[tor-relays] Exit node re-writing PKI certificates?

2014-03-19 Thread Iggy
t, or something else less obvious than cab.cabinethardwareparts.com? I am more curious than anything, and any thoughts are appreciated. I'll paste the details from the previous help ticket below, since they actually captured more details about the bad certificate than I did. Kind Regar

Re: [tor-relays] Exit node re-writing PKI certificates?

2014-03-19 Thread Iggy
I am assuming there is no way to tell this now, after the fact? -iggy On 03/19/2014 11:08 PM, Zack Weinberg wrote: > Really useful to know at this point would be the complete suspicious > certificate (which would e.g. tell us who signed it) and the exit node > in use. > > On We