On Thu, Aug 16, 2012 at 09:51:03AM +0800, Lorenz Kirchner wrote:
>> Yes, assuming the users would not give up out of frustration before :-) We
>> can
>> actually do the math: According to [0], at the moment the Tor network has
>> an
>> advertised bandwidth of 3000 MiB/s. Let's assume that all Chine
On Sat, Aug 11, 2012 at 06:25:03PM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> The constraints are:
> * 100mbit+ connectivity, though in practice I expect they will spend
> most of their time doing far less than that.
> * No more than 2 bridges per /24. If you're running fast (100mbit+)
> exits (which is more
On Thu, Aug 16, 2012 at 3:23 AM, Philipp Winter wrote:
> Yes, assuming the users would not give up out of frustration before :-) We
> can
> actually do the math: According to [0], at the moment the Tor network has
> an
> advertised bandwidth of 3000 MiB/s. Let's assume that all Chinese relays
>
On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 11:42:08PM +0800, Lorenz Kirchner wrote:
>> Perhaps it's better to focus on improved bridge distribution strategies [0]
>> and
>> hard-to-block transport protocols [1]. Also, that would be a universal
>> solution
>> which would also help in other countries and not a specific
Hi Loz,
On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 11:00:11PM +0800, Lorenz Kirchner wrote:
>> I guess, that would require a modification of the path selection on the
>> clients
>> side. Usually, Tor clients randomly pick relays weighted by bandwidth.
>> Unless
>> the Chinese relays would provide an enormous amount
Hi Philipp
> Perhaps it's better to focus on improved bridge distribution strategies
> [0] and
> hard-to-block transport protocols [1]. Also, that would be a universal
> solution
> which would also help in other countries and not a specific - and probably
> hard
> to maintain - Chinese-only solut
I guess, that would require a modification of the path selection on the
> clients
> side. Usually, Tor clients randomly pick relays weighted by bandwidth.
> Unless
> the Chinese relays would provide an enormous amount of bandwidth, they
> would
> barely get selected by clients which leads to a poor
On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 11:55:55AM +0800, Lorenz Kirchner wrote:
> I'm not a tor expert but I am in China and have been using tor... I brought
> this up before and I still feel that tor would benefit from having special
> (entry)relays inside the GFW that have a reliable link to relays outside the
Hi everybody,
I'm not a tor expert but I am in China and have been using tor... I brought
this up before and I still feel that tor would benefit from having special
(entry)relays inside the GFW that have a reliable link to relays outside
the GFW. Clients inside GFW could then always connect to the
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 05:13:56PM +0200, tor-admin wrote:
> My understanding of bridge detection was, that Chinas GFW is able to detect
> the Tor SSL handshake and does active bridge probing after a successful
> connection to a (for the GFW) unknown bridge IP. So they should be able to
> block
On Monday, August 13. 2012, 00:55:45 Roger Dingledine wrote:
> This discussion really goes back to a simple question: is it better to
> use our funding for more design and development, or for strengthening
> the network? For exit relays, I think choosing "strengthen the network"
> is a great and wo
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 08:25:40AM +0200, tor-admin wrote:
> ON Saturday, August 11. 2012, 18:25:03 Roger Dingledine wrote:
> > The constraints are:
> > * 100mbit+ connectivity, though in practice I expect they will spend
> > most of their time doing far less than that.
> > * No more than 2 bridges
ON Saturday, August 11. 2012, 18:25:03 Roger Dingledine wrote:
> The constraints are:
> * 100mbit+ connectivity, though in practice I expect they will spend
> most of their time doing far less than that.
> * No more than 2 bridges per /24. If you're running fast (100mbit+)
> exits (which is more im
>> Sorry for exposing the internals of running
>> a non-profit. But I think transparency is especially important here. :)
>
> I don't know why you feel sorry. Transparency is important for
> non-profit, at least for most I guess.
Non-profit is just a tax and legal designation. After any necessary
Roger Dingledine:
Hi Roger,
> We're in an interesting situation here, where we can use their bridge
> funding for other more important things if we don't spent it all on
> bridges. So maybe the subject should have been the more counterintuitive
> "Help fund Tor bundle usability by running a fast
On 13.08.2012 12:56, Andrew Beveridge wrote:
> I guess I fit into that category - the exit I run (mentioned previously
> in the exit funding thread) is on a server which has about 3 free IP
> addresses which I'm not using right now - I could easily use them as
> fast unpublished bridges if somebody
On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 5:55 AM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
>
> I'm especially hoping to hear from volunteers for whom setting up a few
> extra bridges is basically free -- for example, those already running
> fast non-exit relays who have a few more IP addresses nearby. This is
> also a nice way for
On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 09:58:54AM +0200, Sebastian G. wrote:
> You ask volunteers to achieve a funders goal. Those might run a bridge
> already, but "un-publish" it. Less bridges for the rest. They could run
> relays and turn them into unpublished bridges. Less relays for anyone.
>
> Running a r
Roger Dingledine:
> Hi folks,
>
> In addition to the "get many fast exit relays" plan, that same funder
> (Voice of America) wants us to run a pile of fast stable unpublished
> bridges. We'll give the bridge addresses out manually to their target
> users over the coming months.
> (...)
> We do h
Hi folks,
In addition to the "get many fast exit relays" plan, that same funder
(Voice of America) wants us to run a pile of fast stable unpublished
bridges. We'll give the bridge addresses out manually to their target
users over the coming months.
The constraints are:
* 100mbit+ connectivity, th
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