[tor-relays] Questions about 4 Relays per IP and the ddos mitigation scripts

2023-02-06 Thread Chris Enkidu-6
Hello Everyone, Before I make changes to [my scripts](https://github.com/Enkidu-6/tor-ddos), I need to understand a few things and any help is much appreciated. - First, Does an Exit relay with zero Guard probability and zero middle relay probability need to initiate circuits with a Guard or midd

Re: [tor-relays] Questions about 4 Relays per IP and the ddos mitigation scripts

2023-02-06 Thread nusenu
Hi, thanks for raising these questions and trying to understand before deploying/changes to filters. A good understanding of how tor relays and connections work is important when trying to defend against overload attacks, without breaking functionality with packet filters that cause false posi

Re: [tor-relays] Questions about 4 Relays per IP and the ddos mitigation scripts

2023-02-07 Thread Chris Enkidu-6
@nusenu Thank you very much for taking the time to help me understand things better. I can use all the help I can get.     > You can also not be sure whether it is an actual authenticated relay to relay     > connection or a client to relay connection just by looking at the source IP.     > In

Re: [tor-relays] Questions about 4 Relays per IP and the ddos mitigation scripts

2023-02-07 Thread nusenu
Even if that happens, why would a client connect directly to an Exit and get the Exit to connect to another relay or Guard using the Exit's IP address? You mentioned the exit flag, but you didn't specify whether that relay also had the guard flag. Generally speaking it is correct, that if you f

Re: [tor-relays] Questions about 4 Relays per IP and the ddos mitigation scripts

2023-02-07 Thread Roger Dingledine
On Wed, Feb 08, 2023 at 12:07:22AM +0100, nusenu wrote: > I recall a gitlab.tpo issue that discussed the details of whether > tor clients should change guards when their picked guard lost/gained flags. > Maybe someone else could paste a link to it. This might be the one you want: https://gitlab.to

Re: [tor-relays] Questions about 4 Relays per IP and the ddos mitigation scripts

2023-02-07 Thread Xiaoqi Chen (Danny)
@Enkidu As an user of your filtering script, I want to first say thank you for maintaining the script! > The idea that all relays must be able to connect to other relays any time and in any shape or form they choose can not exist in real world of DDoS mitigation. I totally agree, however I want

Re: [tor-relays] Questions about 4 Relays per IP and the ddos mitigation scripts

2023-02-07 Thread Chris Enkidu-6
> DDoS rate limit filters do not require an all or nothing approach, > different source IPs can be handled differently > see toralf's use of onionoo to feed ipsets as an example. > I would recommend to use tor's controlport as a source of information instead > though > because onionoo is not meant

Re: [tor-relays] Questions about 4 Relays per IP and the ddos mitigation scripts

2023-02-07 Thread Chris Enkidu-6
Hi, Danny Those theoretical concerns may or may not be valid as I don't have enough expertise about how Tor operates under the hood to comment on it, but I can tell you that currently there are a few different DDoS attacks with different purposes but they don't seem to have the surgical accuracy y

Re: [tor-relays] Questions about 4 Relays per IP and the ddos mitigation scripts

2023-02-08 Thread lists
On Mittwoch, 8. Februar 2023 00:07:22 CET nusenu wrote: > I don't think relays should silently drop > other relays packets without first trying: > - to confirm that accepting that IP would render the relay (mostly) unusable > (by first running in a mode that accepts relay IPs) - to understand the