gus wrote:
> Second, in Turkmenistan case, it appears that one ISP (AGTS) had
> different censorship rules compared to their main ISP,
> Turkmentelecom.
That's not possible because AGTS is entirely hosted by TurkmenTelecom.
This is different from PRC China where they have 3 operators with
li...@for-privacy.net wrote:
> Without a court order, the cops have no right to request data at all.
They have the right to send requests without court orders, they just
cannot force you to cooperate.
They do it all the time. We receive tons of them from EU Police.
Finn wrote:
> The weird thing is, that the relay in question is only a relay and
> not an exit node since its creation (185.241.208.179)
> (https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetStats/w/relay/B67C7039B04487854129A66B16F5EE3CFFCBB491.html)
> - anyone has an idea how this happens? Best regards
We receive
jvoisin via tor-relays wrote:
> Is this something other operators have seen too or are we alone?
You're not alone, they're desperately trying to advertise themselves
and you shouldn't give them any form of importance by replying to them.
In fact, they will probably discard your reply as the
Roger Dingledine wrote:
> Typically the way these blocklists work is that they run "honey
> services" somewhere secret on the internet, often on ports like 80
> that are different from the ones they will apply the blocklist to.
> And if anybody connects to their secret honey IP address on port
Thank you for sharing that.
It's obvious that they are either using third-parties or that they are
afraid of being bullied by the Spamhaus gang.
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rus...@gmx.net wrote:
> is there any way to stop or if not reduce the spam, brute force
> attacks that are leaving my exit? Well port blocking or destination
> IP blocking is one way but without any relevant information except
> this hard, right? => https://cleantalk.org/blacklists/51.15.80.14
