On Wed, May 11, 2016 at 07:40:17PM -0700, David Fifield wrote:
> Justin helped me by running some tests and we think we know how this
> Cyberoam device is blocking meek connections. It blocks TLS connections
> that have the Firefox 38's TLS signature and that have an SNI field that
> is one of our
On 5/11/16 10:40 PM, David Fifield wrote:
> Another solution is to change the front domain to something else, for
> exmaple using google.com instead of www.google.com.
Would it be feasible for a future release of meek to do this automatically?
Just cycle through subdomains till one works?
Google
On Sun, May 08, 2016 at 01:37:47PM -0700, David Fifield wrote:
> With the meek blocking, it might be that they are doing some kind of
> timing analysis, or it might be that we screwed up something simple like
> the TLS signature. Could you try it in these configurations?
> Tor Browser 5.5.5
On 5/11/16 10:26 AM, Arnis wrote:
> I don't mind, but please note that TorChat is not developed by Tor dev
> team.
Forgive me, I had confused TorChat with Tor Messenger.
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On 05/11/2016 05:23 PM, Blake Hadley wrote:
On 5/11/16 10:14 AM, Arnis wrote:
On 05/11/2016 05:09 PM, moosehad...@gmail.com wrote:
On May 11, 2016, at 10:00 AM, Arnis wrote:
The work shows that although the design of TorChat is sound, its
implementation has several flaws, which make TorChat
On 5/11/16 10:14 AM, Arnis wrote:
> On 05/11/2016 05:09 PM, moosehad...@gmail.com wrote:
>>> On May 11, 2016, at 10:00 AM, Arnis wrote:
>>>
>>> The work shows that although the design of TorChat is sound, its
>>> implementation has several flaws, which make TorChat users
>>> vulnerable to imperso
> On May 11, 2016, at 10:00 AM, Arnis wrote:
>
> The work shows that although the design of TorChat is sound, its
> implementation has several flaws, which make TorChat users vulnerable to
> impersonation
The impersonation vulnerability mentioned here is inherent; it requires
compromising th
On 05/11/2016 05:09 PM, moosehad...@gmail.com wrote:
On May 11, 2016, at 10:00 AM, Arnis wrote:
The work shows that although the design of TorChat is sound, its implementation
has several flaws, which make TorChat users vulnerable to impersonation
The impersonation vulnerability mentioned her
FYI:
http://kodu.ut.ee/~arnis/torchat_thesis.pdf
Abstract
TorChat is a peer-to-peer instant messenger built on top of the Tor
network that not only provides authentication and end-to-end encryption,
but also allows the communication parties to stay anonymous. In
addition, it prevents third par