Hi,
since out of 447 exit relays that support the new overload system
(it got added in tor 0.4.6.x that recently hit the torproject's debian repo)
over 400 (minus those affected by an onionoo bug)
are overloaded as per tor's definition of it, I'll write some
general recommendations for the DNS ti
nusenu:
I think I have some general questions to begin with:
1) What part should the proposal you brought up play in the overall goal
of limiting impact of malicious relays? You write
"""
Therefore we propose to publish relay operator trust information to
limit the fraction and impact of malici
On 11/6/21 10:39 PM, Logforme wrote:
Got the following in my log today:
Nov 06 18:19:01.000 [warn] Possible compression bomb; abandoning stream.
Nov 06 18:19:01.000 [warn] Unable to decompress HTTP body (tried
Zstandard compressed, on Directory connection (client reading) with
45.66.33.45:80).
Hi,
Sounds good. I read a couple of days ago[1] that there will be a new
iteration of your draft available (shortly). I am happy to give
further feedback while going over the new version, once it is ready.
the changes are already done, but were less significant than expected
since some commen
On Sun, Nov 7, 2021 at 1:36 AM Scott Bennett wrote:
>
>
> Because the obvious incentive for cheaters is in the direction of
> trying
> to get clients' route selectors to choose routes through more than a single
> relay operated by a given cheater, rather than the other way around, this
> loo
