Re: [tor-relays] PSA: Tor 0.4.5 reaches end of life (EOL) on 2023-02-15

2023-01-24 Thread Tortilla via tor-relays
Asked this before, but no one answered, so I'll try adding on this thread. What are the Tor signing keys? What key is being used here: https://dist.torproject.org/tor-0.4.7.13.tar.gz.sha256sum.asc On Mon, January 23, 2023 3:59 pm, Georg Koppen wrote: > Hello! > > In case it affects you as you

Re: [tor-relays] A Simple Web of Trust for Tor Relay Operator IDs

2021-11-11 Thread Tortilla via tor-relays
> This proposal seems to come from a > desire of power and control over the network, not > actually improving "anonymity" for users That sounds more like a personal reaction to not wanting to be identified rather than a helpful statement about other people's motivations, which I'd stay away from,

Re: [tor-relays] Collaborative Bad-Abuse-Sender Blocklist

2020-10-12 Thread Tortilla
> On 9/28/20 1:54 PM, Matt Corallo wrote: > >> Different folks have different views on abuse reports, and that's >> perfectly OK. But "taking it up with list XYZ" isn't >> going to change that (see discussion on NANOG a few months ago on this >> very topic =D) - people are always going to have >>

Re: [tor-relays] Collaborative Bad-Abuse-Sender Blocklist

2020-09-28 Thread Tortilla
On Mon, September 28, 2020 5:04 pm, Matt Corallo wrote: > Hi all, > > I run a few relatively-small exit nodes, and still get a decent flow of > the usual Fail2Ban, blocklist.de, and such > garbage to abuse PoCs. I tend to proactively find appropriate abuse/noc > contacts to provide a response in

Re: [tor-relays] non-encrypted connections from Tor exit relays

2020-09-14 Thread Tortilla
On Thu, September 10, 2020 2:52 pm, kirg...@riseup.net wrote: > hi, generalized question about Tor exit relays and exit relay operators. > do some exit relay operators have a policy to prevent connections > leaving their exit node via non-encrypted ports (e.g. port 25)? Although the intent of y

Re: [tor-relays] Combined relay and hidden service, good idea or not?

2018-01-08 Thread Tortilla
On Mon, January 8, 2018 11:25 am, Dave Warren wrote: > On 2018-01-08 03:21, Florentin Rochet wrote: >>> Perhaps in the case that the HS operator is not trying to mask the HS >>> location, the act of mixing public relay traffic can be nothing but a >>> *help* to defeat anyone trying to correlate t

Re: [tor-relays] Combined relay and hidden service, good idea or not?

2018-01-08 Thread Tortilla
On Mon, January 8, 2018 2:21 am, Florentin Rochet wrote: > Hey Tortilla, > > Sorry for the late reply: > > On 2018-01-05 21:13, Tortilla wrote: >>> The issue is fixed by adding the above warning message: if you care >>> about your hidden service's "hidd

Re: [tor-relays] Combined relay and hidden service, good idea or not?

2018-01-05 Thread Tortilla
On Fri, January 5, 2018 12:31 pm, Roger Dingledine wrote: > On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 03:08:48AM -, torti...@mantablue.com wrote: >> Second, I had read in the past opinions stating: >> >> When operating a hidden service, running a relay helps mix traffic so >> that >> anyone observing traffic f

Re: [tor-relays] Combined relay and hidden service, good idea or not?

2018-01-05 Thread Tortilla
>> When operating a hidden service and a relay in one tor instance, tor >> currently warns: >> >> [warn] Tor is currently configured as a relay and a hidden service. >> That's >> not very secure: you should probably run your hidden service in a >> separate >> Tor process, at least -- see https://tr

[tor-relays] Combined relay and hidden service, good idea or not?

2018-01-04 Thread tortilla
When operating a hidden service and a relay in one tor instance, tor currently warns: [warn] Tor is currently configured as a relay and a hidden service. That's not very secure: you should probably run your hidden service in a separate Tor process, at least -- see https://trac.torproject.org/8742