I observed an interesting behavior in the
authority votes regarding relay stability
and am curious if anyone can comment.
Have a new relay, about ten days old.
Relay is marked
Fast Guard Running Stable Valid
One 10 minute network outage three days ago
and then a 68 minute outage one day ago
Tor Exit Relay have the ability to filter traffic by allowing the
operator make choices based on personal preferences for personal, legal
(ex: country of origin) and for other reasons.
Non-exit Relays do not have the ability to set Relay Policies
(torcc??), and why would they, considering that
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Das, Anupam:
So we have received some questions about running our traceroute
measurements. Let me answer some of the questions:
Here are two more:
1. Is the traffic to go *through* tor, or just clearnet off the
machine running the relay?
2. Is
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krishna e bera:
On 13-10-20 12:42 PM, Gordon Morehouse wrote:
First, during a SYN flood type overload, some peers which have
*existing* circuits built through the relay and are sending SYNs
as normal traffic, will stochastically get caught in
On 27 Oct 2013 21:23, Gordon Morehouse gor...@morehouse.me wrote:
1. Is the traffic to go *through* tor, or just clearnet off the
machine running the relay?
Traffic is sent directly, not through Tor.
2. Is this only applicable to exit relays? That's not clear at all,
whether results from
On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 09:42:01AM -0700, Gordon Morehouse wrote:
With the slower computers, sometimes too many attempts to connect to
the ORPort (I am almost positive as part of TAP circuit building, but
not *really* sure) can eventually cause Tor to consume more physmem
than available and
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David Serrano:
On 2013-10-27 15:00:10 (-0700), Gordon Morehouse wrote:
Here's my 'iptables -L' output, on pastebin because it's a mess
when formatted for email: http://pastebin.com/f1VZNeTF
That's not a fresh boot, though, I did:
I didn't say I knew the type of traffic on my relay, that would be an entirely
new set of problems; I said I can see the IP addresses coming in and going out,
and the ports used. I would venture to ask this is not how Tor is intended to
work? If this is a possible bug in Tor, i dunno, then one
Lukas Erlacher l.erlac...@gmail.com wrote:
Middle nodes don't know the type of traffic. If they have any way
to find out, that is a bug that needs to be fixed. End-of.
Packet timing analysis may be able to tell you *something* -- this is
part of my current research project, ask again in six
Gordon,
Thank you.
I may have a go at building the package from source, now.
Robert
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On 10/27/2013 4:49 PM, Zack Weinberg wrote:
Lukas Erlacher l.erlac...@gmail.com wrote:
Middle nodes don't know the type of traffic. If they have any way
to find out, that is a bug that needs to be fixed. End-of.
Packet timing analysis may be able to tell you *something* -- this is
part of
Hi Gordon,
Thanks for the questions. We have put up a small description of
the project and FAQs (including your posted questions) at the following link-
http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html
Hope you find the page helpful.
Thanks
Anupam Das
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Hi Roger, I was hoping you'd get to this eventually. :)
Roger Dingledine:
On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 09:42:01AM -0700, Gordon Morehouse wrote:
With the slower computers, sometimes too many attempts to connect
to the ORPort (I am almost positive as
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Das, Anupam:
Hi Gordon, Thanks for the questions. We have put up a small
description of the project and FAQs (including your posted
questions) at the following link-
http://web.engr.illinois.edu/~das17/tor-traceroute_v1.html
Hope you find
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