I'd also be interested to hear from anyone who took the time to research
this further. I for one arrived at the same conclusion as Lars at least in
regards to DNS leaking, and saw no way for anything to be leaked, really.
(Also, if netcat fails at some point during the ssh session, the pipe
breaks,
On Thu, 02 May 2013 13:19:59 +, Lucia Liljegren wrote:
...
> Because these "not attackers" are guessing addresses they tend to hit my 404
> page which is dynamic and does some checks. When I detect an IP doing this
> sort of stuff, I use Cloudflare's API and ban the IP 7 days .
You mean, w
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Thu, 02 May 2013 11:03:52 +0200
> From: Moritz Bartl
>
> [...]
> The second and most common type of blocking happens after someone has
> been "attacked" once, or twice, via Tor, or an active "attack" is
> ongoing. I use quotation marks here because most things that happen
I'm looking at using netcat to run ssh over Tor.
Does this use of netcat leak information in any way?
ssh -o ProxyCommand="nc -X 5 -x localhost:9050 %h %p" \
-o User=user1 server.example.org
Many others must have already looked at this way of connecting since it
is fairly obvious. The onl
NoName antispam06,
You make some good points. But the reality of the web is simply that flash
is dominant right now and will be for the near future. The flash issue
should be addressed. I agree 100%, the best way to fix this issue is to
build a safe flash player. However, first we should f
What if you had something like exit nodes that required proof-of-work or
bitcoin-to-use in order to be used, as per-choice of the person running the
node? You would have a bunch of 'unsafe' exit nodes that behave like exit
nodes today, and then a bunch of 'difficult' exit nodes that require user
ef
On 02.05.2013 09:36, Mike Perry wrote:
This shouldn't discourage anyone from working on a minimalistic flash
sandbox though. Any solution would be better than none, especially since
we already allow people to go into the TBB settings and mash the thing
on if they really want..
But why a flash s
On 02.05.2013 05:11, Tom Ritter wrote:
> I used to be a big proponent of proof-of-work schemes, but I've scaled
> back my preference significantly. There's two problems with them: [...]
My thoughts exactly. But, in this case, I have to say from experience
that a few websites that use blacklists t
Thus spake Tom Ritter (t...@ritter.vg):
> On 1 May 2013 15:29, David Vorick wrote:
> > I don't know what I'm talking about, but here goes:
> >
> > If you were to put flash in a "sandbox" that had a fake IP address, might
> > that make the sandbox incompatible with the tor network? When you are
>
