Re: [tor-relays] geo-diversity vs. latency

On Thu, Jun 25, 2015 at 6:27 AM, nusenu wrote: >> A relay running in South America could do more bad than good, as it >> would increase the average latency > > I was also thinking about that. > "Does improving geo-diversity negatively affect latency?" Internet imposed minimum latency to exit dest

Re: [tor-relays] Boosting throughput with own DNS resolvers

>> How does pdns-recursor stack up against unbound chained with >> dnscrypt-proxy? > > With the proxy you're still trusting a third party with all your DNS data, > with a recursor that's not the case. All the DNS plaintext is being passively tapped on the wire anyways. At least with a local resolv

Re: [tor-relays] How to Run High Capacity Tor Relays

On Wed, Jul 22, 2015 at 11:08 AM, teor wrote: > The 20 July 2015 platform percentages on > https://metrics.torproject.org/servers-data.html are: > 87.9 Linux > 6.9 Windows > 4.5 FreeBSD > 0.5 Darwin (OS X, OpenDarwin, …) > 0.1 Other with counts... 6042 Linux 83% 889 Windows 12% 220 FreeBSD

Re: [tor-relays] pinning relay keys to IPs (or not)

AS does not indicate location. Live BGP AS does not necessarily indicate ownership at registrar, though any proxying effectively pools them. A relay IP shouldn't be in more than one AS at once, though it may shift around many over time. dig doesn't really work via tor :( __

Re: [tor-relays] Giving away some "pre-warmed" relay keys for adoption

On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 9:32 AM, Yawning Angel wrote: > Like I noted in my reply to Paul S. if there was a way to > measure/quantify trust, or deal with the "people's Guards just I'd agree that randomly handing off nodes is bad. And that there may be cases where structured handoff among operators

Re: [tor-relays] my provider null routed my exit. advice?

On Fri, Jul 31, 2015 at 5:41 AM, Tyler Durden wrote: > But when it comes to spam they get, indeed, a bit upset. I recommend you to > block the mail ports as we do it. ---> 25, 465, 587 As posted here last month, 25 no longer open relays mail for MUA's, it does accept MX for its own @domains. Sinc

Re: [tor-relays] clarification on what Utah State University exit relays store ("360 gigs of log files")

On Sat, Aug 8, 2015 at 2:03 AM, nusenu wrote: > that implies that USU exit relays store significant amount of logs > >> node. I said that we had extracted and filtered the requested data, >> it was 90 4 gig files (for a total of 360 gigs of log files) or >> about 3.2 billion log entries. > > If yo

Re: [tor-relays] BoingBoing: What happened when we got subpoenaed over our Tor exit node

On Fri, Aug 7, 2015 at 5:38 PM, Damian Busby wrote: > Personally, if I had been the person in comment #2, I would have sent all > those logs anyway. Mind telling us what relays you're operating so we can block them in our clients? > Then they would have been compelled to review them. That's up

Re: [tor-relays] clarification on what Utah State University exit relays store ("360 gigs of log files")

On Wed, Aug 12, 2015 at 7:45 PM, Mike Perry wrote: > At what resolution is this type of netflow data typically captured? Routers originally exported at 100% coverage, then many of them started supporting sampling at various rates (because routers were choking and buggy anyways, and netheads were

[tor-relays] Multicore, bandwidth, relays, capacity, location

On Wed, Aug 12, 2015 at 9:16 AM, Thomas White wrote: > For relays, being able to make more use of available bandwidth would > vastly increase the network speed, furthermore make home clients see > an improvement in their daily Tor usage. It also benefits hidden > service people as they can then ru

Re: [tor-relays] clarification on what Utah State University exit relays store ("360 gigs of log files")

On Thu, Aug 13, 2015 at 3:40 AM, Mike Perry wrote: >> But consider looking at average flow lifetimes on the internet. There may >> be case for going longer, bundling or turfing across a range of ports to >> falsely >> trigger a record / bloat, packet switching and so forth. > > This interests me,

Re: [tor-relays] clarification on what Utah State University exit relays store ("360 gigs of log files")

On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 12:30 AM, Mike Perry wrote: > I submitted a proposal to tor-dev describing a simple defense against > this default configuration: > https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-August/009326.html nProbe should be added to the router list, it's a very popular opensou

Re: [tor-relays] Google Compute Engine rejected as relay?

On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 1:40 PM, Philipp Winter wrote: > I wonder if we wouldn't be better off with GCE remaining blocked. Cloud > platforms seem quite popular among attackers -- presumably because they > can quickly give you a large number of disposable machines. > > Second, and perhaps less obv

Re: [tor-relays] clarification on what Utah State University exit relays store ("360 gigs of log files")

On Sat, Aug 22, 2015 at 1:09 AM, Mike Perry wrote: > As such, I was only able to discover that its default inactive/idle > timoeut is 30s. I couldn't find a range. > What I really need now is any examples of common routers that have a > default inactive/idle timeout below 10s, or allow you to set

Re: [tor-relays] clarification on what Utah State University exit relays store ("360 gigs of log files")

While reducing network traffic to various accounting schemes such as netflow may enable some attacks, look at just one field of it... bytecounting. Assume you've got a nice global view courtesy of your old bed buddies AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, etc and in addition to your own bumps on the cables. You

Re: [tor-relays] clarification on what Utah State University exit relays store ("360 gigs of log files")

On Thu, Sep 3, 2015 at 2:03 AM, coderman wrote: > there is a second limit here, which is the netflow channel capacity / > storage limit, if you introduce simulated flows at a rate beyond this > capacity, you may become unobservable (via loss) resulting in failure > to correlate. I've seen ISP sat

Re: [tor-relays] Deciding where to put new Tor relays

On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 1:12 AM, Virgil Griffith wrote: > URL: http://labs.apnic.net/vizas/ > > For Tor, this tool helps us prioritize the ASs for new relays. To maximize > censorship resistance, we would want relays on AS numbers in the middle > (lots of interconnections) that do not currently h

Re: [tor-relays] Deciding where to put new Tor relays

On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 3:54 AM, Virgil Griffith wrote: > good locations... > intelligence prioritizes spying on Tor relays they will simply download the > list and tap the desired relays, regardless of where the relay is > topographically located. There may be situations in which tapping at a p

Re: [tor-relays] Tor relays without AESNI

As in a former thread on this, here's the cpu ranking of what you can expect, caveat utilization of specific features... http://cpubenchmark.net/high_end_cpus.html http://cpubenchmark.net/singleThread.html Keep in mind as before, the highest chart performer is not necessarily the most effective u

Re: [tor-relays] why are some exit IPs missing from Exit IP DB?

> #17297: TorCheck fails on new exit egress IP not in exit DB, confusing to user > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17297 As said three days ago before OP... No, I'd consider it a technique to avoid having your exit put on braindead tor-hating consensus scraping blacklists... a fea

Re: [tor-relays] How to prevent netscan usage?

> First rule is to use some firewall No it is not, do not do this. An exit needs to pass the traffic that its exitpolicy says it will pass. Otherwise bad things happen with circuit construction and your exit gets badmouthed by users possibly to the point of being banned. If you can't provide an ex

Re: [tor-relays] [tor-dev] How many exits exit from an IP address different than their OR address? (10.7%)

On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 12:44 AM, Jesse V wrote: > This is quite interesting, thanks for the report. I'm not sure why it > would be advantageous to set up a server or network this way, but I > guess they have their reasons. 1) They may or may not be aware of their routing, or the routing applied

Re: [tor-relays] [tor-dev] How many exits exit from an IP address different than their OR address? (10.7%)

On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 10:05 PM, Virgil Griffith wrote: > In our quantifications of relay diversity, knowing the IP addresses that > traffic exits from is important. Ways to have this information correctly > reported would be very helpful. Which is exactly why free to connect back through them a

Re: [tor-relays] Should Onionoo consider relays with the same ip# to be part of the same family?

On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 12:00 AM, Virgil Griffith wrote: > No wrong answer---just wondering what is the community's vibe on this > issue. I can go either way. Same IP excepting NAT is same box, kind of pointless if they're not the same entity [1], err to caution and call it family, put them in t

[tor-relays] Stopping the censoring of tor users (via exit bridges / proxies / OpenVPNs)

On 2/25/16, blacklight . wrote: > hello there! i don't know if this mailing list works but i thought of > giving it a try. > > i was lately reading an article ( > http://www.pcworld.com/article/3037180/security/tor-users-increasingly-treated-like-second-class-web-citizens.html > ) > and it was ab

Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

On 3/6/16, Volker Mink wrote: > Thats bad to lose such a fast exit. And the diversity of an OpenBSD one at that. Somebody could just turn off one of their Linux relays and send this guy the monthly fee instead. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@li

Re: [tor-relays] Exitmap module to count CloudFlare CAPTCHAs

On 3/20/16, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote: >> On 21 Mar 2016, at 04:00, Philipp Winter wrote: >> >> Next, I ran the module for cloudflare.com, which does not seem to >> whitelist Tor. 638 (75%) exit relays saw a CAPTCHA and 211 (25%) >> didn't. This roughly match my own deprecated tools, global

Re: [tor-relays] I would like to help.

Many residential and business ISP's are the same dsl/coax/fiber company. Many of them will provide extra IP's for some tiny fee, so primary clearnet use can remain unaffected. Or you can route tor over vpn. Some do run exits at home. In that case consider contact local LEAs enquiring if they exonor

[tor-relays] NPR story: When A Dark Web Volunteer Gets Raided By The Police

http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/04/04/472992023/when-a-dark-web-volunteer-gets-raided-by-the-police He/they gave passwords and let govt search (and perhaps even index, hash, and copy, knowingly or not [1]) his (possibly then unencrypted) data. As opposed to having it confiscated

Re: [tor-relays] Relays by AS Names

> https://bgp.he.net > compass, globe, etc I've said before there needs to be a community project to determine where relays *are not* and then work its way through them in attempts to place there. Just as you can "get bridges", prospective operators should be able to "get hoster/isp/vps/country"

Re: [tor-relays] Guard flag?

On 4/7/16, Roger Dingledine wrote: > Your above confusion is why nobody should ever write "b" or "B" in this > day and age. Re confusion... as said before with reference links to official standards... These days, formally... "b" bit and "B" byte are well defined context. "k" is 1000, and "Ki" is

Re: [tor-relays] Reading check.torproject

On 4/18/16, eliaz wrote: > Tim Wilson-Brown - teor: >> It's normal for tor to change exits occasionally. >> Do you know which exit your tor client was actually using during that >> time? >> If so, report it to bad-rel...@lists.torproject.org > > Rats, I neglected to save the port scan log. Next ti

Re: [tor-relays] does it make sense to close unused ports at a tor relay with iptables ?

On 4/28/16, Green Dream wrote: >> The likes of GRC.COM make you think that any port not > blocked... is bad. >> I wondered why if nothing there > > Because there is a difference between a closed port and a filtered port. > Deny vs drop. The less of a fingerprint you offer to atta

Re: [tor-relays] Search warrant and house search because of an exit in DE

On 4/30/16, Dr Gerard Bulger wrote: > Once I set my outgoing connection via a UK and very fast and supposedly > "anonymous" proxy server service, I have not heard a squeak from anyone. > These proxy services are very cheap, no limits, and offer another level of > difficulty for enquiring authoriti

Re: [tor-relays] British Airways website blocking non exit relays IPs?

https://www.britishairways.com/ does pageload from 7DDE318DD1F93BF127C84824BBD909BC3887F39F On 5/20/16, Thomas Braun wrote: > Am 20.05.2016 um 13:18 schrieb Pascal Terjan: >> I am now wondering is this is because I run a (non exit) relay. Can >> anyone confirm if they also have the problem? >> h

Re: [tor-relays] VPS for Exits

First, you don't need to keep asking for hosts when you can simply whois the consensus for them. Second, network diversity requires that you find new hosts, use your telephone book. Third, there are risks to asking for referrals, and to piling on top of non-diversity... http://www.salon.com/2014/0

Re: [tor-relays] Tor-arm

On 6/14/16, NotRandom Someone wrote: > What do you think about using tor-arm ? https://gitweb.torproject.org/nyx.git/ Arm now known as Nyx. Your query lack detailed context or specifics for further advice you. So just try it, see if suits you. ___ tor-

Re: [tor-relays] If you get weird crashes, that might be why

On 6/26/16, pa011 wrote: > [report] You have reported about four multiple things. Though they may be related, try breaking them down into a more individual approach. > (Compiled with 100010bf: Op$bf: OpenSSL 1.0.1k 8 Jan 2015; > running with 1000114f: OpenSSL 1.0.1t 3 May 2016). While mismatch

Re: [tor-relays] suspicious "Relay127001" relays

On 7/5/16, Ivan Markin wrote: >> blacklist hosts individually (unless I'm putting them into MyFamily, That could 3rd party backfire against your relay, and must be mutual in the consensus anyway. So don't. > AFAIK, there is no option in tor itself to exclude relays from the routing. > > But you'

Re: [tor-relays] suspicious "Relay127001" relays

On 7/6/16, Green Dream wrote: >> It's up to directory authority operators to deal with >> suspicious/rogue/misconfigured relays by marking them as >> invalid/rejected/badexit. > > So... what's going on in this particular case and what are the directory > authorities going to do, if anything? > > A

[tor-relays] BoingBoing Says Running Exits Is No Trouble re: LEA

https://boingboing.net/2016/07/01/researchers-find-over-100-spyi.html "Many people fear that running an exit node will put them in police crosshairs if it gets used in the commission of a crime. For the record, Boing Boing runs a very high-capacity exit node, and though we've received multiple cont

[tor-relays] Darknet Shenanigans [was: suspicious "Relay127001" relays]

On 7/6/16, Roger Dingledine wrote: > In this > case we actually found these relays misbehaving (accessing onion https://boingboing.net/2016/07/01/researchers-find-over-100-spyi.html http://motherboard.vice.com/read/over-100-snooping-tor-nodes-have-been-spying-on-dark-web-sites https://www.defcon.

Re: [tor-relays] BoingBoing Says Running Exits Is No Trouble re: LEA

On 7/6/16, Green Dream wrote: > It seems easier to say "don't worry about it, it's not really a problem" > from that perspective. That's a given. > For the average Tor volunteer operator, all that comfort, protection and > privilege is gone. _My_ ass is on the line. Or at least it feels that way

Re: [tor-relays] Relay Seccurity

> I'm new with Tor and i'm very interested in this project. > The problem if i act as a exit for the port 80... my home router You are also likely to encounter problems with the copyright cartels, law enforcement at your door, etc. Be sure that your new interest includes reviewing and weighing tho

Re: [tor-relays] max / burst speed

> I run 2 middle nodes, one at 150KB/300KB and the other at 100KB/200KB. Then there is the question of just what is the correct range of burst values to use. In a former life, working with real network hardware, the burst setting was definitely NOT 2x the average rate. It was more like 1.08x. It h

Re: [tor-relays] Introduction

> If only their single fiber connection to the world wasn't the bottleneck. You might want to talk to VerneGlobal and the Icelandic chamber of commerce/investment about that... There are at least four cables, totaling maybe 10Tb. Tata?/TeleGlobe?/GreenlandConnect, FarIce, DanIce, CanTat. HiberniaA

Re: [tor-relays] Abuse complaints about brute forceing via ssh

This 'attack' has been going on for YEARS. Nobody's really getting shells (well some are), just dictionaried. The problem is that OpenSSH logs this by default and people freak out when they see it in their logs. It's just background noise. Real admins tune it out and use ssh keys instead. _

Re: [tor-relays] planned downtime

> Why and for whom is that relevant? Keep in mind that the Tor network > handles churn quite well. If someone chose to use, or only could use, his relays. Or to give a reason other than being raided or broke :) ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@list

Re: [tor-relays] Received botnet/drone abuse complaint

> I received a botnet/drone complaint from shadowserver.org today If the complaint was sent directly to you, rather than to you via your ISP, it is unlikely you need to do anything. Unless you're concerned about possibly having your own IP space blacklisted (which is normally an ISP concern). If

Re: [tor-relays] consensus update request

Maybe this is why my client is taking so long to load at the moment. At first I thought it was my update to ossl 100f, but after checking 100e again, it's not. Tor currently sits in the netstatus consensus and missing dir auth phases for indefinite tens of minutes before coming online. valid-until

Re: [tor-relays] Tor relay system & uptime requirements

> With this set-up I see the Tor process consuming 2% of CPU, > about 60MB of RAM (RSS) used > 100 - 200 connections active at any given time. Seconded. It's not much. And irrespective of hardware, seconded also on using current OS, build libs and Tor. Some OS require setting kernel sysctl to enab

Re: [tor-relays] [tor] Re: Hosting relays in the Netherlands

[sorry, same note, right tor-relays address this time :-] >> I got to a point where I want to make an active contribution to the >> Tor cause starting with running some nodes of my own, but I'm having >> difficulties on finding hosting companies (vps/dedicated) that allow >> running Tor services.

Re: [tor-relays] case law on for exit nodes

>> AFAIK, this is still true in the US. However, I'm pretty sure I've seen >> at least 3 court cases in the EU on this list (though too busy to dig >> them up right now). There have also been several equipment seizures in >> the EU that never escalated to a court case... It does happen that exits

Re: [tor-relays] case law on for exit nodes

> I am especially interested in case law from countries in Europe Contact ccc.de. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Re: [tor-relays] too many abuse reports

>> > I just blocked the port and kept on serving > > As of yet, no one has mentioned the port. Out of curiosity, is it > included in the Reduced Exit Policy? > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReducedExitPolicy I cannot say. However it may be as simple as blocking sql's defaul

Re: [tor-relays] case law on for exit nodes

>> I am especially interested in case law from countries in Europe > > Contact ccc.de. also: exitno...@lists.ccc.de ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Re: [tor-relays] case law on for exit nodes

>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Security_Letter > > I would also like to take this opportunity to display my "I have not > received an NSL" card. > > I think it's still legal to do *that*, right? ;) Setting aside the inalienability of the hole in our face, some wobbly strips of flesh, som

Re: [tor-relays] case law on for exit nodes

>>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Security_Letter Further, judges are always available, including secret FISA ones. Go get it signed by a judge before trying to order people around with what amounts to a request on pretty letterhead. I'd be afraid of complying with anything NOT signed by

Re: [tor-relays] case law on for exit nodes

> There's a thread about it on NANOG right now. Presumably this one... "ISPs and full packet inspection" http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2012-May/048364.html That seems to be more about network ops than targeting specific users. There's a world of difference between routine sniffing of y

Re: [tor-relays] SocksPort flags trouble

> SocksPort 9050 > SocksListenAddress 127.0.0.1 Given the *ListenAddress to *Port syntax move, I'd be ok with killing the *ListenAddress form anytime. However, I'm pretty sure ControlListenAddress still needs to be conformed and marked as deprecated. __

Re: [tor-relays] Electronic surveillance on major tor exits

> We opted for the "if we don't stay relevant to the world, Tor will never > grow enough" route. I think that's still a good decision today. This is probably an ok thing as everyone knows a useless network is a dead network. So maybe in times of glut, do some release or authority based tuning to k

Re: [tor-relays] Call for discussion: turning funding into more exit relays

>> 4) What exactly do we mean by diversity? > > I would look at this almost entirely from a jurisdictional and ISP level. I > believe the biggest "sudden impact" threats to the tor network are going to > be from legal changes (jurisdictional, i.e. "save the children, nullroute > the nodes") and lo

Re: [tor-relays] How to protect yourself from network scanning

> I've thought about constructing iptables rules to limit the number of > SYN packets for the same host per second or such Multiple flows to the same host don't really bother routers of any class. Old routers choke when looking up many hosts in the routing table. So your proposed rules against por

Re: [tor-relays] Call for discussion: turning funding into more exit relays

>> Is there any justification for a low-bandwidth Tor node? Other than the diversity of having more nodes around... seems from discussions here that slower nodes see less users. Which means they're not as likely to be blocked by content providers for user misbehavior. This can be valuable for the

Re: [tor-relays] Help the Tor Project by running a fast unpublished bridge

>> Sorry for exposing the internals of running >> a non-profit. But I think transparency is especially important here. :) > > I don't know why you feel sorry. Transparency is important for > non-profit, at least for most I guess. Non-profit is just a tax and legal designation. After any necessary

[tor-relays] Bad exit

Exit (one of these two I think, no guarantees): 109C56AC68DB55D16E79F832E19313E6C3E47363 67FD1D03F922975269F94EC7E4FD38C6D0E5E900 - torservers? It's not occurring now via them, but whatever exit it was generated these... Error: mail.google.com uses an invalid security certificate. The certificate

Re: [tor-relays] openBSD question.

http://openbsd.org/faq/faq15.html Never consider any package from any OS as reviewed software. There simply isn't time to do such thing properly. Packages merely bring software to an OS and are usually compilation fixes, feature toggles, automated building and if lucky, bug reports sent uptream an

Re: [tor-relays] Map of Tor Relays updated

quite useful for placing new nodes. thx moritz. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

[tor-relays] Deploy relays using hidden exit IP's?

Shouldn't some exit relays (funded or not) be deployed to use an exit IP that is different from it's advertised exit IP in order to prevent a simplistic form of blocking based on scraping the descriptor set? I think this can happen if the default route is out another interface or secondary address.

Re: [tor-relays] Deploy relays using hidden exit IP's?

It would just seem really frustrating for users who want to participate in account based sites (and really, what sites aren't) to find themselves kneejerk blocked at the network level. Tor is slow, there's really no claim to be made that Tor is capable of literally DoSing a site. Only one for cran

Re: [tor-relays] Deploy relays using hidden exit IP's?

Also related, has anyone tried operating an exit behind a VPN/NAT/proxy service? As opposed to having secondary interfaces/routes on the local machine. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailma

[tor-relays] Bandwidth and server leads [was: Tor raid]

> From: elijah wright > Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2012 13:38:51 -0600 > Cc: na...@nanog.org > Subject: Re: William was raided for running a Tor exit node. > We had a guy (aka potential customer) inquire the other day about hosting a > Tor exit on our infrastructure the other day; he disappeared fairly >

[tor-relays] Prepared for [Raided for running a Tor exit node]?

>> Running an exit node from home DSL or Cable is bad idea. One must look >> for a Tor friendly ISP and have balls made of steel! ... ISP[/hoster] and[/or] have ... > However, I do not believe it is that way in > the United States What 'way'? Running an exit node at home, or elsewhere, would s

[tor-relays] Prepared for [Raided for running a Tor exit node]?

> Only regarding home Wireless access in the US > I was involved in a case with just this situation. > > According to my lawyer there is no consensus on who is responsible for wifi. > Every State has different laws each one is just a vague. > In NY, if your wireless is secured (pw protected) you ar

Re: [tor-relays] Prepared for [Raided for running a Tor exit node]?

> In NH, you are responsible for all data that passes your wifi point secured > or not. Where is this codified? > NH - This is a Bill that has passed, but not signed into law... https://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/LXII/638/638-17.htm https://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2003/HB049

Re: [tor-relays] Traffic pattern on Tor relay

> From time to time > > that the traffic oscillates with a period of about 14 seconds and the > traffic doubles in the peaks. 1? Some buffer fill/pause/empty cycle somewhere during a large transfer. Try building a circuit through your node and transfer large to eliminate your node if cycle is not

[tor-relays] Are you looking for node diversity?

> I'd prefer to stay away from the US. > (That said, the 1st and 2nd place remain the same in this case.) > Exit probability is interesting: 43% chance of exiting from a US-based node. > Also, I feel for that poor guy in Chile. Try posting up on some of the lists/forums... isp-planet, datacenter

Re: [tor-relays] Are you looking for node diversity?

> Also google: site: vps/dedicated/whatever hosting http://irandatacenter.ir/ http://serverhosting.ae/vps.html ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Re: [tor-relays] [tor-talk] On the Theory of Remailers

> It is an interesting questions, if with a modern user interface, can they > get to new life? I see no reason the state of the art from the legacy remailer types can't be combined and updated into a new service running on some of the same relay machines we have for Tor today. Even if only 10% ran

Re: [tor-relays] What's wrong with TorStatus?

> https://atlas.torproject.org/ > https://compass.torproject.org/ > >> What's going on with TorStatus? I used to poll the torstatus servers for some datas on occaision. Their node counts seem similar at the moment. I added compass a while ago which works similarly. It also changed recently ago fro

Re: [tor-relays] ServerAstra from hungary allows exit relays

> I couldn't believe that my current traffic level was sustainable long > term at that price point. So I specifically asked the question "what > can I realistically use?" They replied: > > "We are currently offering free bandwidth and we certainly appreciate > you reaching out to us because you are

Re: [tor-relays] [tor-talk] Legal problems: TOR relay & Torrents in .de

> I've snail-mailed them a letter based on what Moritz had posted. They > replied with a standardized letter without even commenting on my > statements. It's basically saying "Last chance to pay or we'll go to > court." > > So I'm a little unsure whether or not it's now time to actually > consult a

Re: [tor-relays] Problems with Debian package and low ports

> Tor has already changed to a non-privileged user, but you are trying to bind > on ports that only root is allowed to bind on. > > Two solutions: > > 1) Run tor as root (really, a bad idea) > 2) Bind to other ports than 80 and 443. 3) Remap the ports outside the restricted range using your packet

Re: [tor-relays] US Investigators seem to learn

> I thought I would let you know: Our US hoster is regularly contacted by > law enforcement about our exits there. Some agents ask if the traffic > pattern is balanced, ie. if the same amount of traffic enters and leaves > the box. > > I always argue that this is a good indicator for Tor traffic, a

Re: [tor-relays] Ongoing denial of service attack against Tor relays by leased botnet in America and PRC (Nobistech, Datashack, Limestone, HE, Pegtech, WholeSale Interent, and Psychz VPS nodes, etc)

> New to the list, I run a Tor exit node from my small cable modem connection > in Honolulu, as well as for a short time on a few on VPS's to prove to > Over the last several weeks, I have collected substantial evidence > indicating that a botnet is degrading the Tor anonymity network in its > ent

Re: [tor-relays] BitTorrent complaint

> tor could easily be made to efficiently use a similar mechanism, if it > doesn't already in order to perform the lookups to compute the answer to > "What is the subset of exit nodes allowing exit to IP addr X on port Y?" The answer may lie with the client polling some exits and computing the ans

Re: [tor-relays] BitTorrent complaint

In some work I've done, limitations would follow as such... a) Advertising non-desire for traffic (exit policy) is the same as packet filtering with the same rules locally. b) You can filter whatever you want at any inspection level you want, for whatever reason, or random/no reason, ***so long as

Re: [tor-relays] BitTorrent complaint

> Bittorrent may be an exception to the above but the performance cost > would be at the clients end and for one bittorrent is hardly a realtime > protocol a little delay making each connection would not make much > difference, two it performs poorly if you insist on running it over tor > anyway an

Re: [tor-relays] [tor-talk] NPA to urge Internet providers to block users of hijacking software [Tor]

>> http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20130418p2a00m0na013000c.html "to voluntarily block communications if an anonymous software system ... is found abused online." The second ripline leaves some room but is without specifics. > It seems they are blurring the line between recomm

Re: [tor-relays] hardware

> AMD doesn't seem to make any server CPUs that are useful for this > application, unfortunately. Really, how so? Many AMD CPU's have AES-NI. Even the A10-6800K (4 x 4.1GHz) would be decent. That plus an a85x mainboard (1Gbit) and 8GB ddr3-2133 is $300. Add some case+ps. https://en.wikipedia.org/

Re: [tor-relays] hardware

>> A10-6800K (4 x 4.1GHz) would be decent. > > It doesn't seem to support ECC It doesn't. And for those that recognize its importance, that's been an kind of weakness of AMD for some time. Actually for both AMD and Intel, it's treated as a price premium instead of just 8+n extra gates and logic.

Re: [tor-relays] Sitevalley is no longer Tor-friendly

I don't see anything specific regarding Tor or its capabilities in their AUP. But there are bits that could be extended to cover Tor. Which it appears they did, whether for bandwidth or cost of dealing with 'complaints'. They are in New Hampshire, perhaps you could let the FreeStateProject know (c

Re: [tor-relays] Sitevalley is no longer Tor-friendly

>> GANDI > Just to let others know, Nos Oignons [1] reached to them about the new > pricing scheme and they offered to sponsor a 25 Mbit/s exit relay. It > should get live in the upcoming weeks. :) > > [1] https://nos-oignons.net/%C3%80_propos/index.en.html GANDI is pretty well known for good thi

Re: [tor-relays] Fwd: Computer requirements for a modest (15-20Mbs) relay?

On Tue, Jul 30, 2013 at 6:50 AM, Andy Isaacson wrote: > On Mon, Jul 29, 2013 at 01:23:13PM -0400, Zack Weinberg wrote: >> On Mon, Jul 29, 2013 at 12:35 PM, Andy Isaacson wrote: >> > Yes, there are cases of law enforcement seizing all computer gear from a >> > house with a exit node -- not just th

[tor-relays] VPN termination on relays

> Mosh is great, but it still relies exclusively on UDP, right? > So no "over Tor"... Somewhat related to things that don't work via exits... So who wants to offer VPN termination as part of their exit service? User tunnels VPN to you, you give back a bound port, or a natted 10 address, something

Re: [tor-relays] Running exit-node in Germany

> check whether the abuse did come from Tor, rather than another computer that > was on the same internal networh (thus sharing the public IP address). Many ISP's run netflow logging or its equivalent for some combination of statistics and security purposes. Being effectively an ISP, a Tor node op

Re: [tor-relays] Is it safe to run an exit node from a VPS provider?

> On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 wrote: VPS, containers, dedicated, encrypted disk, whatever... it's all the same, the filesystem and bits on disk, particular when running, are exposed to whoever is holding the box. Since it's not your box in your DC where you stand guard 24x7, nor have you audited Tor aga

Re: [tor-relays] Is it safe to run an exit node from a VPS provider?

> I would like to propose that you take a look from a different perspective (and > I thought from the mail subject the question will be about that) on this. > > To run an exit node from a VPS provider is not safer -- TO YOU -- than running > an exit node from your personal home connection. > > This

Re: [tor-relays] Key files encryption methods.

There may be no better than pure ram, so this ticket may be of interest: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9478 ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Re: [tor-relays] new relays

On 8/30/13, Andrea Shepard wrote: > On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 11:08:34AM -0500, Jon Gardner wrote: >> Then why have exit policies? Exit nodes regularly block "unwelcome" >> traffic >> like bittorrent, and there's only a slight functional difference between >> that >> and using a filter in front of t

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