relays] Help the Tor Project by running a fast unpublished bridge

2012-08-15 Thread Lorenz Kirchner
On Thu, Aug 16, 2012 at 3:23 AM, Philipp Winter identity.funct...@gmail.com wrote: Yes, assuming the users would not give up out of frustration before :-) We can actually do the math: According to [0], at the moment the Tor network has an advertised bandwidth of 3000 MiB/s. Let's assume