> Do you know how APNIC/RIPE produces the “high-quality BGP-peering graphs
for the entire Internet”? I know that RIPE has been building a pretty large
Internet measurement platform called Atlas [3]. I wonder if they are using
some of that data.
In short, I don't know this 100%. However, this
After talking with APNIC/RIPE, it looks like that if we ask nicely we can
get high-quality BGP-peering graphs for the entire Internet (not 100%
complete, but it's the same data they use internally).
Spend some time thinking about exactly what kinds of attacks we wish to
harden against. Once we
Hi Virgil,
It appears that vizAS detects connections between ASes when they are observed
as adjacent on paths reported by Route Views [0]. When I construct AS-level
routing maps (e.g. as in [1]), I combine Route Views data with the AS-level
topology produced by CAIDA [2]. The CAIDA topology is
On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 3:54 AM, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> good locations...
> intelligence prioritizes spying on Tor relays they will simply download the
> list and tap the desired relays, regardless of where the relay is
> topographically located.
There may be situations in
> They're also likely to be wiretapping magnets.
That's an interesting point. Can we go deeper into this?
Does this mean that, everything else being equal, the good locations for
Tor nodes also happen to be the good locations for surveillance tapping
points?
If yes, my first thought was that
I think good places for nodes means places where there aren't many now.Rob
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I'm at an APNIC conference in Jakarta, and they demoed a new tool which
shows the interconnections (peering + transits) between AS numbers within a
given country (will eventually work for regions).
URL: http://labs.apnic.net/vizas/
Left-panel is IPv4 and right-panel is IPv6.
Here is the fellow
On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 1:12 AM, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> URL: http://labs.apnic.net/vizas/
>
> For Tor, this tool helps us prioritize the ASs for new relays. To maximize
> censorship resistance, we would want relays on AS numbers in the middle
> (lots of interconnections) that