nusenu writes:
> that put users at risk because they potentially see traffic entering
> _and_ leaving the tor network (which breaks the assumption that not
> every relay in a circuit is operated by the same operator).
(strictly speaking, the assumption that no more than one relay in a
circuit is
Thanks for this email.
> Two common Tor network abuses are:
>
> a) Bad exit nodes sniffing and messing around with client traffic.
>
> b) Bad HSDir nodes. The hidden service hash ring is a particularly juicy
>target, since participating relays get to see the addresses of onion
>services
Hello list,
in this email we will present you the current state of bad relays on the Tor
network.
It should be no surprise that the Tor network is under constant attack. As part
of critical Internet infrastructure, people have been attacking our network in
various ways and for multiple reasons.
On 28 February 2017 at 06:07, scar wrote:
> I believe we should encourage
> sinkhole/honeypot operators to just block/ignore Tor exit IPs that connect
> to their traps. what do you all think?
Wouldn't that risk giving away the fact that it's a honeypot?
-J
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