Re: [tor-relays] Subpoena received

Now Alistaro (our ISP) wants the IPs as well or they will probably shut down the server tomorrow. Well that escalated quickly. -- Sam Grüneisen - President Frënn vun der Ënn A.S.B.L. enn.lu ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org

[tor-relays] Wj%#qpkkn

XaLloukkkl Zp Eeddpprriioxzlal Pzjmmp --whmllpq,ukInviato dal l cellulare Andropf K-9 Mail.___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Re: [tor-relays] Subpoena received

All I can say is reach out to EFF and Moritz. I am surprised and saddened to hear this. Have you told your ISP about Tor? Did you tell them in advance of setting up the relay what it is, and what it is not? Kind regards, Matt Speak Freely Tyler Durden: Now Alistaro (our ISP) wants the IPs

Re: [tor-relays] Subpoena received

I'm in contact with Moritz and yes we told them from the beginning what our organization does and what Tor is. We had no problems so far. I'm as surprised as you guys. Voxility/Alistaro was always very Tor friendly. On 2015-04-22 19:08, Speak Freely wrote: All I can say is reach out to EFF and

[tor-relays] Quantum Insert detection for everyone

Greetings, Did you all see this Wired article about Quantum Insert detection? https://www.wired.com/2015/04/researchers-uncover-method-detect-nsa-quantum-insert-hacks These TCP injection attacks are used by various entities around the world (not just NSA!) to target individuals for surveillance

[tor-relays] ARM stopped working

Hello Everyone, I noticed ARM stopped working for me. Has anyone seen this before? Traceback (most recent call last): File /usr/share/arm/starter.py, line 578, in module cli.controller.startTorMonitor(time.time() - initTime) File /usr/share/arm/cli/controller.py, line 700, in

Re: [tor-relays] ARM stopped working

Hi Jeffery. Think I've seen that before, and it was due to running out of disk space so the log file was truncated. Try shutting down tor, moving the log file aside, clearing up some space (if you're out), then starting tor back up so you have a fresh log file. Cheers! -Damian On Wed, Apr 22,

Re: [tor-relays] Subpoena received

On 2015-04-20 08:32, Tyler Durden wrote: Hi I just wanted to let you know that Washington sent us a subpoena regarding one of our exit nodes in Romania. They want to know the real IP behind the Tor Network. I mailed them what Tor is and why I can't help them in identifying this person.

Re: [tor-relays] Subpoena received

Mega? A dotcom? Really people? Come on, that's soo legacy. Use what your mama gave you... put it on a hidden service. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Re: [tor-relays] ARM stopped working

Check the settings of your log rotate as well. If logs are causing the space issue that will help clear it up. On Apr 22, 2015 1:37 PM, Jeffrey Hathaway jahatha...@gmail.com wrote: Hello Everyone, I noticed ARM stopped working for me. Has anyone seen this before? Traceback (most recent call

Re: [tor-relays] Subpoena received

Am 22.04.2015 um 21:39 schrieb grarpamp: Use what your mama gave you... put it on a hidden service. Great idea: http://tke3zwmd6mnvq6jp.onion/AlistarSecuritySubpoena.pdf ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org

Re: [tor-relays] [tor-talk] Quantum Insert detection for everyone

I'm being a jerk and cross-posting to tor-relays, because I want to make sure that relay operators are aware of the differences in the Snort vs HoneyBadger approach. Chris Dagdigian: I run a US-based exit node and would be interested in a way to run this software without compromising the

Re: [tor-relays] Quantum Insert detection for everyone

hi, Am 22.04.2015 um 20:41 schrieb David Stainton: Did you all see this Wired article about Quantum Insert detection? https://www.wired.com/2015/04/researchers-uncover-method-detect-nsa-quantum-insert-hacks proof me wrong but wouldn't the use of a HTTPS/OnionAddress render this attack

Re: [tor-relays] Quantum Insert detection for everyone

Yes and no. HTTPS/Onion services prevents successful TCP injection attacks when the attacker doesn't know the key material... therefore to make this claim about HTTPS in general seems rather sketchy given that many CA's have been pwn'ed (and subpoena'ed?) in the past. TCP injection attacks are

Re: [tor-relays] Quantum Insert detection for everyone

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Thanks for your reply David Stainton wrote: Yes and no. HTTPS/Onion services prevents successful TCP injection attacks when the attacker doesn't know the key material... therefore to make this claim about HTTPS in general seems rather sketchy

Re: [tor-relays] Delete keys on reboot

On Wed, 22 Apr 2015 22:56:31 +, CJ Barlow wrote: If I run rm -f /var/lib/tor/keys/* 21 /home/[me]/reboot.txt it doesn't error (as long as I run it with sudo) but it also doesn't do anything, You might do (ls -lart /var/lib/tor/keys echo /var/lib/tor/keys/* rm -f

Re: [tor-relays] Quantum Insert detection for everyone

TCP injection attacks are not the same as man-in-the-middle attacks... but rather are categorized as man-on-the-side. The difference is important because MoS is *much* cheaper for these various (not just NSA) entities to execute. MoS means you do not have to pwn a route endpoint at the site

Re: [tor-relays] Delete keys on reboot

On 04/22/2015 06:29 AM, CJ Barlow wrote: @reboot rm -f /var/lib/tor/keys/* echo keys gone! /home/[me]/reboot.txt 21 What's about rm -f /var/lib/tor/keys/* 21 /home/[me]/reboot.txt to see the error msg ? -- Toralf pgp key: 7B1A 07F4 EC82 0F90 D4C2 8936 872A E508 0076 E94E -- ; the past