Security TorWorld wrote (2016-11-14):
> We believe that next month on the 1st of December would be a good time
> to add this feature.
What is the current state on this?
You are still on the top of this list:
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ornetstats/stats/master/o/potentially_dangerous_relay
Probably this?
> **Dec 9 23:48:10 XXX tor[3941]: Dec 09 23:48:10.165 [warn] Directory
> /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/ cannot be read: Permission denied**
> **Dec 9 23:48:10 XXX tor[3941]: Dec 09 23:48:10.165 [warn] Failed to
> parse/validate config: Failed to configure rendezvous options. See log
dawuud:
>>> Maybe you could also implement my Tor guard discovery
>>> attack that uses this vulnerability?
>>
>> Why not. I just don't know what the attack is. Can you point me to it?
>
> On second thought I guess we better stick to writing scanners because if we
> start writing exploits then even
> > btw i'm surprised you wrote
> > https://github.com/nogoegst/rough/blob/master/tcp.go
> > instead of using https://github.com/google/gopacket
>
> You shouldn't; rough is just a convenient wrapper on top of TCP-ish
> stuff from gopacket (it makes TCP hacks simpler).
ah right. cool.
> > Maybe
Hey,
Compiled current 0.2.8.11 (git-c49e563d0096aa5d) on a RPi,
set up as a bridge + hidden service (http)
Before update, everything was fine.
Now, it's starting only fine when only bridge is enabled
If hidden service is enabled in torrc, some problems :
- restart loop
- /var/log/tor/notices
Good work Chris - not sure if you know yet but what sort of price per month and
is it vps or dedicated?
Cheers
Mark B
> On 9 Dec 2016, at 14:17, Michael Armbruster wrote:
>
>> On 2016-12-09 at 15:09, Chris Adams wrote:
>> Okay,
>>
>> So I've found a ISP in Kenya that says they're happy to h
On 2016-12-09 at 15:09, Chris Adams wrote:
> Okay,
>
> So I've found a ISP in Kenya that says they're happy to host a tor exit
> node. The ping is 270ms from a Canadian ISP, 16 hops. 183ms from
> Germany, 13 hops.
>
> Ultimately, am I making the tor network better or worse, if I were to
> set up
Okay,
So I've found a ISP in Kenya that says they're happy to host a tor exit
node. The ping is 270ms from a Canadian ISP, 16 hops. 183ms from Germany,
13 hops.
Ultimately, am I making the tor network better or worse, if I were to set
up some tor nodes here?
- Chris
On Fri, Dec 9, 2016 at 8:41
https://ooni.torproject.org/post/belarus-fries-onion/
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On Fri, Dec 9, 2016 at 4:53 AM, Roman Mamedov wrote:
> option available today, and you don't have to go back to Pentium 200 to avoid
Using such a relic as a scrub firewall might protect you from magic packets
launched by your adversaries towards one of those listening transistors
in your shiny ne
On 2016-12-09 11:04, teor wrote:
On 9 Dec. 2016, at 20:45, Dakota Hourie
wrote:
Also been looking for a T-shirt. I would even be willing to buy it!
How
do I contact Jon?
-
Dakota Hourie
Outfall Exits Operator
I have CC'd Jon, go easy on him, it's a busy month!
You can't buy a t-shirt, but
> On 9 Dec. 2016, at 20:45, Dakota Hourie wrote:
>
> Also been looking for a T-shirt. I would even be willing to buy it! How
> do I contact Jon?
> -
> Dakota Hourie
> Outfall Exits Operator
I have CC'd Jon, go easy on him, it's a busy month!
You can't buy a t-shirt, but they are available by d
On Fri, 9 Dec 2016 04:17:49 -0500
grarpamp wrote:
> >> Intel ME/AMT concerns me too
>
> > AMD Family 15h itself is safe.
>
> No one has any proof of that for any modern cpu from any
> maker, featureset irrelavant.
Sure, to clarify what's meant here is "it does not implement the actual
backdoor
Also been looking for a T-shirt. I would even be willing to buy it! How
do I contact Jon?
-
Dakota Hourie
Outfall Exits Operator
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-Original Message-
From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-boun...@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of
grarpamp
Sent: Friday, December 09, 2016 11:18 AM
To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Exploiting firmware
>>> Intel ME/AMT concerns me too
>> AMD Family 15h itself
>> Intel ME/AMT concerns me too
> AMD Family 15h itself is safe.
No one has any proof of that for any modern cpu from any
maker, featureset irrelavant. They all accept microcode updates,
which btw are all encrypted closed binary blobs. And the
chips themselves are fully closed source containing b
> On 09 Dec 2016, at 09:34, teor wrote:
>
>
>> On 8 Dec. 2016, at 22:08, Sec INT wrote:
>>
>> US just has alot of people trying to exit there - so its always busy
>
> Tor clients choose exits at random, based on the ports the exit allows.
> They *do not* try to find an exit close to the site
> On 8 Dec. 2016, at 22:08, Sec INT wrote:
>
> US just has alot of people trying to exit there - so its always busy
Tor clients choose exits at random, based on the ports the exit allows.
They *do not* try to find an exit close to the site they are going to.
> - I find Tor follows the money mo
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