Re: [tor-relays] Tor abuse complaints (per MBit/s)

2016-09-28 Thread Sadia Afroz
Moritz, We did not publish the report anywhere. I put it up on my site just for the ease of sharing it in the mailing list. I can take the report down if you are not comfortable with it being public. > On Sep 28, 2016, at 9:55 PM, Moritz Bartl wrote: > > On 09/28/2016 09:12 PM, nusenu wrote: >

Re: [tor-relays] Tor abuse complaints (per MBit/s)

2016-09-28 Thread Moritz Bartl
On 09/28/2016 09:12 PM, nusenu wrote: > In your number of complains over time graphs you do not seem to take > traffic into account? > > Would you care to add a > number of complains over time per MBit/s of exit relay traffic? I strongly urged them to do exactly this before they publish. The abso

Re: [tor-relays] "Potentially dangerous relay groups"

2016-09-28 Thread nusenu
> It - plus the follow up from that many contributors - did answer my questions > apart from two left: > > - should only Markus be contacted instead of lets say at least all the folks > with more than 2 notes to make them aware? I contacted many of the most relevant operators with incorrect MyF

Re: [tor-relays] The Onion Box v3.0: Web Interface for your Tor relay

2016-09-28 Thread John Ricketts
Ralph, I will begin testing it with my 20 nodes. John On Sep 28, 2016, at 14:49, Ralph Wetzel mailto:theonion...@gmx.com>> wrote: Good Evening! After several months of silence (resulting in intensive development work in the background) I'm happy to announce the release of v3.0RC1

[tor-relays] The Onion Box v3.0: Web Interface for your Tor relay

2016-09-28 Thread Ralph Wetzel
Good Evening!   After several months of silence (resulting in intensive development work in the background) I'm happy to announce the release of v3.0RC1 of The Onion Box, the Web Interface for your Tor relay. It finally became a total re-write of the code, resulting in a decluttered interface an

Re: [tor-relays] Tor abuse complaints (my public key)

2016-09-28 Thread Sadia Afroz
A couple of people asked for my public key. Here it is: -BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- Version: GnuPG v1 mQINBFWxKMQBEAD1DeQxFIwUpoTKKYm0lweSv4uGmaC8EKT4KTlJBLbLrOqmkGE0 0mnnlHgByqR+wzZpDMNXPu9omV+WQDMBJq7v88RzCjsMSvCEVmDx1TQQfikzedA4 /XIRvqlF4+YIHiOaQkCQ5Rc7568rPKWpYZt3BTYErnjyNlzn3czv4Mxlv

Re: [tor-relays] Tor abuse complaints (per MBit/s)

2016-09-28 Thread Sadia Afroz
In your number of complains over time graphs you do not seem to taketraffic into account?Would you care to add anumber of complains over time per MBit/s of exit relay traffic?Thanks for pointing that out!This is a preliminary report, so there are many questions this report doesn’t answer yet.We kno

Re: [tor-relays] "Potentially dangerous relay groups"

2016-09-28 Thread pa011
Am 27.09.2016 um 19:37 schrieb nusenu: > pa...@web.de wrote: >> there is that list of "potentially_dangerous_relaygroups" you published. >> Could yo please emphasize a bit more on what brings a relay on that list, >> apart from incorrect given MyFamily which doesnt seem to be always the case. >>

Re: [tor-relays] Tor abuse complaints (per MBit/s)

2016-09-28 Thread nusenu
> Dear exit operators, Can you please share the abuse complaints you > received while running an exit? > > We are researchers from Univ. of California, Berkeley and Univ. of > Massachusetts Amherst are interested in understanding what kind of > abuse happens through Tor. Thanks to Moritz Bartl fr

Re: [tor-relays] "Potentially dangerous relay groups"

2016-09-28 Thread Corné Oppelaar
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Personally I like what Petrusko provided the most > In torrc, an idea...?? > > *MyFamily http://mydomain.org/myfamily.txt* the list being a plaintext file of fingerprints seperated by newlines, and if the server having that family list is not in t

Re: [tor-relays] "Potentially dangerous relay groups"

2016-09-28 Thread Random Tor Node Operator
On 09/28/2016 02:01 PM, Chad MILLER wrote: > So? A relay can always have behaved badly. What's the harm in you > fraudulently claiming to be in family com.example.chadmiller ? A user's > path won't have passed through both you and me, but you could have > prevented traffic from passing through you

Re: [tor-relays] "Potentially dangerous relay groups"

2016-09-28 Thread Chad MILLER
On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 7:08 AM, grarpamp wrote: > On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 6:24 AM, Chad MILLER wrote: > > Why isn't MyFamily a family name, instead of a list of members? I see no > > downside to having an unauthenticated > > Because anyone can assert the string and > shared strings can't cross

[tor-relays] Request for Tor abuse complaints

2016-09-28 Thread Sadia Afroz
Dear exit operators, Can you please share the abuse complaints you received while running an exit? We are researchers from Univ. of California, Berkeley and Univ. of Massachusetts Amherst are interested in understanding what kind of abuse happens through Tor. Thanks to Moritz Bartl from Torserv

Re: [tor-relays] "Potentially dangerous relay groups"

2016-09-28 Thread grarpamp
On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 6:24 AM, Chad MILLER wrote: > Why isn't MyFamily a family name, instead of a list of members? I see no > downside to having an unauthenticated Because anyone can assert the string and shared strings can't cross certify each other. __

Re: [tor-relays] "Potentially dangerous relay groups"

2016-09-28 Thread Chad MILLER
Why isn't MyFamily a family name, instead of a list of members? I see no downside to having an unauthenticated advisory don't-route-through-me-if-you-also-route-through... So, all of my nodes could have MyFamilyName org.example On Sep 28, 2016 05:52, "Roman Mamedov" wrote: > On Wed, 28 Sep 201

Re: [tor-relays] "Potentially dangerous relay groups"

2016-09-28 Thread Ralph Seichter
On 28.09.2016 11:52, Roman Mamedov wrote: > We're talking MyFamily, so it's you who is in control of all the > nicknames, and it's only by your whim they may or may not change. And your point is what? When I last opted for a different naming scheme, I only had to verify that the names were not al

Re: [tor-relays] "Potentially dangerous relay groups"

2016-09-28 Thread Roman Mamedov
On Wed, 28 Sep 2016 11:41:16 +0200 Ralph Seichter wrote: > Key fingerprints are technically much closer to being IDs than nicknames, > which are nothing but short strings that can - and do - change at a whim. We're talking MyFamily, so it's you who is in control of all the nicknames, and it's on

Re: [tor-relays] "Potentially dangerous relay groups"

2016-09-28 Thread Ralph Seichter
On 28.09.2016 08:53, Roman Mamedov wrote: > Any actual rationale, other than "do as I say"? And aside from linking > to the man page which doesn't provide one EITHER. Key fingerprints are technically much closer to being IDs than nicknames, which are nothing but short strings that can - and do -

Re: [tor-relays] "Potentially dangerous relay groups"

2016-09-28 Thread grarpamp
On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 2:53 AM, Roman Mamedov wrote: > Any actual rationale, other than "do as I say"? And aside from linking to the > man page which doesn't provide one EITHER. The ambiguity problems are long known, leading to it going away. Feel free to search historical references and better