Hello,
We have this ticket open to track this issue:
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/metrics/onionoo/-/issues/40018
cheers,
Gus
On Mon, Dec 27, 2021 at 11:59:30PM +0100, nusenu wrote:
> Hi,
>
> could you paste the Relay Search page link
> and state the correct and incorrect fir
Hi,
could you paste the Relay Search page link
and state the correct and incorrect first_seen timestamps?
kind regards,
nusenu
--
https://nusenu.github.io
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David/Roger:
Search the tor-relay mail archive for my previous responses on loadbalancing
Tor Relays, which I've been successfully doing for the past 6 months with Nginx
(it's possible to do with HAProxy as well). I haven't had time to implement it
with a Tor Bridge, but I assume it will be very
Dave,
After corresponding with Neel and reviewing I2P's obfuscating techniques, in
more detail, it does appear that I2P is blockchaining the fingerprint-to-host
database to all garlic routers. What is not clear is whether said database is
encrypted and secured from operators and only accessable
> On 26 Dec 2021, at 16:48, Bobby Stickel wrote:
>
> Yes
In that case, this thread may be helpful
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2016-December/07.html
(Unwarranted discrimination of relays with dynamic IP)
TLDR;
There are advantages to resetting when a relay's IP a
I notice that the "first seen" info on my obfs4 bridge status page on tor atlas
/ metrics all of a sudden is incorrect, by years. Not sure if it's something
that introduced itself with latest update or what.
The various graphs on traffic and users are still correct through.
A tor op
Shouldn't matter. You can change the IP / location / name etc. of a bridge as
long as you keep and transfer the keys. I have been doing this recently as I
sadly needed to part ways with a provider:
eno1 / daily
day rx | tx | total | avg. rate
-
Regarding:> And as a trivially simple example, what stops an organization with
government level resources from offering $10-$100 (in appropriate currency) to
any citizen that adds a newly discovered bridge to their list?
=> It's basically an arms race. If bridges get burned fast, we can re-deplo
On Mon, Dec 27, 2021 at 12:05:26PM -0700, David Fifield wrote:
> I have the impression that tor cannot use more than one CPU core???is that
> correct? If so, what can be done to permit a bridge to scale beyond
> 1×100% CPU? We can fairly easily scale the Snowflake-specific components
> around the t
The main Snowflake bridge
(https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/5481936581E23D2D178105D44DB6915AB06BFB7F)
is starting to become overloaded, because of a recent substantial
increase in users. I think the host has sufficient CPU and memory
headroom, and pluggable transport process (that re
in chronological order:
--
title: Towards a more Trustworthy Tor Network
when: 2021-12-28, 17:00 CET
where: https://streaming.media.ccc.de/rc3/csh
primary target audience:
- Tor user
- Tor relay operators
- onion service operators
- and every
Yes
On 12/25/2021 10:47 AM, Murad Jabir via tor-relays wrote:
Hello I've noticed that when swapping machines the advertised bandwidth goes
down to 0 and so does the consensus weight. Is it acting like I did a new relay?
Did the IP change ?
Regards,
Murad.
__
Greetings relay operators,
the annual Tor relay operators meetup will be tomorrow (28th) at 2200 UTC+1.
No rC3 ticket required, I'll post the public link here as soon as it's
available.
Looking forward to meeting you
Leibi
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t
On 2021-12-22 23:42, Gary C. New via tor-relays wrote:
I know it might be a fundamental change to the Tor network, but would it
be possible to obfuscate the Tor bridge/relay addresses with their
respective fingerprints; similar, to the I2P network? I've often thought
that this aspect of the I2P
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