esolve esolve:
what I meant is:
Let me say that an attacker controls some nodes. At a certain time, one of
the controlled nodes is used as entry node by a tor client, if the
attacker doesn't know that the node is used as entry node, then the
attacker can't identify the client. Even if it
On 08.12.2012 05:43, Maimun Rizal wrote:
Hi All,
I confused about bandwidth in TOR, there are Bandwidth Max, Burst, and
Observed.
Where I can get information about them?
When will we use three of them?
Maximum bandwidth is the average bandwidth limit for both incoming and
outgoing traffic of
On Fri, Dec 07, 2012 at 09:50:32PM +, Aaron Brouard wrote:
I'm trying to make my hidden service more secure. It runs on a server
running Ubuntu 12.04.1 LTS server version. I have set up full disk
If you can't place the service on physically distinct machines,
private (RFC1918) address space
(2012 General Use) pgp.2...@jry.me
-- next part --
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 230 bytes
Desc: not available
URL:
http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/attachments/20121208/b0f9abc3/attachment
Downloading and gpg verifying Tor Browser each time there is an update
gets really tiresome and I think many people either never gpg verified
or don't do it sometimes.
What if we had a Debian package which contains a Tor Browser updater?
I could eventually provide something like this:
sudo
Hello fellas,
As a follow-up to the discussion we started on Twitter, I wanted to
start this thread here as well to get the discussion going.
The main point of the discussion were:
- What can be done to stop botnets abusing Tor for concealing its
infrastructure?
- What kind of impact would a
I think some of the hysteria over this is overdone.
- What can be done to stop botnets abusing Tor for concealing its
infrastructure?
For unpublished nodes, nothing that I'm aware of. Hidden services are
called that for a reason, and it's necessarily a dual-use technology.
You can't weaken
Hi,
Are settings like ReachableAddresses guaranteed to aggregate in torrc?
E.g., is
ReachableAddresses 1.2.3.4:56
ReachableAddresses 7.8.9.1:78
equivalent to
ReachableAddresses 1.2.3.4:56, 7.8.9.1:78
It is the case in my tests, but would like to be sure.
Also, does obfs2 transport always
On Sat, Dec 08, 2012 at 05:50:53PM +0100, clau...@shadowserver.org wrote 0.8K
bytes in 23 lines about:
: - What can be done to stop botnets abusing Tor for concealing its
: infrastructure?
First off, remember hidden services are just an addressing and routing
scheme. They don't actually provide
On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:47 AM, and...@torproject.is wrote:
I'd be interested if gnunet or i2p have seem similar usage by
botnets.
I was going to write that for I2P it is highly unlikely due to
autonomous daemon configuration complexity, a dependency on Java, and
unreliability wrt. network
10 matches
Mail list logo