Thanks for all the useful links and directions.
We now return to our regularly scheduled program: "unflagged BAD EXIT
nodes, and the women who love them".
The other Damian
On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 4:59 PM Damian Johnson wrote:
> > Sorry for hijacking, but I wasn't sure where best to put this...
> Sorry for hijacking, but I wasn't sure where best to put this...
Glad you want to get involved! This would be more suited for its own
thread on tor-dev@ but that said, my top suggestion is: pick something
that interests you. Enjoying your involvement with open source and, by
extension, sticking
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> 2. Openness. Traditionally there's been some contention about where
> to draw the line between openness and secrecy. Personally this is
> what turned me off to this space [3]. Thankfully Philipp's moving
> us toward being a little less secretive. [
rg
Subject: Re: [tor-relays] unflagged BAD EXIT nodes
Sorry for hijacking, but I wasn't sure where best to put this.
As a programmer, where should I start if I am considering lending my time to
the tor project? While I feel that the BAD EXIT issue needs some love, I defer
to those with mo
Sorry for hijacking, but I wasn't sure where best to put this.
As a programmer, where should I start if I am considering lending my time
to the tor project? While I feel that the BAD EXIT issue needs some love, I
defer to those with more knowledge on the state of things to direct my
efforts.
Is t
> I find it more worrying that we do not "hear" about the 'more serious
> attacks' that keep them busy and don't allow them to look into i.e.
> 'AviatoChortler' (even after a few weeks). That might mean that there
> is a constant stream of 'more serious attacks' (without information I
> can only gu
At 10:04 7/4/2015 +0200, nusenu wrote:
>I find it more worrying that we do not "hear"
>about the 'more serious attacks' that keep
>them busy and don't allow them to look into
>i.e. 'AviatoChortler' (even after a few
>weeks). That might mean that there is a
>constant stream of 'more serious attacks
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> But bottom line, the Tor Project apparently did nothing with the
> information.
Well, they apparently made (according to phw) an informed decision on
which attacks they should be spending the little available resources.
That is certainly more tha
On 07/03/2015 01:22 PM, nusenu wrote:
> you can find answers to some of your questions here:
> https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2015-June/038264.html
> ___
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproje
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you can find answers to some of your questions here:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2015-June/038264.html
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Looking through the list of suspect
exit nodes, they fall into three
categories:
1) very low-bandwidth Window Vista
systems running 0.2.4.21
2) recently dead/offline
3) one massive Linux exit
The (1) exits might be hacked Windows
systems, perhaps part of a botnet
--no contact given. Seems a
Could someone comment on why 15 exit nodes
discovered to be sniffing and abusing login
credentials have not been marked with the
BAD EXIT flag?
The research appears to be legitimate, involved
a good deal of effort, and seems credible:
https://chloe.re/2015/06/20/a-month-with-badonions/
was blogg
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