On Tue, Dec 04, 2018 at 04:14:46PM +, iwanle...@cock.li wrote:
> The descriptors seem to indicate onion addresses. So if I act a relay, I
> seem to be able to get the addresses. Then how? ... Could someone skilled
> try to get the lists? :D
Please don't.
In particular, if we notice that your
Hello,
According to
/tor/src/core/mainloop/connection.c
Lines 4700 - 4710:
/* The interface changed. We're a client, so we need to regenerate our
* keys. First, reset the state. */
log_notice(LD_NET, "Our IP address has changed. Rotating keys...");
tor_addr_copy(*last_interface_
[Typo in onion list address, fixed and resent herein]
> The descriptors seem to indicate onion addresses. So if I act a relay, I
> seem to be able to get the addresses. Then how? ... Could someone
> skilled try to get the lists? :D
Yes, many services, researchers, and privates routinely do this.
> with OnionCat to yield IPv6 and UDP transport among tor's P2P
> That's simply not possible with v3's no-IP TCP only onions.
That is to say, it's not possible with code that exists today...
the various possible solutions, and others yet to be proposed,
that could provide those things with v3 onio
> The descriptors seem to indicate onion addresses. So if I act a relay, I
> seem to be able to get the addresses. Then how? ... Could someone
> skilled try to get the lists? :D
Yes, many services, researchers, and privates routinely do this.
The code exists in some repositories, or you can write
On 12/04/2018 03:55 PM, Mirimir wrote:
Doh. Make that:
> So is there an efficient way to specify a v2-sized subset of v3 onions?
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On 12/04/2018 08:41 AM, Aaron Johnson wrote:
> If you want to keep your onion address hidden, you should run a v3 onion
> service. An improvement of v3 over v2 is that Hidden Service Directories can
> no longer identify the onion address of the onion-service descriptors they
> store. As a result
I'll change to v3 Onion Services in the very near future. I hear that there are
so many security improvements with v3 Onion Services and can't wait to give
them a try :)
Also I agree with the wider point. You are attacking the network and likely
violating the Tor Research Ethics Policy that was
Nathaniel Suchy writes:
> It's true that someone malicious can run a HSDir and get some (but not
> all) of the Onion Addresses however this would assume that your onion
> address ends up in a malicious HSDir (last time I checked it's
> published to 5 different HSDirs?).
v3 onions get rid of this
If you want to keep your onion address hidden, you should run a v3 onion
service. An improvement of v3 over v2 is that Hidden Service Directories can no
longer identify the onion address of the onion-service descriptors they store.
As a result, there is no point in any Tor protocol at which a v3
Tor does NOT have responsibility that the lists make onion sites
good/bad.
Who publishes the lists may have... a part of the responsibility?
Anyway I want the lists!
Then I studied below:
https://www.torproject.org/docs/onion-services
From this, DB (relay?) can get onion service descriptors.
htt
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