> On 10 Aug 2015, at 04:57 , Roman Mamedov wrote:
>
> On Mon, 10 Aug 2015 06:39:45 +1200
> Carlin Bingham wrote:
>
>> Try MX Toolbox's blacklist check[0], it searches over 90 blacklists and
>> you'll find at the very least you're on one of the Tor-specific lists.
>>
>>
>> [0] https://mxtool
On Sun, Aug 09, 2015 at 12:52:21PM -0700, Green Dream wrote:
> Some of the speeds are a bit
> slow, but nothing low enough to explain the extremely low measured
> bandwidth these relays are getting.
Note that the bandwidth weights in the consensus are unitless: they
are simply weights, and they o
> So we now have the bandwidth, IP, and dirport of the fastest exits. With this
> list in hand, I just needed to form a proper URL, wget each one, and grep out
> the transfer speed:
>
> http://37.130.227.133:80/tor/server/all 1.17 MB/s
> http://176.126.252.11:443/tor/server/all 4.54 MB/s
> http
> A simple test you could run on your server is fetching directory info
> from nodes that have directory functionality enabled.
Thanks for the idea. blutmagie offers a CSV list of its current result set,
so this ended up being quite easy to automate.
I fetched a copy of the CSV to the server:
++ 09/08/15 06:44 + - Sharif Olorin:
>I'd be curious to know if anyone is running a relay that's not logged
>at all within its own AS; it seems like it'd be out of the reach of
>most operators, unless they have a friendly employer.
Up until now, my host didn't do anything like netflow - but I
I checked the lists; all my ipv4 relays are there. At the same time, I
haven't noticed any issues with network access from any of the addresses,
in 5+ years of observations. Doesn't mean that nothing is blocked, just
that ppl on my network never attempt to go to places behind the lists.
Wondering
On Mon, 10 Aug 2015 06:39:45 +1200
Carlin Bingham wrote:
> Try MX Toolbox's blacklist check[0], it searches over 90 blacklists and
> you'll find at the very least you're on one of the Tor-specific lists.
>
>
> [0] https://mxtoolbox.com/blacklists.aspx
Yeah on precisely one:
> DAN TOR
> This
Or just search Google for your relay's IP. You'll find several blacklists
that contain it and all the other relays. It's not FUD. Here are some more
examples:
https://www.dan.me.uk/torlist/
https://github.com/ktsaou/blocklist-ipsets/blob/master/dm_tor.ipset
https://github.com/ktsaou/blocklist-ipse
On Mon, 10 Aug 2015, at 05:19 AM, Roman Mamedov wrote:
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> On Sun, 9 Aug 2015 13:02:14 -0400
> Zack Weinberg wrote:
>
> > several "this IP is a source of spam" blacklists indiscriminately list _all_
> > Tor relays, whether or not they are exit no
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On 8/9/2015 10:00 AM, Zack Weinberg wrote:
> On 08/09/2015 12:52 PM, Kurt Besig wrote:
>> Without going into any detail at this point I'm wondering if
>> others, running a simple middle relay, have encountered any
>> governmental harassment as a dir
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On Sun, 9 Aug 2015 13:02:14 -0400
Zack Weinberg wrote:
> several "this IP is a source of spam" blacklists indiscriminately list _all_
> Tor relays, whether or not they are exit nodes.
Now this is just unnecessarily FUDish, at http://bgp.he.net/ one
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On 08/09/2015 12:52 PM, Kurt Besig wrote:
> Without going into any detail at this point I'm wondering if
> others, running a simple middle relay, have encountered any
> g
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On 08/09/2015 12:52 PM, Kurt Besig wrote:
> Without going into any detail at this point I'm wondering if
> others, running a simple middle relay, have encountered any
> governmental harassment as a direct result of running a relay. The
> blocking of
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Without going into any detail at this point I'm wondering if others,
running a simple middle relay, have encountered any governmental
harassment as a direct result of running a relay. The blocking of
state agencies e.g, CA.SDI.gov, CA.DMV.gov?
Over t
Hi.
On 08/09/2015 07:44 AM, Sharif Olorin wrote:
>> > I would expect most US universities to be logging netflow in the very
>> > least. Even if the Tor operator isn't keeping logs, it seems safe to assume
>> > the network operator is.
>
> I'd be surprised if it was different for non-US universitie
> Thanks for running the tests. Which exit nodes led to poor performance? I
> would like to try to reproduce any performance problems.
I did not record the nodes (they were in Europe). A simple test you could run
on your server is fetching directory info from nodes that have directory
functiona
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