> Besides, as I said, the FBI, just like any ISIS affiliate, can put
> up all the exit nodes it likes, so it would be a waste of time for
> them to bug other exits. A blacklist of these supposedly bugged
> exits would be ridiculously useless for its incompleteness. It
> wouldn't do any harm either,
Tristan wrote on 08/04/2016 19:57:
> In this instance, it was local authorities, and the guy bought all-new
> hardware, so I'd say this specific problem is solved.
>
> For future reference, how would we even find these incidents? This time it
> was on the news, but if it wasn't, nobody would have
In this instance, it was local authorities, and the guy bought all-new
hardware, so I'd say this specific problem is solved.
For future reference, how would we even find these incidents? This time it
was on the news, but if it wasn't, nobody would have known.
On Apr 8, 2016 12:54 PM, "Green Dream"
Who said Tor was against the police?
The fact is, in the United States, the FBI and other law enforcement
agencies have been known to plant malware, modify hardware, etc., in order
to maintain persistent access to machines they wish to monitor. Whether or
not you think this is valid in some cases
Green Dream wrote on 08/04/2016 01:54:
> As I already said, this particular case is not so clear cut. However
> letting the police poke around...
I didn't realize that Tor was against the police, or vice-versa, at
least in decent countries like yours or mine, so far. I don't think
it's a good ide
Even if he is formating all the things: You can't be sure that any
middle/exit/guard node is compromised. How do you know I am one of the
good guys with my nodes? You can't. I could role play here and in
reality be a member of the super secret society of the supreme awesome
bunnies to take over the
@ Tristan re: "What happened to "innocent until proven guilty?" Please note
I already said "This particular case is perhaps not so clear cut"
@ Markus re: "How do you know a exit server is compromised?" You don't
always know. With any skill on the attacker's part, you will NOT know.
Still, sometim
The server on question was in this guy's house. He should be able to find
something if it was compromised, and if not, he can easily backup his relay
and wipe his hard drive.
On Apr 7, 2016 6:48 PM, "Markus Koch" wrote:
> The issue is: How do you know a exit server is compromised? As a CCNP
> I c
The issue is: How do you know a exit server is compromised? As a CCNP
I can configure a SPAN Port in 30 seconds and suck all the exit
traffic out of it without any indication for the server owner. Even if
he visit his server in the data center and no one visit their servers
:/
2016-04-08 1:42 GMT
What happened to "innocent until proven guilty?" While the police could
have compromised the relay, we can't assume they did just because they're
the police.
On Apr 7, 2016 6:42 PM, "Green Dream" wrote:
> > Of course, but what would they make of it? They might have 200
> > perfectly legitimate To
> Of course, but what would they make of it? They might have 200
> perfectly legitimate Tor nodes already, making a blacklist
> absolutely useless.
So we should do nothing? This logic makes little sense. The directory
authorities already have blacklist capabilities, and add known malicious
relays
krishna e bera wrote on 07/04/2016 04:28:
> On 04/06/2016 04:29 AM, Marco Predicatori wrote:
>> krishna e bera wrote on 05/04/2016 23:27:
>>> On 04/05/2016 02:38 PM, grarpamp wrote:
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/04/04/472992023/when-a-dark-web-volunteer-gets-raided-by-the-
On 04/06/2016 04:29 AM, Marco Predicatori wrote:
> krishna e bera wrote on 05/04/2016 23:27:
>> On 04/05/2016 02:38 PM, grarpamp wrote:
>>> http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/04/04/472992023/when-a-dark-web-volunteer-gets-raided-by-the-police
>> What was the exit node's fingerprint?
On Tue, Apr 5, 2016 at 11:38 AM, grarpamp wrote:
> http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/04/04/472992023/when-a-dark-web-volunteer-gets-raided-by-the-police
>
> He/they gave passwords and let govt search (and perhaps even index,
> hash, and copy, knowingly or not [1]) his (possibly th
krishna e bera wrote on 05/04/2016 23:27:
> On 04/05/2016 02:38 PM, grarpamp wrote:
>> http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/04/04/472992023/when-a-dark-web-volunteer-gets-raided-by-the-police
> What was the exit node's fingerprint? Is there a blacklist we or
> the Directory Authoriti
On 04/05/2016 02:38 PM, grarpamp wrote:
> http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/04/04/472992023/when-a-dark-web-volunteer-gets-raided-by-the-police
>
> He/they gave passwords and let govt search (and perhaps even index,
> hash, and copy, knowingly or not [1]) his (possibly then unencr
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/04/04/472992023/when-a-dark-web-volunteer-gets-raided-by-the-police
He/they gave passwords and let govt search (and perhaps even index,
hash, and copy, knowingly or not [1]) his (possibly then unencrypted) data.
As opposed to having it confiscated
It's probably unusual but exemplifies why exit nodes should not be run from
a home connection.
On Mon, Apr 4, 2016, 23:54 Greg wrote:
>
> http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/04/04/472992023/when-a-dark-web-volunteer-gets-raided-by-the-police
>
> A Seattle exit node operator is vis
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/04/04/472992023/when-a-dark-web-volunteer-gets-raided-by-the-police
A Seattle exit node operator is visited by local police over a child
pornography warrant... Is this out of the ordinary or is this to be
expected when running an exit from your ho
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