snip
I'm more
worried about the risks to user anonymity. It sucks to be
the user reading
about some sensitive subject when your apt cron job
decides to poke every
package source you install from. “Oh, that guy
who keeps reading about Foozer's
Disease must be in the
Antarctica/McMurdo
--- Ursprüngliche Nachricht ---
Von: grarpamp grarp...@gmail.com
Datum: 02.03.2012 07:45:20
An: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Betreff: Re: [tor-talk] Operating system updates / software installation
behind Tor Transparent Proxy
On Thu, Mar 1, 2012 at 11:31 PM, Andrew Lewman
Robert Ransom wrote (20 Feb 2012 08:23:05 GMT) :
torsocks 1.2-3 just hit wheezy/testing, and it works on irssi (at
least as shipped in wheezy).
torsocks 1.2-3~bpo60+1 is now available in squeeze-backports.
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It's lame so or so. The exit node admins will have to deal with
copyright infringement complaints.
'All bulk data' was the intended meaning. Assuming copyright is not
going away, certainly operators would want to see the complaint
generating portion of bulk move solely and natively to the
Robert Ransom rransom.8...@gmail.com wrote:
On 2012-03-02, Andrew Lewman and...@torproject.is wrote:
The trick is, I like to think I know what I'm doing and that I'll
notice if apt-get or my VM image fails to transfer untouched. Whether
I'll actually notice a sophisticated exploit in deb
On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 10:33, pro...@secure-mail.biz wrote:
The transparently proxied operating system does not know it's real external
IP, only it's Tor exit IP. And can therefore never leak it's real external IP.
I see this claim made all the time — is it actually true? Is Tor
designed to
how about like this
http://imgur.com/VFkmo
this is helpful for user who has two firefox browsers - easy identification of
tor-powered!
--
Jerzy Łogiewa -- jerz...@interia.eu
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On Sat, 03 Mar 2012 15:00:51 +, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 10:33, pro...@secure-mail.biz wrote:
The transparently proxied operating system does not know it's real external
IP, only it's Tor exit IP. And can therefore never leak it's real external
IP.
I see this
The transparently proxied operating system does not know it's real external
IP, only it's Tor exit IP. And can therefore never leak it's real external
IP.
I see this claim made all the time — is it actually true? Is Tor
designed
to withstand active attacks where Torified applications try
On Sat, 03 Mar 2012 15:00:51 +, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
On Sat, Mar
3, 2012 at 10:33, pro...@secure-mail.biz wrote:
The transparently
proxied operating system does not know it's real external IP, only it's Tor
exit IP. And can therefore never leak it's real external IP.
I
see this
[Sending from a differentaccount, while my tormail is messed up - eliaz]
The problem described below might be clearer from this copy of a screen
grab showing three in-country relays appearing in the bottom-right list
of Network Map:
relay 1 (Online)
Location: xxx
IP Address: xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
It's my impression that signed packages aren't a priority
for the BSDs in general.
It will happen when one of their mirrors gets rooted, or one of
their devs gets their machine, and thus their dev account, rooted.
The kernel.org, gnu/fsf and debian[?] incidents all come to mind.
Too bad it
On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 12:33 AM, pro...@secure-mail.biz wrote:
...
Application level leaks are problematic. We have a page which describes many
of these problems including with workarounds (we recommend Tor Browser etc.).
these are significant if you are mixing tor and non-tor access on the
On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 7:06 AM, pro...@secure-mail.biz wrote:
... There are three ways to torify.
Torified through http/socks-proxy settings and about:config, certainly not.
(DNS leaks depend on about:config, which malware wouuld not honor.)
this is prone to failure as you mention and easily
coderman wrote:
On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 12:33 AM, pro...@secure-mail.biz wrote:
...
Application level leaks are problematic. We have a page which describes many
of these problems including with workarounds (we recommend Tor Browser
etc.).
these are significant if you are mixing tor and
On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 10:06 AM, pro...@secure-mail.biz wrote:
We have also a sub page TorBOX/LeakTests and all went negative. Additionally,
Skype, which is known for it's ability to punch through firewalls was not
able to non-torified connections. What I don't like to advertise is, that
Who is 93.114.40.75?
The Tor check page lists it and says I'm not using Tor. Another user
reported this, too.
I loaded the Tor check page today and it said I wasn't using Tor. The IP
listed was: 93.114.40.75. I checked blutmagie's site and it said I wasn't
using Tor, with the same IP address
On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 8:10 AM, Fabian Keil
freebsd-lis...@fabiankeil.de wrote:
Robert Ransom rransom.8...@gmail.com wrote:
On 2012-03-02, Andrew Lewman and...@torproject.is wrote:
The trick is, I like to think I know what I'm doing and that I'll
notice if apt-get or my VM image fails to
This is a repost of important question NOT solved within the last two months.
This is my second attempt today to send this message. Is it being deleted
by moderation because TBB may be a method of eliminating Tor use outside
of the browser and (maybe, IMO) the developers (may) wish to keep (a
On Sun, Mar 04, 2012 at 02:29:31AM -, m...@tormail.net wrote 1.6K bytes in
45 lines about:
: This is my second attempt today to send this message. Is it being deleted
: by moderation because TBB may be a method of eliminating Tor use outside
: of the browser and (maybe, IMO) the developers
On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 3:54 PM, Hggiu Uizzu torbox...@yahoo.com wrote:
.
We already learned about this in [1] and discussed it on our Dev page [2]
(and wondered why you said /29 and not /31).
some operating systems (Windows) do not support /31 host-to-host
interface configurations. in which
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