On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 9:36 AM, Jeroen Massar jer...@massar.ch wrote:
the proposed setup breaks all anonymity (OpenVPN sends Raw IP
packets)
thus 1:1 mapping for the few people who will use it.
No, it does not break any anonymity. And it doesn't matter what
OpvenVPN sends because it all
On Monday, June 16, 2014 2:29 AM, grarpamp grarp...@gmail.com wrote:
No, it does not break any anonymity. And it doesn't matter what
OpvenVPN sends because it all happens over the users already secured
Tor circuit '--'. You just don't understand the model. Here it is
again. '' is a
On Mon, Jun 16, 2014 at 12:59 PM, Bogglesnatch Candycrush
bogglesna...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Monday, June 16, 2014 2:29 AM, grarpamp grarp...@gmail.com wrote:
No, it does not break any anonymity. And it doesn't matter what
OpvenVPN sends because it all happens over the users already secured
Tor
On 6/16/14, grarpamp grarp...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 9:36 AM, Jeroen Massar jer...@massar.ch wrote:
If an operator does not want you on their site, do not circumvent it.
You are thus stating: I want to circumvent a site's decision to block me.
No, you are still not
Jeroen Massar jer...@massar.ch once said:
Even though you are guessing that other people, who operate a site,
don't make a balanced and thoughtful decision, it is not for you to
attempt to circumvent that decision.
That is like saying they should not have connected it to the network at
all
On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 8:27 PM, Tom Ritter t...@ritter.vg wrote:
This seems very similar to the idea of having private exit nodes:
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#HideExits
Tor daemon must of course know its exit OR ip's+ports via some
mechanism (currently, distributed consensus), or Tor
Ops request: Deploy OpenVPN terminators
We are ops because we want to allow people to avoid censorship and
speak freely. But are we doing all we can? It is well known that
all relays, exit or non-exit are added to a variety of blocklists.
Primarily through scraping the consensus. And those
On 2014-05-13 23:09, grarpamp wrote:
[..]
*But we can
bind to it and let users find it with their own openvpn scans close
to (one up or down from) our OR IP.* Just use the standard openvpn
TCP port on it.
Thank you for suggesting the GFW folks now scan and/or directly block
these IP addresses
On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 5:48 PM, Jeroen Massar jer...@massar.ch wrote:
Thank you for suggesting the GFW folks now scan and/or directly block
these IP addresses too.
The gfw is going to do what the gfw does. And many times that is
dedicated to blocking access to tor, not access from tor,
This seems very similar to the idea of having private exit nodes:
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#HideExits
It's also easy to enumerate Exit IPs not by scanning up/down, by just
building a circuit through every exit node to a server you control,
and looking at the originating IP.
-tom
On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 05:09:50PM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
Ops request: Deploy OpenVPN terminators
Anecdotally, the GFW blocks OpenVPN endpoints as well.
-andy
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On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 8:40 PM, Andy Isaacson a...@hexapodia.org wrote:
Anecdotally, the GFW blocks OpenVPN endpoints as well.
You need to specify context... access *to* ovpn nodes?, which
is moot because that is not the deployment specified here in
diagram... you already guaranteed access via
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