Do you mean how many can you use I in parallel for different circuits? Or
how many you can put one after the other?
I'm pretty sure that without changing the source code you can only use one
bridge at the start of each circuit. Now if you mean in parallel I don't
know how Tor behaves if you give i
On 1/9/2013 2:57 PM, Coyo wrote:
On 1/9/2013 4:41 AM, Konstantinos Asimakis wrote:
First of all, AFAIK, bridge relays act as entry guards, meaning they
*replace* the first step of your tor circuits, they don't extend them
to 4 nodes.
When I say "entry guards" i mean entry guards from the perspe
On 1/9/2013 4:41 AM, Konstantinos Asimakis wrote:
First of all, AFAIK, bridge relays act as entry guards, meaning they
*replace* the first step of your tor circuits, they don't extend them
to 4 nodes. With that in mind you might be able to do this:
your client -> bridge (obfuscated or not) ->
First of all, AFAIK, bridge relays act as entry guards, meaning they
*replace* the first step of your tor circuits, they don't extend them to 4
nodes. With that in mind you might be able to do this:
your client -> bridge (obfuscated or not) -> tor node B -> tor node C ->
whatever (clearnet / intro
On 1/8/2013 7:21 PM, Coyo wrote:
If you have a hidden service, and hide that on Server A, then have it
connect via obfsproxy to Relay B, can you configure a manually-chosen
list of entry guard relays to enter the wider Tor Network from Relay B?
[Hidden Server] -- obfsproxy --> [Bridge Relay] -
I didn't realize the TOR Project had their own mailing list server,
though it makes sense.
I'm studying tor relays, especially obfsproxy, and I thought I'd go
ahead and ask a question.
If you have a hidden service, and hide that on Server A, then have it
connect via obfsproxy to Relay B, can
