Re: [tor-relays] torservers.net: some exits became guards? (deanonymization risk)

Moritz Bartl: > Which is sadly not the case. Our MyFamily statements are badly out of > sync. Will fix this next week. Looking forward to a safer tor network! -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu https://twitter.com/nusenu_ signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature

Re: [tor-relays] torservers.net: some exits became guards? (deanonymization risk)

On Sat, Jun 10, 2017 at 10:39 AM, Moritz Bartl wrote: > > We had to temporarily disable some of our exits due to ongoing > negotiations with the provider. > > Will your provider allow BGP announcements of other IP space? Depending on how many exits we're talking about I

Re: [tor-relays] torservers.net: some exits became guards? (deanonymization risk)

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 06/08/2017 02:00 PM, Paul Syverson wrote: > It shouldn't be possible to use the relay in both positions > simultaneously. As long as "MyFamily" is correctly set, yes IMO. - -- Toralf PGP C4EACDDE 0076E94E -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

Re: [tor-relays] torservers.net: some exits became guards? (deanonymization risk)

On 08.06.2017 14:00, Paul Syverson wrote: > circuit. And if all torservers.net relays are properly indicated to be > from the same family, they will never be selected for both ends of a > circuit. Which is sadly not the case. Our MyFamily statements are badly out of sync. Will fix this next week.

Re: [tor-relays] torservers.net: some exits became guards? (deanonymization risk)

Hi Paul, Paul Syverson: > It shouldn't be possible > to use the relay in both positions simultaneously. And even if it > could serve as both guard and exit simultaneously, the route-selection > algorithm would preclude it being used as both ends for any > circuit. And if all torservers.net

Re: [tor-relays] torservers.net: some exits became guards? (deanonymization risk)

Hi Nusenu, On Thu, Jun 08, 2017 at 09:58:00AM +, nusenu wrote: > Dear Torservers, > > are you aware that you have recently become a relay operator with > end-to-end correlation (deanonymization) capabilities? (in fact you are > the biggest known such operator) > This is especially bad for

[tor-relays] torservers.net: some exits became guards? (deanonymization risk)

Dear Torservers, are you aware that you have recently become a relay operator with end-to-end correlation (deanonymization) capabilities? (in fact you are the biggest known such operator) This is especially bad for tor clients because you are also one of the biggest tor exit operators. Some of