What's in the logs?
Did you check what does iptables DROP, REJECT?
To check DNS resolving try `dig @DNS_SERVER_IP google.com`
On 1/2/15 11:54 PM, Oğuz Yarımtepe wrote:
I changed the firewall rules.
/etc/firewall.user
This file is interpreted as shell script.
# Put your custom iptables rules
Did something happen in Kazakhstan in the first week of October 2014?
There big decrease in relay users (about 40%) accompanied by a
simultaneous big increase in bridge users (about 800%).
Take a look at the graphs (also attached):
https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?graph=
Summary:
The documentation is still somewhat vague on the best use of the
"HardwareAccel" option.
> *HardwareAccel* *0*|*1*
>
> If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration
> when available. (Default: 0)
>
I could not find a definitive answer in the archives or in
https:/
>So let's assume less than 1% of Facebook users use this.. let's take
>a million for example. Hundreds of thousands of Tor users would then
>be keeping hundreds of circuits open while they are interacting with
>the Bulk data servers. What do Tor backend experts think of this
>scenario?
I think
On 1/3/15, usprey wrote:
> Summary:
> The documentation is still somewhat vague on the best use of the
> "HardwareAccel" option.
you could submit a patch ;)
>> *HardwareAccel* *0*|*1*
>>
>> If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration
>> when available. (Default: 0)
On Sat, Jan 3, 2015 at 1:31 AM, Jeremy Rand wrote:
> Look for 41.25 and 41.26
The location holding entity of 25 is the entry guard,
which itself can't be located. And the notice reciever of 26
can't forward or retain regarding that which is unknown
to him. It falls apart under any location hidden
On Sat, Jan 03, 2015 at 10:04:52AM +, cont...@sharebook.com wrote:
> >So let's assume less than 1% of Facebook users use this.. let's take
> >a million for example. Hundreds of thousands of Tor users would then
> >be keeping hundreds of circuits open while they are interacting with
> >the Bulk
On Fri, 02 Jan 2015 18:06:53 -0800
"Jesse B. Crawford" wrote:
> [..]
>
> Facebook having a signed SSL certificate for their hidden service
> reliably anchors it to their corporate identity, preventing phishing
> attacks and giving users confidence.
True. It seems /most/ of the conversation for
On 3 January 2015 at 13:34, coderman wrote:
> On 1/3/15, usprey wrote:
>> Summary:
>> The documentation is still somewhat vague on the best use of the
>> "HardwareAccel" option.
>
>
> you could submit a patch ;)
>
I will be glad to, but will have to know what to write first. =)
>
>
>>> *Hardwar
On Fri, Jan 2, 2015 at 9:46 PM, Ruben Pollan wrote:
>> the best place to go shopping for a server with 1gbps dedicated
>> bandwidth in a location that is helpful to the network. Someone on irc
>
> ... maybe the ipredator documentation of
> their tor server can help:
> https://ipredator.se/guide/to
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 1/3/2015 4:30 AM, David Fifield wrote:
> Did something happen in Kazakhstan in the first week of October
> 2014? There big decrease in relay users (about 40%) accompanied by
> a simultaneous big increase in bridge users (about 800%).
>
> Take a loo
On 01/03/2015 03:30 AM, David Fifield wrote:
> I wrote a program to look for blocking events by looking for
> unlikely increases/decreases in relays and bridges simultaneously.
> This Kazakhstan event was one of the highest-scored finds by the
> program. I'm not aware of a Tor blocking event in Kaz
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Hash: SHA1
On 01/01/15 12:28, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) - lists wrote:
> On 12/31/14 7:27 PM, Nick Mathewson wrote:
>> o Major features (hidden services): - Make HS port scanning more
>> difficult by immediately closing the circuit when a user attempts
>> to conne
Le 03/01/2015 14:19, carlo von lynX a écrit :
Tor doesn't have that and so far I have not heard of anyone being
interested in changing this. In fact, it would be such a drastic
intrusion into its current operation mode that it would risk affecting
the current way Tor operates. That is why it is
Hi,
I'd like to connect vidalia to a system tor daemon, but it has unwanted
side effects.. that makes it unusable for me.
My minimal torrc:
==
SOCKSPort 0.0.0.0:9050
ControlPort 9051
HashControlPassword ...
==
After starting vidalia and providing the respective control port
password, vidalia cau
-BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-
Version: APG v1.1.1
hQIMA8lnVNK+PSX1ARAAovXsz24o7OVA71FmfMh2xbXBdjv6krBPk0N7wCWC+cav
nRqTlHd9lKOzf/eEBDLdE9iECfjdKEWQdilsuJZE0sbYHpbQKdN/ZZldqM/CyPBy
EuzkPJswI2MifH/o9MXxCdy4opBFG4lnCgqOiqIMpXentOc5YFBA0J2i2YFEFm8D
aw5THffrD5acTHYQnCtZ9p9PstFASh+FPIHTzotNHahWLXjte1+LYYO
Can we get an unencrypted version of this? :-)
~Josef
Am 04.01.2015 um 00:04 schrieb Christoph Volonte:
> -BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-
> Version: APG v1.1.1
>
> hQIMA8lnVNK+PSX1ARAAovXsz24o7OVA71FmfMh2xbXBdjv6krBPk0N7wCWC+cav
> nRqTlHd9lKOzf/eEBDLdE9iECfjdKEWQdilsuJZE0sbYHpbQKdN/ZZldqM/CyPBy
> Euz
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Yes i thought the sock should be localhost:9050 sometimes its also port 9051
Am 4. Januar 2015 00:06:21 MEZ, schrieb Josef 'veloc1ty' Stautner
:
>Can we get an unencrypted version of this? :-)
>
>~Josef
>
>Am 04.01.2015 um 00:04 schrieb Christoph V
On 2015-01-03 05:23, Matthew Puckey wrote:
>
>
> Not sure I would use DNS as an example of reliable authentication. As
> above though, do you think current or future users would be checking
> who issed the certificate? I don't think the typical user would. In
> that scenerio, I would hope the dif
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