Re: [tor-talk] Skype banned tor-nodes?

2013-05-30 Thread James Brown
Mike Perry: > Cross-posting to tor-relays to give everyone the heads up - I just added > 33033 to the ReducedExitPolicy page for Skype: > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReducedExitPolicy > > Non-relay related discussion should remove tor-relays from the Cc. > Very thanks. As

[tor-talk] Stealth mode

2013-05-30 Thread Achter Lieber
Hello. I have a simple enough question that I hope someone can help me with. In Mac there is a setting called 'stealth mode.' As I understand this setting, a request to a port or ping or somesuch, will get no response from the computer at all. No indication that there is anything there at all - l

Re: [tor-talk] Stealth mode

2013-05-30 Thread grarpamp
> In Mac there is a setting called 'stealth mode.' > As I understand this setting, a request to a port or ping or somesuch, > will get no response from the computer at all. No indication that there is > anything there at all - like a computer. > Whomever or whatever made the request will not know.

Re: [tor-talk] Stealth mode

2013-05-30 Thread Lars Noodén
On Thu, 30 May 2013, Achter Lieber wrote: > Is stealth mode a setting that will hinder or enhance the use of the Tor > Bundle? The "stealth" mode menu is weak on information but it appears that it simply drops packets instead of rejecting them properly. When that happens to you or a service you

[tor-talk] DNS provider that does not hijack failures

2013-05-30 Thread Robin Kipp
Hi all, just setup my tor node and got the following log entries after a few minutes: May 30 22:37:26 home Tor[3107]: Your DNS provider gave an answer for "skwpnmuq.com", which is not supposed to exist. Apparently they are hijacking DNS failures. Trying to correct for this. We've noticed 1 possi

Re: [tor-talk] Anonymity of Leaking Servers (Was Re: [tor-dev] "Trawling for Tor Hidden Services: Detection, Measurement, Deanonymization")

2013-05-30 Thread Low-Key²
- Original Message - > Is that important for Strongbox?  I don't think Strongbox's threat model > needs the document upload server to *be* anonymous.  I can see why it would be important for preventing end to end correlation. Given the recent example of the massive grab of phone dat

Re: [tor-talk] DNS provider that does not hijack failures

2013-05-30 Thread Sean Alexandre
On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 11:42:48PM +0200, Robin Kipp wrote: > We use OpenDNS on our network, and I know they provide an info page if > someone attempts > to browse to a non-existant address. This isn't a big issue normally, but I > can see how > it's a problem with Tor. Thus, I'd like to use a

Re: [tor-talk] DNS provider that does not hijack failures

2013-05-30 Thread Joe Btfsplk
On 5/30/2013 6:07 PM, Sean Alexandre wrote: On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 11:42:48PM +0200, Robin Kipp wrote: We use OpenDNS on our network, and I know they provide an info page if someone attempts to browse to a non-existant address. This isn't a big issue normally, but I can see how it's a problem

Re: [tor-talk] DNS provider that does not hijack failures

2013-05-30 Thread Sean Alexandre
On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 07:15:36PM -0500, Joe Btfsplk wrote: > On 5/30/2013 6:07 PM, Sean Alexandre wrote: > >On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 11:42:48PM +0200, Robin Kipp wrote: > >>We use OpenDNS on our network, and I know they provide an info page if > >>someone attempts > >>to browse to a non-existant

Re: [tor-talk] DNS provider that does not hijack failures

2013-05-30 Thread Joe Btfsplk
On 5/30/2013 8:11 PM, Sean Alexandre wrote: On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 07:15:36PM -0500, Joe Btfsplk wrote: Google? Oh, my. Not ideal, I agree. What would you use, if your ISP's resolvers weren't an option? Also, let's say you don't want to run your own DNS resolver. (Running your own resolver