Re: [tor-talk] Tor and solidarity against online harassment

anoia about 'looking him up in .mil databases' is enabling an atmosphere of abuse and harassment which has recently been receiving some very suspicious-looking promotion. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D536 PGP fingerprint (RSA): 3611

Re: [tor-talk] Tor and solidarity against online harassment

omment on Pandorast articles where you belong. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D536 PGP fingerprint (RSA): 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5 pgpXdLVpIv4mv.pgp Description: PGP signature -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@l

Re: [tor-talk] NSA TAO Exploit of Whonix Qubes - EGOTISTICALSHALLOT - Martin Peck

> written in their documents, and any knowledge of its authenticity as > being real or fake. > > And if anyone else has any additional information regarding this > EGOTISTICALSHALLOT mention-/-codename-/-program then please > contribute. Um, it appears under the heading &#x

Re: [tor-talk] insufficient hidden service performance is potential de-anonymizing DoS [was Re: [tor-dev] yes hello, internet supervillain here]

e something like the observed pattern. Who would leave an obviously broken crawler producing nothing of interest like that running for such a long time and O(1M) requests, though? An attack designed to look like skiddie bullshit is starting to sound plausible. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint (E

Re: [tor-talk] dutch police crawling hidden servers

idden service > addresses on port 80 alone. > > Of course, it's easier to crawl the 20+ hidden wikis and go from there. I seriously doubt anyone is going to be crawling the 80-bit space of HS key hashes by brute force like that. They'll be running some sort of enumeration attack

Re: [tor-talk] What are use cases made unpleasant by Tor's speed?

or. This might win from authenticated hidden services and then building shorter circuits, since if the client and HS are controlled by the same person, then preserving the client's anonymity *from the HS* rather than an observing third party is less important. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprin

Re: [tor-talk] Pissed off about Blacklists, and what to do?

some behind- the-scenes TLA pressure being applied to the blacklists just like they try to tamper with standards processes. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D536 PGP fingerprint (RSA): 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5 p

Re: [tor-talk] A question about hidden services and tor in general

You'd have the same problem as trying to deanonymize a client from a subverted exit node. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D536 PGP fingerprint (RSA): 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5 pgpDw354q9xU6.pgp De

Re: [tor-talk] A question about hidden services and tor in general

On Sat, Nov 02, 2013 at 05:49:57AM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote: > On Sat, Nov 02, 2013 at 02:45:51AM -0700, Andrea Shepard wrote: > > There's a whole circuit between the HS and the rendezvous point. You'd > > have the same problem as trying to deanonymize a client from

Re: [tor-talk] x.509 for hidden services

you describe and signing a certificate using a different key for the service to use. As for the migration to elliptic curves, I think the most serious problem you'll encounter is that the curve we end up using may not be one that has a standardized OID or is widely supported in X.509 implementati

Re: [tor-talk] VOIP and tor

e legislations where it is illegal to stream > to more than N clients at the same time without a permit. > > FOr Germany, N = 1 AFAIR. > > Andreas Wow, that is absolutely horrifying. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D53

Re: [tor-talk] "Remation" -- joint GCHQ/NSA meeting on Tor

we should examine the bwauth system more closely to be sure the node can't distinguish a bwauth measurement from other connections, though - otherwise they could still manipulate the path selection weights like that. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79

Re: [tor-talk] Tor Weekly News ??? July 3rd, 2013

t idea; I hope these keep getting written. Maybe they'd be worth putting on the blog too? -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D536 PGP fingerprint (RSA): 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5 pgpaRF4gyvzSI.pgp Description:

Re: [tor-talk] Speculation: Next 10 years of Tor?

e effective defense strategies for the DAs if it should become necessary. The hardest problem, I think, is defending against attempts to suppress relays by legal force; the current model of total connectivity means it's trivial to enumerate the IPs of all relays. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerp

Re: [tor-talk] Tragedy of the commons.

place. You shouldn't use iptables to block connections that the exit policy says are permitted; it makes clients get false positive connection failures. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint: 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5 pgpK7hYIST2eJ.pgp Descripti

Re: [tor-talk] NSA supercomputer

the capabilities of publicly known hardware at building quantum computers and can apply Grover's algorithm in a large but not impossible 2^64 operations. [1] Since you can test whether a key is correct in polynomial time using two blocks of ciphertext, search for keys is in NP and bein

Re: [tor-talk] NSA supercomputer

On Fri, Apr 05, 2013 at 04:45:57PM -0700, Andrea Shepard wrote: > [1] Since you can test whether a key is correct in polynomial time using two > blocks of ciphertext, search for keys is in NP and being able to rigorously > prove security for a block cipher would imply P != NP as a

Re: [tor-talk] Private mail server (Was: i saw your response on the Tor talk list)

On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 12:53:10AM +, Julian Yon wrote: > On Sun, 18 Nov 2012 16:18:35 -0800 > Andrea Shepard wrote: > > > On Sat, Nov 17, 2012 at 07:06:32PM +0100, Andreas Krey wrote: > > > > > > Servers doing the former deserve to be walked away from

Re: [tor-talk] Private mail server (Was: i saw your response on the Tor TTFtalk list)

7;re particularly paranoid and up for a little hardware design, put an audio recorder or other suitable monitoring device on a PCIe card with a battery or supercap to charge up from the bus and then keep it running while the machine is shut down. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint: 3611 95A4 0740 ED

Re: [tor-talk] Private mail server (Was: i saw your response on the Tor talk list)

ne from telling you. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint: 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5 pgpLLUqEGPFvB.pgp Description: PGP signature ___ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailm

Re: [tor-talk] Private mail server (Was: i saw your response on the Tor talk list)

delivering to my account and had to unsub/resub. > Well yes; I still like my mail directly appear in my inbox (even though > I admin that I need to poll this address). > > Andreas Yes, local mail spool is nice, and so is being able to just write one's own .procmailrc. -- Andre

Re: [tor-talk] Emulating a VPN service with Tor

hidden services which don't care about keeping the endpoints anonymous from each other, just from everyone else. -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint: 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5 pgpKzjIkXj9wc.pgp Description: PGP signature _

Re: [tor-talk] help us:Korean government started to fine netizen who download child pornography without child

-have-to-exist%E2%80%9D/ [3] http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=213003 [4] http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/15/self-made-kiddie-porn/ -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint: 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5 pgprlRM81vR

Re: [tor-talk] Tor hidden service 'in cloud'

want to find a server motherboard I can use with coreboot and add SSL support on the serial console, and then a challenge-response authentication to boot... -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint: 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5 pgpM5hgERiKCB.pgp Description: PGP signature _

Re: [tor-talk] Will Hidden Service Be Removed?

lient side TCP ("active open" in the RFC's terminology) and a hidden service is server side ("passive open"), what's our analogue of the simultaneous open edge case where the SYNs cross on the wire? :) -- Andrea Shepard PGP fingerprint: 3611 9