Re: [tor-talk] about tor entry node

2012-12-08 Thread Sebastian G. bastik.tor
esolve esolve: what I meant is: Let me say that an attacker controls some nodes. At a certain time, one of the controlled nodes is used as entry node by a tor client, if the attacker doesn't know that the node is used as entry node, then the attacker can't identify the client. Even if it

Re: [tor-talk] Bandwidth in TOR

2012-12-08 Thread Moritz Bartl
On 08.12.2012 05:43, Maimun Rizal wrote: Hi All, I confused about bandwidth in TOR, there are Bandwidth Max, Burst, and Observed. Where I can get information about them? When will we use three of them? Maximum bandwidth is the average bandwidth limit for both incoming and outgoing traffic of

Re: [tor-talk] Securing a hidden service

2012-12-08 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Fri, Dec 07, 2012 at 09:50:32PM +, Aaron Brouard wrote: I'm trying to make my hidden service more secure. It runs on a server running Ubuntu 12.04.1 LTS server version. I have set up full disk If you can't place the service on physically distinct machines, private (RFC1918) address space

Re: [tor-talk] tor-talk Digest, Vol 23, Issue 25

2012-12-08 Thread Aaron Brouard
(2012 General Use) pgp.2...@jry.me -- next part -- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 230 bytes Desc: not available URL: http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/attachments/20121208/b0f9abc3/attachment

[tor-talk] Interested in a Tor Browser update script for Debian, Ubuntu and derivatives?

2012-12-08 Thread adrelanos
Downloading and gpg verifying Tor Browser each time there is an update gets really tiresome and I think many people either never gpg verified or don't do it sometimes. What if we had a Debian package which contains a Tor Browser updater? I could eventually provide something like this: sudo

[tor-talk] Botnets through Tor

2012-12-08 Thread Claudio
Hello fellas, As a follow-up to the discussion we started on Twitter, I wanted to start this thread here as well to get the discussion going. The main point of the discussion were: - What can be done to stop botnets abusing Tor for concealing its infrastructure? - What kind of impact would a

Re: [tor-talk] Botnets through Tor

2012-12-08 Thread survivd
I think some of the hysteria over this is overdone. - What can be done to stop botnets abusing Tor for concealing its infrastructure? For unpublished nodes, nothing that I'm aware of. Hidden services are called that for a reason, and it's necessarily a dual-use technology. You can't weaken

[tor-talk] Aggregate-type settings in torrc

2012-12-08 Thread Maxim Kammerer
Hi, Are settings like ReachableAddresses guaranteed to aggregate in torrc? E.g., is ReachableAddresses 1.2.3.4:56 ReachableAddresses 7.8.9.1:78 equivalent to ReachableAddresses 1.2.3.4:56, 7.8.9.1:78 It is the case in my tests, but would like to be sure. Also, does obfs2 transport always

Re: [tor-talk] Botnets through Tor

2012-12-08 Thread andrew
On Sat, Dec 08, 2012 at 05:50:53PM +0100, clau...@shadowserver.org wrote 0.8K bytes in 23 lines about: : - What can be done to stop botnets abusing Tor for concealing its : infrastructure? First off, remember hidden services are just an addressing and routing scheme. They don't actually provide

Re: [tor-talk] Botnets through Tor

2012-12-08 Thread Maxim Kammerer
On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:47 AM, and...@torproject.is wrote: I'd be interested if gnunet or i2p have seem similar usage by botnets. I was going to write that for I2P it is highly unlikely due to autonomous daemon configuration complexity, a dependency on Java, and unreliability wrt. network