Sorry for the naïve question, but we have a total of about 7000 relays, many
of them residential and thus practically unused or very lightly used. So the
actual number of relays that carry most of the traffic is rather small, and
many of them are middle relays, leaving an even smaller number of gua
> Whats the trust mechanism (if any) to ensure that the majority of guards
> are not hijacked by adversaries?
See https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay
* You need to wait around 70d to be a fully ready guard relay consuming all
the possible bandwidth.
* Any sybil attack will
@Aeris
I do not see how Sybil attacks relate to my question. The adversary will simply
set up new nodes, without messing with attacking identities of existing ones.
As to the rest of it, let us calculate. Assuming that the adversary wants to
control 4000 nodes for 3 years, the 70d startup perio
On 01/01/2017 04:54 PM, Rana wrote:
> The adversary will simply set up new nodes
Which can be called a Sybil attack.
> That’s $1million a year to control most of the Tor nodes., You call this
> "costly"? This amount is a joke, a trifle, petty cash for any US or Russian
> government agency. F
On Sun, 01 Jan 2017 23:54:03 +, Rana wrote:
...
> I do not see how Sybil attacks relate to my question. The adversary will
> simply set up new nodes, without messing with attacking identities of
> existing ones.
It will not go quite unnoticed when the set of major relays changes
substantiall
On 01/01/2017 03:42 PM, Andreas Krey wrote:
> On Sun, 01 Jan 2017 23:54:03 +, Rana wrote:
> ...
>> I do not see how Sybil attacks relate to my question. The adversary will
>> simply set up new nodes, without messing with attacking identities of
>> existing ones.
>
> It will not go quite unno
> @Aeris
>
> I do not see how Sybil attacks relate to my question. The adversary will
> simply set up new nodes, without messing with attacking identities of
> existing ones.
Sybil attack is not attacking identity, but just running bunch of relays.
> As to the rest of it, let us calculate. Assum
@Andreas
>It will not go quite unnoticed when the set of major relays changes
>substantially over a few months.
Tor exists for what, 10 years? 30 new rogue relays per month (monthly quantity
designed to be proportional to the recent months growth statistic) would go
totally unnoticed and would
> On 02 Jan 2017, at 07:28, Rana wrote:
> I think I already covered the "if it exists" part. Sticking to the original
> (old) design doc of Tor is not a practically useful strategy. I believe that
> Tor has MOSTLY such strong adversaries, the others do not matter much. You do
> not really use
@Sebastian
>> On 02 Jan 2017, at 07:28, Rana wrote:
>> I think I already covered the "if it exists" part. Sticking to the original
>> (old) design doc of Tor is not a practically useful strategy. I believe that
>> Tor has MOSTLY such strong adversaries, the others do not matter much. You
>> do
On 01/01/2017 11:28 PM, Rana wrote:
> @Mirimir, @Andreas
>>> This assumes that there is only one entity wanting to do that.
>>> When there are multiple the game isn't that easy.
>
>> Yes, that is a great Tor feature! Dueling adversaries strengthen
>> Tor against each other.
>
> That's wishful
@Mirimir
>> This is not Blockchain where hundreds of thousands of greedy selfish
>> genes are working together for non-collusion. A practically zero-
>> effort collusion of already fully cooperating FIVE EYE agencies (US,
>> UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) is needed to sprinkle several tens
On 01/02/2017 12:53 AM, Rana wrote:
> @Mirimir
>>> This is not Blockchain where hundreds of thousands of greedy selfish
>>> genes are working together for non-collusion. A practically zero-
>>> effort collusion of already fully cooperating FIVE EYE agencies (US,
>>> UK, Canada, Australia, New Z
> > Tor model breaks down when facing a modest government adversary for the
> > simple reason that having only 7000 relays total, with a minority of
> > them carrying most of the traffic, invites cheap infiltration and
> > takeover by state adversaries.
>
> Yeah, that's a problem :(
That’s a theo
> Currently, most of the major guard operators are well known people
are you sure?
- Zwiebel, 33rd on that list
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Sorry
-Original Message-
From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-boun...@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of
Aeris
Sent: Monday, January 02, 2017 3:56 PM
>Currently, most of the major guard operators are well known people and no
>doubt they’re not engaged with three-letter agencies.
>https:/
2, 2017 4:19 PM
To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-relays] How can we trust the guards?
> Currently, most of the major guard operators are well known people
are you sure?
- Zwiebel, 33rd on that list
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> I do not know how to interpret this table. How many guards are there at any
> given time?
Currently, we have 2442 guards.
This number is not fix but vary each days depending of community efforts to
maintain stable nodes with enough bandwidth.
> Known to whom? Is there a Tor police that researc
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Hash: SHA256
On 01/02/2017 04:32 PM, Aeris wrote:
> Tor node selection for circuits will address this trouble and avoid you to
> use
> more than 1 of their nodes in the same circuit, preventing any anonymity
> problem.
*any* sounds a little bit too optimistic
> *any* sounds a little bit too optimistic IMO, but it reduces the risk of
> being deanonymized (always under the assumption of the threat model).
If family name is correctly defined, Tor ensure you will only use one of those
nodes on your circuits.
If family name not correctly defined, Tor proj
On Mon, 02 Jan 2017 08:28:52 +, Rana wrote:
...
> That US agencies are actively working to destroy anonymity of (hopefully only
> selected, but who knows?) Tor users is an undisputable fact. Your implicit
> assumption that Russia is also attacking Tor is, however, unfounded.
Now, what is the
Just to play devils advocate here - when a single hacker can control tens of
thousands of devices in a botnet - just how easy would it be for a "state"
agency to control a few hundred tor nodes? We can always assume, possibly to our
own demise, that they utilize it to some degree themselves, and le
On 01/02/2017 06:56 AM, Aeris wrote:
>>> Tor model breaks down when facing a modest government adversary for the
>>> simple reason that having only 7000 relays total, with a minority of
>>> them carrying most of the traffic, invites cheap infiltration and
>>> takeover by state adversaries.
>>
>> Ye
On 01/01/2017 11:28 PM, Rana wrote:
> I believe that what is needed is changing Tor to accommodate a
> lot of small relays running by a very large number of volunteers,
> and to push real traffic through them.
Alternately, you need lots of small relays, running (with plausible
deniability) on I
> On 3 Jan 2017, at 11:46, Mirimir wrote:
>
>> I believe that what is needed is changing Tor to accommodate a
>> lot of small relays running by a very large number of volunteers,
>> and to push real traffic through them.
>
> Alternately, you need lots of small relays, running (with plausible
>
On 01/02/2017 06:08 PM, teor wrote:
>
>> On 3 Jan 2017, at 11:46, Mirimir wrote:
>>
>>> I believe that what is needed is changing Tor to accommodate a
>>> lot of small relays running by a very large number of volunteers,
>>> and to push real traffic through them.
>>
>> Alternately, you need lot
@teor
>I think you are talking about a different network, which is not Tor as
currently designed, implemented, and deployed.
>In particular, how do you get decent throughput, reliability, and low-
latency out of tens of thousands of devices?
>This is an open research problem, which the Tor design d
> 93% of the time despite having decent ultra-stable 153 KB/s bandwidth
> and static IP);
> The same relay is VERY reliable - totally stable for weeks,
> yet still under-used only because it is small.
Any people who will use your relay on a circuit will also damn you to run such
small relay. This
>Any people who will use your relay on a circuit will also damn you to run such
>small relay. This is so slow and not usable for day to day web surfing,
>specially if you are well connected to Internet (fiber or decent ADSL).
>Personnally, I have around this speed directly for my ADSL Internet co
> The question remains whether NOT having access to my relay makes life
> easier for people. Sometimes I guess you are right. But when all the big
> relays get overloaded, small relays could provide MORE bandwidth than large
> relays.Both your and my statements are qualitative, I would like someon
On Tue, 03 Jan 2017 11:34:19 +, Aeris wrote:
...
> And there is also an hardware bottleneck, because every components (mainly
> ethernet & SD card here) are connected to the same physical USB controller
> limited to 480Mbps for *overall* transfer (network + disk + others USB).
Which isn't th
>> https://github.com/ornetstats/stats/blob/master/o/main_guard_operators.txt
>
> I do not know how to interpret this table. How many guards are there at any
> given time?
The list includes all relays having
- the guard flag
_and_ a
- guard probability > 0%*
now, 2079 relays currently.
732 of th
> On 3 Jan 2017, at 17:38, Rana wrote:
>
> @teor
>> I think you are talking about a different network, which is not Tor as
> currently designed, implemented, and deployed.
>> In particular, how do you get decent throughput, reliability, and low-
> latency out of tens of thousands of devices?
>>
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